SDF Chatter

4,745 readers
180 users here now
founded 2 years ago
ADMINS
SDF

Support for this instance is greatly appreciated at https://sdf.org/support

1
 
 
2
3
1
Driving In Denver, Colorado (drive-around-the-world.blogspot.com)
4
 
 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/33521571

"Ramadan Mubarak!" - "Einen gesegneten Ramadan": Was mit dem Gruß zum islamischen Fastenmonat beginnt, ist keine normale Nachricht, sondern ein Hackerangriff. Im Frühjahr 2025 erhielten Mitglieder des Weltkongresses der Uiguren (WUC) in München eine E-Mail. Wer auf den Link im Text klickte, ließ unbemerkt einen Trojaner auf sein Gerät, der Sicherheitseinstellungen aushebelt - und damit lokale Dateien, IP-Adressen und Identifikationsnummern an die Angreifer übermitteln konnte.

Das "Citizen Lab", eine renommierte Forschungsgruppe an der Universität Toronto, bestätigt: Der gesamte Angriff, einschließlich aller beobachteten Methoden und Taktiken, stimmt mit bekannten Attacken staatlicher chinesischer Hackergruppen überein.

[...]

Auch westliche Geheimdienste schlagen Alarm. Anfang April warnen deutsche, US-amerikanische, britische, kanadische und australische Behörden vor gezielten Cyberangriffen aus China. Ziel sei laut Analyse: die digitale Überwachung chinesischer Minderheiten im Ausland - insbesondere Uiguren, Tibeter, Menschen aus Hongkong und Taiwan.

[...]

Im Rahmen des internationalen Rechercheprojekts "China Targets", an dem auch das ZDF beteiligt ist, haben Reporter über 100 Fälle aus mehr als 20 Ländern dokumentiert, in denen China gezielt Uiguren, Tibeter, Menschen aus Hongkong und Taiwan, Kritikerinnen und Aktivisten im Ausland mit Morddrohungen, Nötigung und Cyberattacken angegriffen hat.

Allein in Deutschland haben ZDF-Reporter mehr als ein Dutzend dieser Fälle recherchiert. Die Betroffenen berichten von Morddrohungen und Online-Attacken - und davon, dass ihre Familien in China unter Druck gesetzt wurden.

[...]

Trotz der wachsenden Bedrohung erfassen deutsche Behörden die Fälle nicht systematisch. Das Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) führt keine gesonderte Statistik zur Verfolgung chinesischer Dissidenten.

Der Verfassungsschutz bleibt zurückhaltend - teilt jedoch auf ZDF-Anfrage mit: "Alle Ausprägungen der Transnationalen Repression (TNR), von (digitaler) Einschüchterung bis hin zu Akten des Staatsterrorismus, verletzen grundlegende Menschenrechte und stellen einen Eingriff in die Souveränität und Sicherheit Deutschlands dar."

[...]

Gleichzeitig pflegt die Bundesregierung ihre Beziehungen zu Peking: China ist einer der wichtigsten Handelspartner Deutschlands. Sogar auf militärischer Ebene arbeiten die Staaten zusammen.

Laut als Verschlusssache eingestuften Bundestagsunterlagen, die dem ZDF vorliegen, fanden im Zeitraum 2014 bis 2024 insgesamt 122 Delegationsbesuche zwischen dem Verteidigungsministerium Deutschlands und chinesischen Streitkräften statt. 80 Angehörige der Streitkräfte wurden in Deutschland ausgebildet.

[...]

5
 
 

If you’ve dealt with reactance, you surely know the two equations for computing inductive and capacitive reactance. But unless you’ve really dug into it, you may only know the formula the way a school kid knows how to find the area of a circle. You have to have a bit of higher math to figure out why the equation is what it is. [Old Hack EE] wanted to figure out why the formulas are what they are, so he dug in and shared what he learned in a video you can see below.

The key to understanding this is simple. The reactance describes the voltage over the current through the element, just like resistance. The difference is that a resistance is just a single number. A reactance is a curve that gives you a different value at different frequencies. That’s because current and voltage are out of phase through a reactance, so it isn’t as easy as just dividing.

If you know calculus, the video will make a lot of sense. If you don’t know calculus, you might have a few moments of panic, but you can make it. If you think of frequency in Hertz as cycles per second, all the 2π you find in these equations convert Hz to “radian frequency” since one cycle per second is really 360 degrees of the sine wave in one second. There are 2π radians in a circle, so it makes sense.

We love developing intuition about things that seem fundamental but have a lot of depth to them that we usually ignore. If you need a refresher or a jump start on calculus, it isn’t as hard as you probably think. Engineers usually use vectors or imaginary numbers to deal with reactance, and we’ve talked about that too, if you want to learn more.


From Blog – Hackaday via this RSS feed

6
 
 

"Ramadan Mubarak!" - "Einen gesegneten Ramadan": Was mit dem Gruß zum islamischen Fastenmonat beginnt, ist keine normale Nachricht, sondern ein Hackerangriff. Im Frühjahr 2025 erhielten Mitglieder des Weltkongresses der Uiguren (WUC) in München eine E-Mail. Wer auf den Link im Text klickte, ließ unbemerkt einen Trojaner auf sein Gerät, der Sicherheitseinstellungen aushebelt - und damit lokale Dateien, IP-Adressen und Identifikationsnummern an die Angreifer übermitteln konnte.

Das "Citizen Lab", eine renommierte Forschungsgruppe an der Universität Toronto, bestätigt: Der gesamte Angriff, einschließlich aller beobachteten Methoden und Taktiken, stimmt mit bekannten Attacken staatlicher chinesischer Hackergruppen überein.

[...]

Auch westliche Geheimdienste schlagen Alarm. Anfang April warnen deutsche, US-amerikanische, britische, kanadische und australische Behörden vor gezielten Cyberangriffen aus China. Ziel sei laut Analyse: die digitale Überwachung chinesischer Minderheiten im Ausland - insbesondere Uiguren, Tibeter, Menschen aus Hongkong und Taiwan.

[...]

Im Rahmen des internationalen Rechercheprojekts "China Targets", an dem auch das ZDF beteiligt ist, haben Reporter über 100 Fälle aus mehr als 20 Ländern dokumentiert, in denen China gezielt Uiguren, Tibeter, Menschen aus Hongkong und Taiwan, Kritikerinnen und Aktivisten im Ausland mit Morddrohungen, Nötigung und Cyberattacken angegriffen hat.

Allein in Deutschland haben ZDF-Reporter mehr als ein Dutzend dieser Fälle recherchiert. Die Betroffenen berichten von Morddrohungen und Online-Attacken - und davon, dass ihre Familien in China unter Druck gesetzt wurden.

[...]

Trotz der wachsenden Bedrohung erfassen deutsche Behörden die Fälle nicht systematisch. Das Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) führt keine gesonderte Statistik zur Verfolgung chinesischer Dissidenten.

Der Verfassungsschutz bleibt zurückhaltend - teilt jedoch auf ZDF-Anfrage mit: "Alle Ausprägungen der Transnationalen Repression (TNR), von (digitaler) Einschüchterung bis hin zu Akten des Staatsterrorismus, verletzen grundlegende Menschenrechte und stellen einen Eingriff in die Souveränität und Sicherheit Deutschlands dar."

[...]

Gleichzeitig pflegt die Bundesregierung ihre Beziehungen zu Peking: China ist einer der wichtigsten Handelspartner Deutschlands. Sogar auf militärischer Ebene arbeiten die Staaten zusammen.

Laut als Verschlusssache eingestuften Bundestagsunterlagen, die dem ZDF vorliegen, fanden im Zeitraum 2014 bis 2024 insgesamt 122 Delegationsbesuche zwischen dem Verteidigungsministerium Deutschlands und chinesischen Streitkräften statt. 80 Angehörige der Streitkräfte wurden in Deutschland ausgebildet.

[...]

7
 
 
8
9
10
11
 
 

debord-tired but i don't wanna dérive

12
13
3
submitted 7 minutes ago* (last edited 7 minutes ago) by Dirt_Owl@hexbear.net to c/badposting@hexbear.net
 
 

YOU CANNOT STOP A TRUE BEANIS PATRIOT.

The WOKE MOD MENACE now knows how big and strong our beanis is. DO NOT STOP HERE, TAKE THE SERVER BACK FOR BEANIS AND FREEDOM.

14
 
 
15
 
 

Diarcesia is a supranational monarchy (as in ruled by a leader titled "Monarch") in a fictional planet which allowed its component country (called a "dieresis") to secede. Diarcesia used to hold considerable influence in the Nankrai Archipelago and once held large parts of Rhozerus and Yechia.

In 1872, Mervin, the last of the expansionist Monarchs was deposed and killed. His successor, Grere, passed democratic reforms that included the end of expansionist wars. Many of the less-willing diereses—mostly overseas and a few in the mainland—seceded without incident. These included the Diarcesian holdings of the Nankrai Archipelago outside Ikuyo, which remained loyal.

That loyalty was to be tested in 2028 when disgruntled elements northern half ("Kita Ikuyo") launched a surprise attack in Kaisura in its bid to free itself from Ikuyo dieresis and Diarcesia as a whole. The event came to be known as the Cutting of Kaisura.

16
 
 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/33521349

Archived

*Key Findings *

  • In March 2025, senior members of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) living in exile were targeted with a spearphishing campaign aimed at delivering Windows-based malware capable of conducting remote surveillance against its targets.
  • The malware was delivered through a trojanized version of a legitimate open source word processing and spell check tool developed to support the use of the Uyghur language. The tool was originally built by a developer known and trusted by the targeted community.
  • Although the malware itself was not particularly advanced, the delivery of the malware was extremely well customized to reach the target population and technical artifacts show that activity related to this campaign began in at least May of 2024.
  • The ruse employed by the attackers replicates a typical pattern: threat actors likely aligned with the Chinese government have repeatedly instrumentalized software and websites that aim to support marginalized and repressed cultures to digitally target these same communities.
  • This campaign shows the ongoing threats of digital transnational repression facing the Uyghur diaspora. Digital transnational repression arises when governments use digital technologies to surveil, intimidate, and silence exiled and diaspora communities.

[...]

The Uyghur diaspora, alongside Tibetans and, more recently, exiles from Hong Kong, is one of China’s primary targets for transnational repression. In their homeland, the Xinjiang region in northwestern China (which most Uyghurs prefer to call by its historical name East Turkestan), Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities are forced to live under a high-tech police state, built on a sweeping system of mass surveillance, mobility controls, and internment camps, as well as a comprehensive control over their cultural and religious life. Chinese authorities follow individuals even outside China, targeting Uyghurs living in exile or in the diaspora with tactics ranging from physical attacks and extradition requests to digital threats and surveillance. China’s extensive campaign of transnational repression targets Uyghurs both on the basis of their ethnic identity and activities. Diaspora members who engage in human rights advocacy and raise international awareness on China’s suppression of their culture and community draw particular attention from Chinese authorities.

[...]

17
 
 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/33521349

Archived

*Key Findings *

  • In March 2025, senior members of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) living in exile were targeted with a spearphishing campaign aimed at delivering Windows-based malware capable of conducting remote surveillance against its targets.
  • The malware was delivered through a trojanized version of a legitimate open source word processing and spell check tool developed to support the use of the Uyghur language. The tool was originally built by a developer known and trusted by the targeted community.
  • Although the malware itself was not particularly advanced, the delivery of the malware was extremely well customized to reach the target population and technical artifacts show that activity related to this campaign began in at least May of 2024.
  • The ruse employed by the attackers replicates a typical pattern: threat actors likely aligned with the Chinese government have repeatedly instrumentalized software and websites that aim to support marginalized and repressed cultures to digitally target these same communities.
  • This campaign shows the ongoing threats of digital transnational repression facing the Uyghur diaspora. Digital transnational repression arises when governments use digital technologies to surveil, intimidate, and silence exiled and diaspora communities.

[...]

The Uyghur diaspora, alongside Tibetans and, more recently, exiles from Hong Kong, is one of China’s primary targets for transnational repression. In their homeland, the Xinjiang region in northwestern China (which most Uyghurs prefer to call by its historical name East Turkestan), Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities are forced to live under a high-tech police state, built on a sweeping system of mass surveillance, mobility controls, and internment camps, as well as a comprehensive control over their cultural and religious life. Chinese authorities follow individuals even outside China, targeting Uyghurs living in exile or in the diaspora with tactics ranging from physical attacks and extradition requests to digital threats and surveillance. China’s extensive campaign of transnational repression targets Uyghurs both on the basis of their ethnic identity and activities. Diaspora members who engage in human rights advocacy and raise international awareness on China’s suppression of their culture and community draw particular attention from Chinese authorities.

[...]

18
 
 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/33521349

Archived

*Key Findings *

  • In March 2025, senior members of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) living in exile were targeted with a spearphishing campaign aimed at delivering Windows-based malware capable of conducting remote surveillance against its targets.
  • The malware was delivered through a trojanized version of a legitimate open source word processing and spell check tool developed to support the use of the Uyghur language. The tool was originally built by a developer known and trusted by the targeted community.
  • Although the malware itself was not particularly advanced, the delivery of the malware was extremely well customized to reach the target population and technical artifacts show that activity related to this campaign began in at least May of 2024.
  • The ruse employed by the attackers replicates a typical pattern: threat actors likely aligned with the Chinese government have repeatedly instrumentalized software and websites that aim to support marginalized and repressed cultures to digitally target these same communities.
  • This campaign shows the ongoing threats of digital transnational repression facing the Uyghur diaspora. Digital transnational repression arises when governments use digital technologies to surveil, intimidate, and silence exiled and diaspora communities.

[...]

The Uyghur diaspora, alongside Tibetans and, more recently, exiles from Hong Kong, is one of China’s primary targets for transnational repression. In their homeland, the Xinjiang region in northwestern China (which most Uyghurs prefer to call by its historical name East Turkestan), Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities are forced to live under a high-tech police state, built on a sweeping system of mass surveillance, mobility controls, and internment camps, as well as a comprehensive control over their cultural and religious life. Chinese authorities follow individuals even outside China, targeting Uyghurs living in exile or in the diaspora with tactics ranging from physical attacks and extradition requests to digital threats and surveillance. China’s extensive campaign of transnational repression targets Uyghurs both on the basis of their ethnic identity and activities. Diaspora members who engage in human rights advocacy and raise international awareness on China’s suppression of their culture and community draw particular attention from Chinese authorities.

[...]

19
 
 

Archived

*Key Findings *

  • In March 2025, senior members of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) living in exile were targeted with a spearphishing campaign aimed at delivering Windows-based malware capable of conducting remote surveillance against its targets.
  • The malware was delivered through a trojanized version of a legitimate open source word processing and spell check tool developed to support the use of the Uyghur language. The tool was originally built by a developer known and trusted by the targeted community.
  • Although the malware itself was not particularly advanced, the delivery of the malware was extremely well customized to reach the target population and technical artifacts show that activity related to this campaign began in at least May of 2024.
  • The ruse employed by the attackers replicates a typical pattern: threat actors likely aligned with the Chinese government have repeatedly instrumentalized software and websites that aim to support marginalized and repressed cultures to digitally target these same communities.
  • This campaign shows the ongoing threats of digital transnational repression facing the Uyghur diaspora. Digital transnational repression arises when governments use digital technologies to surveil, intimidate, and silence exiled and diaspora communities.

[...]

The Uyghur diaspora, alongside Tibetans and, more recently, exiles from Hong Kong, is one of China’s primary targets for transnational repression. In their homeland, the Xinjiang region in northwestern China (which most Uyghurs prefer to call by its historical name East Turkestan), Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities are forced to live under a high-tech police state, built on a sweeping system of mass surveillance, mobility controls, and internment camps, as well as a comprehensive control over their cultural and religious life. Chinese authorities follow individuals even outside China, targeting Uyghurs living in exile or in the diaspora with tactics ranging from physical attacks and extradition requests to digital threats and surveillance. China’s extensive campaign of transnational repression targets Uyghurs both on the basis of their ethnic identity and activities. Diaspora members who engage in human rights advocacy and raise international awareness on China’s suppression of their culture and community draw particular attention from Chinese authorities.

[...]

20
 
 
21
 
 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/33521285

Archived

TDs in Ireland [a member of the Dáil Éireann -the Lower House of the Houses of the Oireachtas elected by the people of Ireland- is commonly referred to as a Teachta Dála (TD) or Deputy] increasingly regard China as an “international security issue” amid complaints about the bullying and intimidation of Irish residents, a journalist has said.

The Chinese State has long taken a different attitude to free speech to Ireland’s and individuals who criticise Beijing can face harsh consequences.

On The Pat Kenny Show, Irish Times journalist Colm Keena told the story of Nuria Zyden - a woman from China’s Uyghur minority.

“She came to Ireland in 2009, is a naturalised Irish citizen, has three Irish born children living here,” he said.

She gets phone calls from the police in Xinjiang because they’re not happy with her Uyghur activities here [in Ireland] on behalf of the Uyghur community.

[...]

“[They would] ring people and [tell them], ‘I want you to come back to China to face charges,’” he said.

“Then, if you weren’t inclined to do that, then something bad might happen to family members back in China.”

[...]

A report by a human rights group Safeguard Defenders concluded that sometimes such tactics work, with at least one Chinese person returning from Ireland to China to face charges.

“They published a new report last year, the same NGO, and they looked at the history of this activity,” Mr Keena said.

“One of the reports that was in it is a news report from China about a fella in Ireland from Fujian living in Dublin who was wanted by police back in Fujian.

He got 19 telephone calls from police in Fujian saying, ‘We’ve been visiting your family.’

“He eventually agreed to return to China to face charges and it was all sub-diplomatic, not done through Interpol or anything like that.

“It was reported in Chinese media because, I suppose, the Chinese authorities want people to know this is happening.”

[...]

A sizable number of Ireland’s Chinese diaspora come from Fujian province and the local police force has even set up a centre on Dublin’s Capel Street to keep an eye on them.

“It was created in, I suppose you could say, in a sub-diplomatic kind of way,” Mr Keena said.

22
 
 

Archived

TDs in Ireland [a member of the Dáil Éireann -the Lower House of the Houses of the Oireachtas elected by the people of Ireland- is commonly referred to as a Teachta Dála (TD) or Deputy] increasingly regard China as an “international security issue” amid complaints about the bullying and intimidation of Irish residents, a journalist has said.

The Chinese State has long taken a different attitude to free speech to Ireland’s and individuals who criticise Beijing can face harsh consequences.

On The Pat Kenny Show, Irish Times journalist Colm Keena told the story of Nuria Zyden - a woman from China’s Uyghur minority.

“She came to Ireland in 2009, is a naturalised Irish citizen, has three Irish born children living here,” he said.

She gets phone calls from the police in Xinjiang because they’re not happy with her Uyghur activities here [in Ireland] on behalf of the Uyghur community.

[...]

“[They would] ring people and [tell them], ‘I want you to come back to China to face charges,’” he said.

“Then, if you weren’t inclined to do that, then something bad might happen to family members back in China.”

[...]

A report by a human rights group Safeguard Defenders concluded that sometimes such tactics work, with at least one Chinese person returning from Ireland to China to face charges.

“They published a new report last year, the same NGO, and they looked at the history of this activity,” Mr Keena said.

“One of the reports that was in it is a news report from China about a fella in Ireland from Fujian living in Dublin who was wanted by police back in Fujian.

He got 19 telephone calls from police in Fujian saying, ‘We’ve been visiting your family.’

“He eventually agreed to return to China to face charges and it was all sub-diplomatic, not done through Interpol or anything like that.

“It was reported in Chinese media because, I suppose, the Chinese authorities want people to know this is happening.”

[...]

A sizable number of Ireland’s Chinese diaspora come from Fujian province and the local police force has even set up a centre on Dublin’s Capel Street to keep an eye on them.

“It was created in, I suppose you could say, in a sub-diplomatic kind of way,” Mr Keena said.

23
24
25
view more: next ›