Hotznplotzn

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/55198015

Beijing, Moscow Targeting Key UN Posts.

Archived

[...]

Some of the funding China is opposing for 2026-2027 is for the UN support office to assist the Gang Suppression Force. It is a non-UN security force that a small group of countries established to work with the Haitian National Police and armed forces to counter criminal groups that have taken control of much of Haiti.

[...]

Since 2017, Human Rights Watch has documented how China and Russia—two countries with abysmal human rights records—have led a sustained push to cut as many UN human rights posts as possible. Backed by Egypt, Iran, North Korea, and others, they have also sought to defund multiple UN rights investigations around the world.

In addition to Haiti, China is currently seeking to defund UN human rights posts in Syria, South Sudan, and Democratic Republic of Congo. Russia is supporting China’s efforts in the peacekeeping budget negotiations, which are scheduled to conclude this week.

[...]

China’s defunding efforts come after the UN leadership was forced to slash UN spending due to a liquidity crisis largely caused by the US withholding billions of dollars of obligatory UN dues and China paying late.

Delegations from Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere are resisting China’s efforts.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/55198015

Beijing, Moscow Targeting Key UN Posts.

Archived

[...]

Some of the funding China is opposing for 2026-2027 is for the UN support office to assist the Gang Suppression Force. It is a non-UN security force that a small group of countries established to work with the Haitian National Police and armed forces to counter criminal groups that have taken control of much of Haiti.

[...]

Since 2017, Human Rights Watch has documented how China and Russia—two countries with abysmal human rights records—have led a sustained push to cut as many UN human rights posts as possible. Backed by Egypt, Iran, North Korea, and others, they have also sought to defund multiple UN rights investigations around the world.

In addition to Haiti, China is currently seeking to defund UN human rights posts in Syria, South Sudan, and Democratic Republic of Congo. Russia is supporting China’s efforts in the peacekeeping budget negotiations, which are scheduled to conclude this week.

[...]

China’s defunding efforts come after the UN leadership was forced to slash UN spending due to a liquidity crisis largely caused by the US withholding billions of dollars of obligatory UN dues and China paying late.

Delegations from Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere are resisting China’s efforts.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/55198015

Beijing, Moscow Targeting Key UN Posts.

Archived

[...]

Some of the funding China is opposing for 2026-2027 is for the UN support office to assist the Gang Suppression Force. It is a non-UN security force that a small group of countries established to work with the Haitian National Police and armed forces to counter criminal groups that have taken control of much of Haiti.

[...]

Since 2017, Human Rights Watch has documented how China and Russia—two countries with abysmal human rights records—have led a sustained push to cut as many UN human rights posts as possible. Backed by Egypt, Iran, North Korea, and others, they have also sought to defund multiple UN rights investigations around the world.

In addition to Haiti, China is currently seeking to defund UN human rights posts in Syria, South Sudan, and Democratic Republic of Congo. Russia is supporting China’s efforts in the peacekeeping budget negotiations, which are scheduled to conclude this week.

[...]

China’s defunding efforts come after the UN leadership was forced to slash UN spending due to a liquidity crisis largely caused by the US withholding billions of dollars of obligatory UN dues and China paying late.

Delegations from Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere are resisting China’s efforts.

[...]

Beijing, Moscow Targeting Key UN Posts.

Archived

[...]

Some of the funding China is opposing for 2026-2027 is for the UN support office to assist the Gang Suppression Force. It is a non-UN security force that a small group of countries established to work with the Haitian National Police and armed forces to counter criminal groups that have taken control of much of Haiti.

[...]

Since 2017, Human Rights Watch has documented how China and Russia—two countries with abysmal human rights records—have led a sustained push to cut as many UN human rights posts as possible. Backed by Egypt, Iran, North Korea, and others, they have also sought to defund multiple UN rights investigations around the world.

In addition to Haiti, China is currently seeking to defund UN human rights posts in Syria, South Sudan, and Democratic Republic of Congo. Russia is supporting China’s efforts in the peacekeeping budget negotiations, which are scheduled to conclude this week.

[...]

China’s defunding efforts come after the UN leadership was forced to slash UN spending due to a liquidity crisis largely caused by the US withholding billions of dollars of obligatory UN dues and China paying late.

Delegations from Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere are resisting China’s efforts.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/55162696

[Op-ed by César Eduardo Santos, researcher at the Expediente Abierto center (www.expedienteabierto.org). Specialized in the authoritarian influence of China and Russia in Latin America.]

Archived

[...]

Cooperation between China and [Latin American] countries should not be understood merely as an exchange of resources or investments, but as a broader web of institutional, technological, and ideational interactions that, in certain contexts, may contribute to the reproduction of authoritarian dynamics, as highlighted in the report Authoritarianism with Chinese Characteristics by the think tank Expediente Abierto.

[...]

People-to-people exchanges constitute one of the most visible—and at the same time most underestimated—instruments of China’s international projection. On the surface, these mechanisms aim to foster understanding between societies. However, they form an integral part of the [Chinese Communist Party] CCP’s foreign policy and operate under strong state control, building networks of influence that connect foreign actors with China’s political apparatus.

In Latin America, and particularly in Central America, these exchanges have expanded beyond cultural or academic spheres to include sensitive sectors of the state apparatus. Delegations of police officers, military personnel, judges, and prosecutors have participated in training programs in China, where they are exposed to operational doctrines and governance models related to public order control and the administration of justice.

[...]

In Nicaragua, officials from the National Police have held bilateral meetings with China’s Ministry of Public Security and participated in training programs that include instruction in riot-control tactics, the use of drones in police operations, criminal investigation techniques, and dignitary protection. This cooperation also extends to participation in international security platforms led by China.

Similarly, in 2024, Chinese Ambassador Zhang Yanhui, accompanied by newly appointed Defense Attaché Dai Zenggang, held an official meeting with El Salvador’s Minister of Defense, during which they discussed expanding cooperation in key defense areas, signaling a deepening of military ties between the two countries. These interactions go beyond the defense sphere and extend into the legal and prosecutorial domains. In 2023, Supreme Court President Óscar López met in Beijing with Zhang Jun, President of China’s Supreme People’s Court, where they signed judicial cooperation agreements. Subsequently, in 2024, Attorney General Rodolfo Delgado met with his Chinese counterpart to strengthen cooperation between their respective justice institutions.

A similar pattern can be observed in Honduras, where Supreme Court President Rebeca Ráquel Obando participated in a judicial cooperation forum organized by China in Quanzhou in 2023 and met with Chinese Ambassador Yu Bo in 2024 to expand bilateral legal cooperation. Such exchanges have facilitated the circulation of experiences related to judicial digitalization, criminal management, and the construction of the so-called “rule of law,” in a context where the executive branch has expanded its control over the judiciary.

[...]

In Nicaragua, the Sandinista government has promoted systems such as SINAREM (National Emergency Response System) with Chinese assistance. This type of technological architecture, based on centralized data and integrated surveillance, has obvious applications for social control.

[...]

Likewise, the National Library of San Salvador, built by Chinese companies, incorporates facial recognition systems and automated services. In addition, Salvadoran officials have visited companies such as Huawei, China Mobile, and BYD as part of training programs in China, where they have been exposed to 5G technologies, connectivity platforms, and digital governance solutions. Although presented under the banner of modernization, these tools expand the state’s capacity to manage data and monitor public spaces.

[...]

Honduran officials have participated in “smart city” programs in China, where they have been exposed to “urban brain” systems based on big data, sensors, and integrated surveillance. Domestically, the national 911 emergency system—which includes license plate recognition and thousands of interconnected cameras—has been linked to technologies associated with Huawei and other related companies. Although presented as public security infrastructure, this system provides the foundations for broader monitoring capabilities.

[...]

The significance of Chinese technology lies not only in its potential for overt repression. As recent analyses suggest, these tools enable more subtle and persistent forms of control, expanding not only the state’s capacity to repress but also its ability to govern in a preventive manner.

[...]

The dynamics described above invite a reconsideration of China’s presence in Central America. Beyond infrastructure and trade, the evidence points to a broader framework of cooperation. On the one hand, China expands its influence within strategic sectors of the state apparatus, builds networks with ruling elites, and promotes the adoption of technological standards and regulatory frameworks aligned with its global interests. On the other hand, recipient regimes gain access to resources, technologies, and expertise that can strengthen their control capacities, reduce their dependence on Western partners, and legitimize their illiberal governing practices.

[...]

In this sense, authoritarian cooperation should be understood not as an external imposition but as a relational process shaped by converging interests and specific political trajectories. The key question, therefore, is not whether China is “exporting authoritarianism,” but rather how its mechanisms of cooperation interact with domestic dynamics that are already moving in that direction.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/55161437

Over the past few years, millions of new electric vehicles have hit the roads in China, with the majority adopted in its richer cities.

While electric vehicles have huge benefits compared with the carbon emissions from petrol- and diesel-fueled cars, the total amount of electricity needed to run so many vehicles is significant.

This drives up total electricity generation across the shared grid network, affecting poorer, fossil fuel-dependent cities—which in turn endure higher pollution from the carbon emissions created in generating that power, as well as the additional cost of measures to mitigate that pollution.

The researchers say their findings, published in Nature Cities, could apply to richer and poorer cities in countries worldwide.

[...]

Senior author Professor Zhifu Mi (UCL Bartlett School of Sustainable Construction) said, "Electric vehicles are one of the most important pathways for decarbonizing transport, and their rapid growth in China is a major opportunity to reduce national emissions.

"However, our study shows that the carbon benefits of electric vehicles depend strongly on the power system.

"Decarbonizing the grid must go hand in hand with promoting electric vehicles, while policies should ensure that less developed cities do not bear disproportionate carbon burdens."

[...]

The researchers found that the growing popularity of electric vehicles is increasing power demand in the richest cities that have been the biggest adopters.

However, through the interconnected power grid, much of their surging electricity demand is met by power produced in nearby less developed cities that still rely on coal or other fossil fuels, minimizing the carbon-reduction impact of electric vehicles and putting a greater environmental and economic burden on these poorer cities.

[...]

The researchers found that while it appeared the country's 20 most economically advanced cities accounted for 80% of carbon emission reductions, 136 of the cities they analyzed (nearly 50%) have become 'carbon importers'—cities that have increased their carbon footprint by shouldering the power generation burden for electric vehicles used elsewhere.

[...]

There have been significant economic disparities in the adoption of electric vehicles. About 75% of China's electric vehicles were concentrated in just 10% of cities in 2020, predominantly those with the highest GDP per capita. This means the cities adopting electric vehicles fastest are generally not the same cities producing the electricity and carbon emissions.

Mi said, "Electric vehicles are necessary, but not sufficient on their own. To maximize their climate benefits, we need cleaner power grids, better carbon accounting, and compensation or support mechanisms for cities that bear transferred emissions."

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/55162696

[Op-ed by César Eduardo Santos, researcher at the Expediente Abierto center (www.expedienteabierto.org). Specialized in the authoritarian influence of China and Russia in Latin America.]

Archived

[...]

Cooperation between China and [Latin American] countries should not be understood merely as an exchange of resources or investments, but as a broader web of institutional, technological, and ideational interactions that, in certain contexts, may contribute to the reproduction of authoritarian dynamics, as highlighted in the report Authoritarianism with Chinese Characteristics by the think tank Expediente Abierto.

[...]

People-to-people exchanges constitute one of the most visible—and at the same time most underestimated—instruments of China’s international projection. On the surface, these mechanisms aim to foster understanding between societies. However, they form an integral part of the [Chinese Communist Party] CCP’s foreign policy and operate under strong state control, building networks of influence that connect foreign actors with China’s political apparatus.

In Latin America, and particularly in Central America, these exchanges have expanded beyond cultural or academic spheres to include sensitive sectors of the state apparatus. Delegations of police officers, military personnel, judges, and prosecutors have participated in training programs in China, where they are exposed to operational doctrines and governance models related to public order control and the administration of justice.

[...]

In Nicaragua, officials from the National Police have held bilateral meetings with China’s Ministry of Public Security and participated in training programs that include instruction in riot-control tactics, the use of drones in police operations, criminal investigation techniques, and dignitary protection. This cooperation also extends to participation in international security platforms led by China.

Similarly, in 2024, Chinese Ambassador Zhang Yanhui, accompanied by newly appointed Defense Attaché Dai Zenggang, held an official meeting with El Salvador’s Minister of Defense, during which they discussed expanding cooperation in key defense areas, signaling a deepening of military ties between the two countries. These interactions go beyond the defense sphere and extend into the legal and prosecutorial domains. In 2023, Supreme Court President Óscar López met in Beijing with Zhang Jun, President of China’s Supreme People’s Court, where they signed judicial cooperation agreements. Subsequently, in 2024, Attorney General Rodolfo Delgado met with his Chinese counterpart to strengthen cooperation between their respective justice institutions.

A similar pattern can be observed in Honduras, where Supreme Court President Rebeca Ráquel Obando participated in a judicial cooperation forum organized by China in Quanzhou in 2023 and met with Chinese Ambassador Yu Bo in 2024 to expand bilateral legal cooperation. Such exchanges have facilitated the circulation of experiences related to judicial digitalization, criminal management, and the construction of the so-called “rule of law,” in a context where the executive branch has expanded its control over the judiciary.

[...]

In Nicaragua, the Sandinista government has promoted systems such as SINAREM (National Emergency Response System) with Chinese assistance. This type of technological architecture, based on centralized data and integrated surveillance, has obvious applications for social control.

[...]

Likewise, the National Library of San Salvador, built by Chinese companies, incorporates facial recognition systems and automated services. In addition, Salvadoran officials have visited companies such as Huawei, China Mobile, and BYD as part of training programs in China, where they have been exposed to 5G technologies, connectivity platforms, and digital governance solutions. Although presented under the banner of modernization, these tools expand the state’s capacity to manage data and monitor public spaces.

[...]

Honduran officials have participated in “smart city” programs in China, where they have been exposed to “urban brain” systems based on big data, sensors, and integrated surveillance. Domestically, the national 911 emergency system—which includes license plate recognition and thousands of interconnected cameras—has been linked to technologies associated with Huawei and other related companies. Although presented as public security infrastructure, this system provides the foundations for broader monitoring capabilities.

[...]

The significance of Chinese technology lies not only in its potential for overt repression. As recent analyses suggest, these tools enable more subtle and persistent forms of control, expanding not only the state’s capacity to repress but also its ability to govern in a preventive manner.

[...]

The dynamics described above invite a reconsideration of China’s presence in Central America. Beyond infrastructure and trade, the evidence points to a broader framework of cooperation. On the one hand, China expands its influence within strategic sectors of the state apparatus, builds networks with ruling elites, and promotes the adoption of technological standards and regulatory frameworks aligned with its global interests. On the other hand, recipient regimes gain access to resources, technologies, and expertise that can strengthen their control capacities, reduce their dependence on Western partners, and legitimize their illiberal governing practices.

[...]

In this sense, authoritarian cooperation should be understood not as an external imposition but as a relational process shaped by converging interests and specific political trajectories. The key question, therefore, is not whether China is “exporting authoritarianism,” but rather how its mechanisms of cooperation interact with domestic dynamics that are already moving in that direction.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/55161437

Over the past few years, millions of new electric vehicles have hit the roads in China, with the majority adopted in its richer cities.

While electric vehicles have huge benefits compared with the carbon emissions from petrol- and diesel-fueled cars, the total amount of electricity needed to run so many vehicles is significant.

This drives up total electricity generation across the shared grid network, affecting poorer, fossil fuel-dependent cities—which in turn endure higher pollution from the carbon emissions created in generating that power, as well as the additional cost of measures to mitigate that pollution.

The researchers say their findings, published in Nature Cities, could apply to richer and poorer cities in countries worldwide.

[...]

Senior author Professor Zhifu Mi (UCL Bartlett School of Sustainable Construction) said, "Electric vehicles are one of the most important pathways for decarbonizing transport, and their rapid growth in China is a major opportunity to reduce national emissions.

"However, our study shows that the carbon benefits of electric vehicles depend strongly on the power system.

"Decarbonizing the grid must go hand in hand with promoting electric vehicles, while policies should ensure that less developed cities do not bear disproportionate carbon burdens."

[...]

The researchers found that the growing popularity of electric vehicles is increasing power demand in the richest cities that have been the biggest adopters.

However, through the interconnected power grid, much of their surging electricity demand is met by power produced in nearby less developed cities that still rely on coal or other fossil fuels, minimizing the carbon-reduction impact of electric vehicles and putting a greater environmental and economic burden on these poorer cities.

[...]

The researchers found that while it appeared the country's 20 most economically advanced cities accounted for 80% of carbon emission reductions, 136 of the cities they analyzed (nearly 50%) have become 'carbon importers'—cities that have increased their carbon footprint by shouldering the power generation burden for electric vehicles used elsewhere.

[...]

There have been significant economic disparities in the adoption of electric vehicles. About 75% of China's electric vehicles were concentrated in just 10% of cities in 2020, predominantly those with the highest GDP per capita. This means the cities adopting electric vehicles fastest are generally not the same cities producing the electricity and carbon emissions.

Mi said, "Electric vehicles are necessary, but not sufficient on their own. To maximize their climate benefits, we need cleaner power grids, better carbon accounting, and compensation or support mechanisms for cities that bear transferred emissions."

[...]

[Op-ed by César Eduardo Santos, researcher at the Expediente Abierto center (www.expedienteabierto.org). Specialized in the authoritarian influence of China and Russia in Latin America.]

Archived

[...]

Cooperation between China and [Latin American] countries should not be understood merely as an exchange of resources or investments, but as a broader web of institutional, technological, and ideational interactions that, in certain contexts, may contribute to the reproduction of authoritarian dynamics, as highlighted in the report Authoritarianism with Chinese Characteristics by the think tank Expediente Abierto.

[...]

People-to-people exchanges constitute one of the most visible—and at the same time most underestimated—instruments of China’s international projection. On the surface, these mechanisms aim to foster understanding between societies. However, they form an integral part of the [Chinese Communist Party] CCP’s foreign policy and operate under strong state control, building networks of influence that connect foreign actors with China’s political apparatus.

In Latin America, and particularly in Central America, these exchanges have expanded beyond cultural or academic spheres to include sensitive sectors of the state apparatus. Delegations of police officers, military personnel, judges, and prosecutors have participated in training programs in China, where they are exposed to operational doctrines and governance models related to public order control and the administration of justice.

[...]

In Nicaragua, officials from the National Police have held bilateral meetings with China’s Ministry of Public Security and participated in training programs that include instruction in riot-control tactics, the use of drones in police operations, criminal investigation techniques, and dignitary protection. This cooperation also extends to participation in international security platforms led by China.

Similarly, in 2024, Chinese Ambassador Zhang Yanhui, accompanied by newly appointed Defense Attaché Dai Zenggang, held an official meeting with El Salvador’s Minister of Defense, during which they discussed expanding cooperation in key defense areas, signaling a deepening of military ties between the two countries. These interactions go beyond the defense sphere and extend into the legal and prosecutorial domains. In 2023, Supreme Court President Óscar López met in Beijing with Zhang Jun, President of China’s Supreme People’s Court, where they signed judicial cooperation agreements. Subsequently, in 2024, Attorney General Rodolfo Delgado met with his Chinese counterpart to strengthen cooperation between their respective justice institutions.

A similar pattern can be observed in Honduras, where Supreme Court President Rebeca Ráquel Obando participated in a judicial cooperation forum organized by China in Quanzhou in 2023 and met with Chinese Ambassador Yu Bo in 2024 to expand bilateral legal cooperation. Such exchanges have facilitated the circulation of experiences related to judicial digitalization, criminal management, and the construction of the so-called “rule of law,” in a context where the executive branch has expanded its control over the judiciary.

[...]

In Nicaragua, the Sandinista government has promoted systems such as SINAREM (National Emergency Response System) with Chinese assistance. This type of technological architecture, based on centralized data and integrated surveillance, has obvious applications for social control.

[...]

Likewise, the National Library of San Salvador, built by Chinese companies, incorporates facial recognition systems and automated services. In addition, Salvadoran officials have visited companies such as Huawei, China Mobile, and BYD as part of training programs in China, where they have been exposed to 5G technologies, connectivity platforms, and digital governance solutions. Although presented under the banner of modernization, these tools expand the state’s capacity to manage data and monitor public spaces.

[...]

Honduran officials have participated in “smart city” programs in China, where they have been exposed to “urban brain” systems based on big data, sensors, and integrated surveillance. Domestically, the national 911 emergency system—which includes license plate recognition and thousands of interconnected cameras—has been linked to technologies associated with Huawei and other related companies. Although presented as public security infrastructure, this system provides the foundations for broader monitoring capabilities.

[...]

The significance of Chinese technology lies not only in its potential for overt repression. As recent analyses suggest, these tools enable more subtle and persistent forms of control, expanding not only the state’s capacity to repress but also its ability to govern in a preventive manner.

[...]

The dynamics described above invite a reconsideration of China’s presence in Central America. Beyond infrastructure and trade, the evidence points to a broader framework of cooperation. On the one hand, China expands its influence within strategic sectors of the state apparatus, builds networks with ruling elites, and promotes the adoption of technological standards and regulatory frameworks aligned with its global interests. On the other hand, recipient regimes gain access to resources, technologies, and expertise that can strengthen their control capacities, reduce their dependence on Western partners, and legitimize their illiberal governing practices.

[...]

In this sense, authoritarian cooperation should be understood not as an external imposition but as a relational process shaped by converging interests and specific political trajectories. The key question, therefore, is not whether China is “exporting authoritarianism,” but rather how its mechanisms of cooperation interact with domestic dynamics that are already moving in that direction.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/55161437

Over the past few years, millions of new electric vehicles have hit the roads in China, with the majority adopted in its richer cities.

While electric vehicles have huge benefits compared with the carbon emissions from petrol- and diesel-fueled cars, the total amount of electricity needed to run so many vehicles is significant.

This drives up total electricity generation across the shared grid network, affecting poorer, fossil fuel-dependent cities—which in turn endure higher pollution from the carbon emissions created in generating that power, as well as the additional cost of measures to mitigate that pollution.

The researchers say their findings, published in Nature Cities, could apply to richer and poorer cities in countries worldwide.

[...]

Senior author Professor Zhifu Mi (UCL Bartlett School of Sustainable Construction) said, "Electric vehicles are one of the most important pathways for decarbonizing transport, and their rapid growth in China is a major opportunity to reduce national emissions.

"However, our study shows that the carbon benefits of electric vehicles depend strongly on the power system.

"Decarbonizing the grid must go hand in hand with promoting electric vehicles, while policies should ensure that less developed cities do not bear disproportionate carbon burdens."

[...]

The researchers found that the growing popularity of electric vehicles is increasing power demand in the richest cities that have been the biggest adopters.

However, through the interconnected power grid, much of their surging electricity demand is met by power produced in nearby less developed cities that still rely on coal or other fossil fuels, minimizing the carbon-reduction impact of electric vehicles and putting a greater environmental and economic burden on these poorer cities.

[...]

The researchers found that while it appeared the country's 20 most economically advanced cities accounted for 80% of carbon emission reductions, 136 of the cities they analyzed (nearly 50%) have become 'carbon importers'—cities that have increased their carbon footprint by shouldering the power generation burden for electric vehicles used elsewhere.

[...]

There have been significant economic disparities in the adoption of electric vehicles. About 75% of China's electric vehicles were concentrated in just 10% of cities in 2020, predominantly those with the highest GDP per capita. This means the cities adopting electric vehicles fastest are generally not the same cities producing the electricity and carbon emissions.

Mi said, "Electric vehicles are necessary, but not sufficient on their own. To maximize their climate benefits, we need cleaner power grids, better carbon accounting, and compensation or support mechanisms for cities that bear transferred emissions."

[...]

Over the past few years, millions of new electric vehicles have hit the roads in China, with the majority adopted in its richer cities.

While electric vehicles have huge benefits compared with the carbon emissions from petrol- and diesel-fueled cars, the total amount of electricity needed to run so many vehicles is significant.

This drives up total electricity generation across the shared grid network, affecting poorer, fossil fuel-dependent cities—which in turn endure higher pollution from the carbon emissions created in generating that power, as well as the additional cost of measures to mitigate that pollution.

The researchers say their findings, published in Nature Cities, could apply to richer and poorer cities in countries worldwide.

[...]

Senior author Professor Zhifu Mi (UCL Bartlett School of Sustainable Construction) said, "Electric vehicles are one of the most important pathways for decarbonizing transport, and their rapid growth in China is a major opportunity to reduce national emissions.

"However, our study shows that the carbon benefits of electric vehicles depend strongly on the power system.

"Decarbonizing the grid must go hand in hand with promoting electric vehicles, while policies should ensure that less developed cities do not bear disproportionate carbon burdens."

[...]

The researchers found that the growing popularity of electric vehicles is increasing power demand in the richest cities that have been the biggest adopters.

However, through the interconnected power grid, much of their surging electricity demand is met by power produced in nearby less developed cities that still rely on coal or other fossil fuels, minimizing the carbon-reduction impact of electric vehicles and putting a greater environmental and economic burden on these poorer cities.

[...]

The researchers found that while it appeared the country's 20 most economically advanced cities accounted for 80% of carbon emission reductions, 136 of the cities they analyzed (nearly 50%) have become 'carbon importers'—cities that have increased their carbon footprint by shouldering the power generation burden for electric vehicles used elsewhere.

[...]

There have been significant economic disparities in the adoption of electric vehicles. About 75% of China's electric vehicles were concentrated in just 10% of cities in 2020, predominantly those with the highest GDP per capita. This means the cities adopting electric vehicles fastest are generally not the same cities producing the electricity and carbon emissions.

Mi said, "Electric vehicles are necessary, but not sufficient on their own. To maximize their climate benefits, we need cleaner power grids, better carbon accounting, and compensation or support mechanisms for cities that bear transferred emissions."

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/55099277

Archived

Venezuela’s efforts to restructure more than US$150 billion in sovereign and oil company debt could improve investor confidence in its energy sector, but obligations to China may complicate any final agreement, according to experts interviewed by S&P Global.

The June 12 report noted that Venezuela’s total external debt is estimated at between US$150 billion and US$200 billion.

According to Phillip Luck, Director of the economics program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Venezuela’s debt to China could pose a challenge to restructuring efforts, not because of its size, but because of the way it is structured.

[...]

“The loans get repaid on oil that flows through an account Beijing controls, which puts it ahead of the bondholders in any restructuring… Any IMF [International Monetary Fund] plan where debt holders have to take a haircut, and China refuses, given its position, is going to be a problem,” Luck said.

[...]

China provided billions of dollars to Venezuela between 2000 and 2018 through oil-backed financing arrangements. While some of the crude once dedicated to those agreements is now being sold elsewhere, uncertainty remains over whether related revenues continue to service Chinese claims.

Chinese involvement in Venezuela’s oil sector remains significant. State-owned companies maintain investments in several projects, including the Sinovensa joint venture, which produced 91,200 barrels per day (b/d) in May, according to Venezuela’s Ministry of Hydrocarbons. China Concord Resources also participates in the Lagunillas Lago and Lago V projects, which together produced more than 10,000 b/d in May.