Mutually Assured Education

This article examines the growing trend of online platform migration and technology non-use, driven by dissatisfaction with existing platforms and the search for safer, more inclusive digital spaces, reshaping social connections and digital ecosystems.

NOTE: It is restricted access unfortunately.

The digital future of Europe needs a democratic foundation, and a newly released policy study is pointing the way forward. “Time to Build a European Digital Ecosystem – Recommendations for the EU’s Digital Policy,” published by FEPS Europe and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, offers bold ideas for strengthening Europe’s digital sovereignty and public sphere.

We outline a theory of algorithmic attention rents in digital aggregator platforms. We explore the way that as platforms grow, they become increasingly capable of extracting rents from a variety of actors in their ecosystems – users, suppliers, and advertisers – through their algorithmic control over user attention. We focus our analysis on advertising business models, in which attention harvested from users is monetized by reselling the attention to suppliers or other advertisers, though we believe the theory has relevance to other online business models as well. We argue that regulations should mandate the disclosure of the operating metrics that platforms use to allocate user attention and shape the “free” side of their marketplace, as well as details on how that attention is monetized.

In a capitalist world, the often-overlooked systems of technical standards offer a rare example of economic collaboration that prioritizes the public good over profit.

Julie E. Cohen (Georgetown University Law Center) argues that understanding tech oligarchy is now an urgent priority in political economy

Interoperability plays an important role in the digital economy and can be a key driver of innovation, competition, choice and economic growth. However, effective interoperability can be hindered by certain barriers, and is often not implemented to its full potential, including in mobile ecosystems.

This report develops a general framework to promote the adoption of hardware interoperability and makes specific recommendations for the effective implementation of Article 6(7) of the Digital Markets Act (DMA).

Wi-Fi-based Positioning Systems (WPSes) are used by modern mobile devices to learn their position using nearby Wi-Fi access points as landmarks. In this work, we show that Apple’s WPS can be abused to create a privacy threat on a global scale. We present an attack that allows an unprivileged attacker to amass a worldwide snapshot of Wi-Fi BSSID geolocations in only a matter of days. Our attack makes few assumptions, merely exploiting the fact that there are relatively few dense regions of allocated MAC address space. Applying this technique over the course of a year, we learned the precise locations of over 2 billion BSSIDs around the world.The privacy implications of such massive datasets become more stark when taken longitudinally, allowing the attacker to track devices’ movements. While most Wi-Fi access points do not move for long periods of time, many devices—like compact travel routers—are specifically designed to be mobile.We present several case studies that demonstrate the types of attacks on privacy that Apple’s WPS enables: We track devices moving in and out of war zones (specifically Ukraine and Gaza), the effects of natural disasters (specifically the fires in Maui), and the possibility of targeted individual tracking by proxy—all by remotely geolocating wireless access points.We provide recommendations to WPS operators and Wi-Fi access point manufacturers to enhance the privacy of hundreds of millions of users worldwide. Finally, we detail our efforts at responsibly disclosing this privacy vulnerability, and outline some mitigations that Apple and Wi-Fi access point manufacturers have implemented both independently and as a result of our work.

I've been going on about this book to people for almost a year, a must-read! Open access.

How the innate physical properties of different technologies influence the strategy and structure of the organizations implementing the technologies, the sequel to Design Rules: The Power of Modularity.

In Design Rules, volume 2, Carliss Baldwin offers a comprehensive view of the digital economy by putting forth an original theory that explains how technology shapes organizations in a market economy. The theory claims that complementarities arising from the physical nature of technologies can be arrayed on a spectrum ranging from strong to very weak. Two basic types of technologies in turn exhibit different degrees of complementarity between their internal components. Flow production technologies, which are found in steel mills and auto factories, specify a series of steps, each of which is essential to the final product. In contrast, platform technologies, which are characteristic of computer hardware, software, and networks, are modular systems designed to provide options.

Baldwin then investigates the dynamics of strategy for firms in platform ecosystems. Such firms create value by solving technical bottlenecks—technical barriers to performance that arise in different parts of the system as it evolves. They capture value by controlling and defending strategic bottlenecks—components that are (1) essential to the functioning of some part of the system; (2) unique; and (3) controlled by a profit-seeking enterprise. Strategic bottlenecks can be acquired by solving technical bottlenecks. They can be destroyed via tactics such as substitution, reverse engineering, bypassing the bottleneck, and enveloping a smaller bottleneck within a larger one. Strategy in platform ecosystems can thus be viewed as the effective management of technical and strategic bottlenecks within a modular technical system.

This Chapter investigates how the Internet has been, and is currently, governed. It examines multistakeholderism as one of the dominant approaches to Internet governance: the concept of multilateral collaboration and decision-making as to the content and infrastructure of the Internet. It identifies pitfalls with this model, including the hegemonic impulses of participants and the creep of private sector power caused by large technology companies. It then interrogates whether the emerging concept of digital constitutionalism can remedy multistakeholderism's pitfalls in the age of the large technology company. The Chapter sets out areas of tension that proponents of digital constitutionalism will need to resolve if it is indeed to push back against the twin threats of private sector power and the emerging sovereigntist impulses of authoritarian states.

Data is a contextual phenomenon. It reflects the social and material context from which it is derived and in which it is generated. It embeds the purposes, assumptions and rationales of those who produce, collect, use, share and monetize it. In the AI and digital platform economy, data's role is primarily infrastructural. Its core uses are internal to companies. Data only rarely serves as a medium of exchange or commodity, and more frequently serves to profile users, train models, produce predictions, bundle and extend product capabilities which in turn are sold to advertisers and other customers. Insofar as they focus on the former, many technical, economic and legal attempts at defining data have inspired reductive policy efforts that include data protection, data ownership and limited data sharing remedies. This paper argues that understanding data as part of infrastructural pipelines can have significant conceptual and policy implications, and can redirect the way privacy, property and antitrust experts understand and govern data. This argument becomes more salient as market actors and regulators grapple with the catalyzing effects of neural networks and generative AI models on digital markets. In antitrust and competition law especially, regulators are consciously adopting a view of data as an infrastructural input into AI and other digital markets. Treating data as an input over which certain firms have competitive advantages can have significant implications for nascent AI markets, and yet the views in antitrust remain too narrow. Understanding data infrastructurally means viewing it not only as a critical input but also as inseparable from other material digital resources such as protocols, algorithms, semiconductors, and platform interfaces; as having important collective functions; and as calling for public interest regulation. Understanding data as infrastructure can move us past limited legal efforts and remedial solutions such as data separations, data sharing, and individual controls, and help reorient how data is produced, stored and managed toward public uses.

Governments have begun to view AI compute infrastructures, including advanced AI chips, as a geostrategic resource. This is partly because “compute governance” is believed to be emerging as an important tool for governing AI systems. In this governance model, states that host AI compute capacity within their territorial jurisdictions are likely to be better placed to impose their rules on AI systems than states that do not. In this study, we provide the first attempt at mapping the global geography of public cloud GPU compute, one particularly important category of AI compute infrastructure. Using a census of hyperscale cloud providers’ cloud regions, we observe that the world is divided into “Compute North” countries that host AI compute relevant for AI development (ie. training), “Compute South” countries whose AI compute is more relevant for AI deployment (ie. running inferencing), and “Compute Desert” countries that host no public cloud AI compute at all. We generate potential explanations for the results using expert interviews, discuss the implications to AI governance and technology geopolitics, and consider possible future trajectories.

Brown, M. A., Gruen, A., Maldoff, G., Messing, S., Sanderson, Z., & Zimmer, M. (2024). Web Scraping for Research: Legal, Ethical, Institutional, and Scientific Considerations (arXiv:2410.23432). arXiv. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2410.23432

A nice overview of the different considerations, with recommendations, for researchers who may want to use web scraping.

As scraping for large-scale AI training becomes more common, scraping for other research purposes may become more challenging.

@mae

This report aims to go behind the headlines and beyond the simplified facial recognition (FR) debate that we see in so much of the media today. The report highlights the types of FR in use by policing and others around the world, and explores the big debates around that use. We interviewed 34 stakeholders – including policing practitioners, academics, regulators and suppliers – to share their views and expertise on this complex issue. This analysis includes an insightful foreword from National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) Chair Chief Constable Gavin Stephens.

Digital platforms have disrupted many sectors but have not yet visibly transformed highly regulated industries. This study of Big Tech entry in healthcare and education explores how platforms have begun to enter highly regulated industries systematically and effectively. It presents a four-stage process model of platform entry, which we term as “digital colonization.” This involves provision of data infrastructure services to regulated incumbents; data capture in the highly regulated industry; provision of data-driven insights; and design and commercialization of new products and services. The article clarifies platforms’ sources of competitive advantage in highly regulated industries and concludes with managerial and policy recommendations.

Policymakers face increased pressure to regulate digital markets to balance competition, privacy, and innovation. While traditional policy literature views regulation as a technical problem requiring specific interventions, there is significant debate about the appropriate solutions. This analysis synthesizes both technocratic and political perspectives, proposing a framework to predict effective regulatory remedies by examining common market structures.

Examining how U.S. regulation of media infrastructure over the past century—spanning broadband, digital platforms, and data centers—has eroded civil liberties and democratic principles, this book interweaves historical and interdisciplinary perspectives to elucidate how policies from an analog era continue to shape today’s digital governance. The work fosters a comprehensive understanding of the policy challenges faced and inspires potential restorative actions to realign infrastructure regulation with public interest and equity.

This talk analyzes how the US, China, and the EU shape the global digital order. The speaker examines different regulatory models: US market-driven, Chinese state-driven, and EU rights-driven approaches. The discussion highlighted shifts in tech regulation, including AI governance, geopolitical impacts, and the rise of digital sovereignty. Despite challenges, the talk emphasized the importance of democratic governance over critical tech policy decisions.

Abstract

Reinforced by the technological decoupling and the related battle for technological supremacy between the United States and China, telecommunication technology has become increasingly politicised. As the functioning of global telecommunication technology relies on interoperability and compatibility, government and private actors have strong incentives to shape the underlying standards in their economic and political interests. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and its Members play a central role in setting these standards for future telecommunication technology. Despite the ITU's importance in this field, relatively little is known about the organisation's work on standardisation and the actors behind it. This Policy Insight introduces a new data set on the involvement of over 800 government and private actors and their almost 50,000 contributions to ITU standardisation processes between 2000 and 2022. A descriptive analysis of the data set illustrates that particularly Chinese actors—Huawei, ZTE, China Mobile, China Unicom and China Telecom—have been actively driving the ITU's standardisation processes in the areas of transport, access and home but also future networks and cloud. The data set introduced here is envisaged as a source which allows researchers to study the reasons and implications for certain actors' involvement in the international standardisation of telecommunication and digitalisation.

This Article challenges the common view that more stringent regulation of the digital economy inevitably compromises innovation and undermines technological progress. This view, vigorously advocated by the tech industry, has shaped the public discourse in the United States, where the country’s thriving tech economy is often associated with a staunch commitment to free markets. U.S. lawmakers have also traditionally embraced this perspective, which explains their hesitancy to regulate the tech industry to date. The European Union has chosen another path, regulating the digital economy with stringent data privacy, antitrust, content moderation, and other digital regulations designed to shape the evolution of the tech economy toward European values around digital rights and fairness. According to the EU’s critics, this far-reaching tech regulation has come at the cost of innovation, explaining the EU’s inability to nurture tech companies and compete with the United States and China in the tech race. However, this Article argues that the association between digital regulation and technological progress is considerably more complex than what the public conversation, U.S. lawmakers, tech companies, and several scholars have suggested to date. For this reason, the existing technological gap between the United States and the EU should not be attributed to the laxity of American laws and the stringency of European digital regulation. Instead, this Article shows there are more foundational features of the American legal and technological ecosystem that have paved the way for U.S. tech companies’ rise to global prominence—features that the EU has not been able to replicate to date. By severing tech regulation from its allegedly adverse effect on innovation, this Article seeks to advance a more productive scholarly conversation on the costs and benefits of digital regulation. It also directs governments deliberating tech policy away from a false choice between regulation and innovation while drawing their attention to a broader set of legal and institutional reforms that are necessary for tech companies to innovate and for digital economies and societies to thrive.

Our current policy and research focus on artificial intelligence (AI) needs a paradigmatic shift in order to regulate technology effectively. It is evident that AI-based systems and services grab the attention of policymakers and researchers in light of recent regulatory efforts, like the EU AI Act and subsequent public interest technology initiatives focusing on AI (Züger & Asghari, 2023). While these initiatives have their merits, they end up narrowly focusing efforts on the latest trends in digitalisation. We argue that this approach leaves untouched the engineered environments in which digital services are produced, thereby undermining efforts to regulate AI and to ensure that AI-based services serve the public interest. Even when policymakers consider how digital services are produced, they assume that AI is captured by a few cloud companies (Cobbe, 2024; Vipra & West, 2023), when, in fact, AI is a product of these environments. If policymakers fail to recognise and tackle issues stemming from AI’s production environments, their focus on AI may be misguided. Accordingly, we argue that policy and research should shift their regulatory focus from AI to its production environments.

The White Paper sets out an initial high-level framework for states, policymakers, civil society, workers and others to dismantle Big Tech's concentrated power over digital ecosystems, and to encourage the emergence of a fair digital economy that is open, decentralised, democratic and serves the common good.

The Green Web Foundation tackles "How power consolidation of digital infrastructures threatens our democracies-and what we can do about it"