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The Polish internet infrastructure recently withstood an unprecedented distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack measuring an astonishing 1.3 terabits per second – marking the largest such attack ever recorded in the country. Security teams have been battling this extensive cyber assault over several days, effectively neutralizing what would have otherwise caused significant disruption to digital services nationwide.

This record-breaking attack has already overshadowed previous incidents documented in the CERT Orange Polska Report for 2024, establishing a new benchmark for cybersecurity threats in the region.

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Over the past week, cybersecurity specialists observed and continuously mitigated a series of attacks directed at one of Poland’s leading companies. The threat actors employed significant volumetric attacks, utilizing nearly every available traffic amplification technique to maximize impact.

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Archived

Chinese exports of video game consoles to Russia have jumped nearly sevenfold since 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, according to Chinese customs data, raising concerns that such devices could be diverted for military use.

In 2024, China shipped $95.38 million worth of gaming devices, including controllers, to Russia, according to customs data released earlier this month. A Chinese research firm has said the sharp increase indicates gaming equipment is "becoming increasingly popular in Russia."

[...]

Earlier this year, Japan, Britain and the European Union banned the export of game controllers to Russia, citing concerns that such devices could be repurposed to operate drones on battlefield in Ukraine.

China has opposed Western sanctions on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine and continued to trade with it, despite international concern that Chinese exports may be aiding the Russian war effort.

[...]

Today, the Commission announced the selection of 15 renewable hydrogen production projects for public funding across the European Economic Area (EEA). The projects, located across five countries, are expected to produce nearly 2.2 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen over ten years, avoiding more than 15 million tonnes of CO₂ emissions. The hydrogen will be produced in sectors such as transportation, the chemical industry, or the production of methanol and ammonia. They will receive a total of €992 million in EU funding, from the Innovation Fund sourced from the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS).

The winning bidders, awarded after the second European Hydrogen Bank (EHB) auction, will produce the renewable hydrogen in Europe with a subsidy that will help to close the price difference between their production costs and the market price and accelerate the deployment of cleaner fuels.

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In parallel, Spain, Lithuania, and Austria are allocating up to €836 million in national funding for projects in their countries through the ‘Auctions-as-a-Service' feature. This allows Member States to identify and fund eligible projects in their territories that meet the auction's qualification criteria but cannot be funded by the Innovation Fund due to budgetary limitations. ‘Auctions-as-a-service' is open to all Member States, enabling them to benefit from the EU-level auction platform and award national funding to additional projects with simplified procedure.

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With an estimated total budget of €40 billion from the EU Emissions Trading System for the period from 2020 to 2030, the Innovation Fund creates financial incentives for companies and public authorities to invest in cutting-edge net-zero technologies and support Europe's transition to climate neutrality.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/34994310

At just 37 hectares, the Philippines-controlled island of Pagasa – or "hope" – is barely big enough to live on. There is almost nothing there.

The 300 or so inhabitants live in a cluster of small, wooden houses. They fish in the clear, turquoise waters, and grow what vegetables they can in the sandy ground.

But they are not alone in these disputed waters: just off shore, to the west, lies an armada of ships.

These are all Chinese, from the navy, the coastguard or the so-called maritime militia – large fishing vessels repurposed to maintain Chinese dominance of this sea. As our plane approached the island we counted at least 20.

For the past 10 years, China has been expanding its presence in the South China Sea, taking over submerged coral reefs, building three large air bases on them, and deploying hundreds of ships, to reinforce its claim to almost all of the strategic sea lanes running south from the great exporting cities on the Chinese coast.

Few of the South East Asian countries which also claim islands in the same sea have dared to push back against China; only Vietnam and the Philippines have done so. The militaries of both countries are much smaller than China's, but they are holding on to a handful of reefs and islands.

[...]

"Pagasa is very important to us," Jonathan Malaya, assistant director-general of the Philippines National Security Council, tells the BBC.

"It has a runway. It can support life – it has a resident Filipino community, and fishermen living there.

"And given the size of the island, one of the few that did not need reclaiming from the sea, under international law it generates its own territorial sea of 12 nautical miles.

"So it is, in a way, a linchpin for the Philippine presence."

[...]

[Assistant director-general of the Philippines National Security Council] Jonathan Malaya says his government has made a formal diplomatic protest every week to the Chinese Embassy over the presence of its ships in what the Philippines views as the territorial waters of Pagasa. This is in marked contrast to the previous administration of President Rodrigo Duterte, which avoided confrontations with China in the hope of getting more investment in the Philippines.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/34994310

At just 37 hectares, the Philippines-controlled island of Pagasa – or "hope" – is barely big enough to live on. There is almost nothing there.

The 300 or so inhabitants live in a cluster of small, wooden houses. They fish in the clear, turquoise waters, and grow what vegetables they can in the sandy ground.

But they are not alone in these disputed waters: just off shore, to the west, lies an armada of ships.

These are all Chinese, from the navy, the coastguard or the so-called maritime militia – large fishing vessels repurposed to maintain Chinese dominance of this sea. As our plane approached the island we counted at least 20.

For the past 10 years, China has been expanding its presence in the South China Sea, taking over submerged coral reefs, building three large air bases on them, and deploying hundreds of ships, to reinforce its claim to almost all of the strategic sea lanes running south from the great exporting cities on the Chinese coast.

Few of the South East Asian countries which also claim islands in the same sea have dared to push back against China; only Vietnam and the Philippines have done so. The militaries of both countries are much smaller than China's, but they are holding on to a handful of reefs and islands.

[...]

"Pagasa is very important to us," Jonathan Malaya, assistant director-general of the Philippines National Security Council, tells the BBC.

"It has a runway. It can support life – it has a resident Filipino community, and fishermen living there.

"And given the size of the island, one of the few that did not need reclaiming from the sea, under international law it generates its own territorial sea of 12 nautical miles.

"So it is, in a way, a linchpin for the Philippine presence."

[...]

[Assistant director-general of the Philippines National Security Council] Jonathan Malaya says his government has made a formal diplomatic protest every week to the Chinese Embassy over the presence of its ships in what the Philippines views as the territorial waters of Pagasa. This is in marked contrast to the previous administration of President Rodrigo Duterte, which avoided confrontations with China in the hope of getting more investment in the Philippines.

[...]

At just 37 hectares, the Philippines-controlled island of Pagasa – or "hope" – is barely big enough to live on. There is almost nothing there.

The 300 or so inhabitants live in a cluster of small, wooden houses. They fish in the clear, turquoise waters, and grow what vegetables they can in the sandy ground.

But they are not alone in these disputed waters: just off shore, to the west, lies an armada of ships.

These are all Chinese, from the navy, the coastguard or the so-called maritime militia – large fishing vessels repurposed to maintain Chinese dominance of this sea. As our plane approached the island we counted at least 20.

For the past 10 years, China has been expanding its presence in the South China Sea, taking over submerged coral reefs, building three large air bases on them, and deploying hundreds of ships, to reinforce its claim to almost all of the strategic sea lanes running south from the great exporting cities on the Chinese coast.

Few of the South East Asian countries which also claim islands in the same sea have dared to push back against China; only Vietnam and the Philippines have done so. The militaries of both countries are much smaller than China's, but they are holding on to a handful of reefs and islands.

[...]

"Pagasa is very important to us," Jonathan Malaya, assistant director-general of the Philippines National Security Council, tells the BBC.

"It has a runway. It can support life – it has a resident Filipino community, and fishermen living there.

"And given the size of the island, one of the few that did not need reclaiming from the sea, under international law it generates its own territorial sea of 12 nautical miles.

"So it is, in a way, a linchpin for the Philippine presence."

[...]

[Assistant director-general of the Philippines National Security Council] Jonathan Malaya says his government has made a formal diplomatic protest every week to the Chinese Embassy over the presence of its ships in what the Philippines views as the territorial waters of Pagasa. This is in marked contrast to the previous administration of President Rodrigo Duterte, which avoided confrontations with China in the hope of getting more investment in the Philippines.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/34990316

Der frühere Wirecard-Vorstand Jan Marsalek war offenbar nicht nur jahrelang für russische Geheimdienste aktiv, sondern unterhielt über einen Mittelsmann anscheinend auch enge Kontakte zu chinesischen Stellen. Das berichten die "Süddeutsche Zeitung", NDR, WDR sowie das österreichische Nachrichtenmagazin "Profil". Demnach soll Marsalek Peking beispielsweise vorgeschlagen haben, die Uiguren-Gemeinde in München ausspähen zu wollen.

Das geht aus Chat-Nachrichten hervor, die Marsalek mit dem Kopf seines russischen Spionagerings in London, Orlin Roussev, austauschte. Der Bulgare und fünf Landsleute waren erst in der vergangenen Woche von einem Gericht in London zu Haftstrafen von insgesamt mehr als 50 Jahren verurteilt worden, weil die Gruppe für Marsalek in mehreren europäischen Ländern spioniert haben soll.

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The European Union will review a pact governing its political and economic ties with Israel due to the "catastrophic" situation in Gaza, EU top diplomat Kaja Kallas said.

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International pressure on Israel has mounted in recent days amid complaints about the lack of humanitarian aid reaching Gaza and as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government launched a new military offensive in the enclave.

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Diplomats said 17 of 27 EU members backed the review, which will focus on whether Israel is complying with a human rights clause in the agreement, and was proposed by Dutch Foreign Minister Caspar Veldkamp.

"The situation in Gaza is catastrophic. The aid that Israel has allowed in is of course welcomed, but it's a drop in the ocean. Aid must flow immediately, without obstruction and at scale, because this is what is needed," Kallas told reporters.

[...]

Der frühere Wirecard-Vorstand Jan Marsalek war offenbar nicht nur jahrelang für russische Geheimdienste aktiv, sondern unterhielt über einen Mittelsmann anscheinend auch enge Kontakte zu chinesischen Stellen. Das berichten die "Süddeutsche Zeitung", NDR, WDR sowie das österreichische Nachrichtenmagazin "Profil". Demnach soll Marsalek Peking beispielsweise vorgeschlagen haben, die Uiguren-Gemeinde in München ausspähen zu wollen.

Das geht aus Chat-Nachrichten hervor, die Marsalek mit dem Kopf seines russischen Spionagerings in London, Orlin Roussev, austauschte. Der Bulgare und fünf Landsleute waren erst in der vergangenen Woche von einem Gericht in London zu Haftstrafen von insgesamt mehr als 50 Jahren verurteilt worden, weil die Gruppe für Marsalek in mehreren europäischen Ländern spioniert haben soll.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/34990039

Archived

In 2010, an elite unit of the Chinese police entered an Apple shop in Shanghai and violently assaulted the customers. The attack was so brutal that the floor tiles subsequently had to be replaced: they were too bloodstained. Those customers had been waiting in line for days for the latest iPhone; their crime was to refuse to leave upon learning that the shop had sold out of stock.

Yet no official record of this event exists. The shop’s cameras were cut and employees had their phones wiped. “It shows you how quickly the Chinese can brush everything under the carpet,” one person present tells journalist Patrick McGee. “It was like a mini-Tiananmen Square.” The incident is one small example in McGee’s eye-opening book, Apple in China, of how the Californian iPhone maker has “bound its future inextricably to a ruthless authoritarian state”.

When people think of Apple’s presence in China, the focus tends either to be on the cheap manufacture of the company’s parts and the poor working conditions at those factories, or on the censorship of content on Apple devices inside the country. McGee, a journalist at the Financial Times, breaks down in much greater detail the relationship between this capitalist company and communist nation – a relationship so intertwined and complex that it will take decades to unravel. He makes the argument that not only has China effectively made Apple what it is today, but the reverse is also true. “China wouldn’t be China today without Apple,” McGee writes. “[Apple’s] investments in the country have been spectacular, rivalling nation-building efforts.”

[...]

The more Apple invests in both training these [Chinese] contracted factory workers and paying for special machinery that could only be used for its products – in 2018 the value of Apple’s “long-lived assets” in China peaked at $13.3 billion – the more it becomes bound to the country. [Apple contractor's] Foxconn hubs, for example, are now surrounded by hundreds of sub-suppliers that cater to Apple’s every whim. “Anything we wanted, we could get it,” one engineer recalls. “Whatever we needed, it would happen.”

[...]

Apple is notoriously secretive, but McGee proffers dozens of first-hand accounts of how the company essentially bumbled its way into becoming hooked on China. By the time Apple executives realise that the Chinese president Xi Jinping is ramping up repression at home and taking a more combative stance in international affairs, it’s too late to untangle the relationship: those business ties, McGee writes, are “unbreakable”. In 2016, when the Chinese authorities make it clear that they can remove, whenever they want, the cheap and plentiful labour on which Apple relies, Cook is compelled to make a trip to the Chinese Communist Party headquarters. The company pledges to invest $275 billion in China over the next five years. It does not, unsurprisingly, announce this investment to the Western press.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/34990039

Archived

In 2010, an elite unit of the Chinese police entered an Apple shop in Shanghai and violently assaulted the customers. The attack was so brutal that the floor tiles subsequently had to be replaced: they were too bloodstained. Those customers had been waiting in line for days for the latest iPhone; their crime was to refuse to leave upon learning that the shop had sold out of stock.

Yet no official record of this event exists. The shop’s cameras were cut and employees had their phones wiped. “It shows you how quickly the Chinese can brush everything under the carpet,” one person present tells journalist Patrick McGee. “It was like a mini-Tiananmen Square.” The incident is one small example in McGee’s eye-opening book, Apple in China, of how the Californian iPhone maker has “bound its future inextricably to a ruthless authoritarian state”.

When people think of Apple’s presence in China, the focus tends either to be on the cheap manufacture of the company’s parts and the poor working conditions at those factories, or on the censorship of content on Apple devices inside the country. McGee, a journalist at the Financial Times, breaks down in much greater detail the relationship between this capitalist company and communist nation – a relationship so intertwined and complex that it will take decades to unravel. He makes the argument that not only has China effectively made Apple what it is today, but the reverse is also true. “China wouldn’t be China today without Apple,” McGee writes. “[Apple’s] investments in the country have been spectacular, rivalling nation-building efforts.”

[...]

The more Apple invests in both training these [Chinese] contracted factory workers and paying for special machinery that could only be used for its products – in 2018 the value of Apple’s “long-lived assets” in China peaked at $13.3 billion – the more it becomes bound to the country. [Apple contractor's] Foxconn hubs, for example, are now surrounded by hundreds of sub-suppliers that cater to Apple’s every whim. “Anything we wanted, we could get it,” one engineer recalls. “Whatever we needed, it would happen.”

[...]

Apple is notoriously secretive, but McGee proffers dozens of first-hand accounts of how the company essentially bumbled its way into becoming hooked on China. By the time Apple executives realise that the Chinese president Xi Jinping is ramping up repression at home and taking a more combative stance in international affairs, it’s too late to untangle the relationship: those business ties, McGee writes, are “unbreakable”. In 2016, when the Chinese authorities make it clear that they can remove, whenever they want, the cheap and plentiful labour on which Apple relies, Cook is compelled to make a trip to the Chinese Communist Party headquarters. The company pledges to invest $275 billion in China over the next five years. It does not, unsurprisingly, announce this investment to the Western press.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/34990039

Archived

In 2010, an elite unit of the Chinese police entered an Apple shop in Shanghai and violently assaulted the customers. The attack was so brutal that the floor tiles subsequently had to be replaced: they were too bloodstained. Those customers had been waiting in line for days for the latest iPhone; their crime was to refuse to leave upon learning that the shop had sold out of stock.

Yet no official record of this event exists. The shop’s cameras were cut and employees had their phones wiped. “It shows you how quickly the Chinese can brush everything under the carpet,” one person present tells journalist Patrick McGee. “It was like a mini-Tiananmen Square.” The incident is one small example in McGee’s eye-opening book, Apple in China, of how the Californian iPhone maker has “bound its future inextricably to a ruthless authoritarian state”.

When people think of Apple’s presence in China, the focus tends either to be on the cheap manufacture of the company’s parts and the poor working conditions at those factories, or on the censorship of content on Apple devices inside the country. McGee, a journalist at the Financial Times, breaks down in much greater detail the relationship between this capitalist company and communist nation – a relationship so intertwined and complex that it will take decades to unravel. He makes the argument that not only has China effectively made Apple what it is today, but the reverse is also true. “China wouldn’t be China today without Apple,” McGee writes. “[Apple’s] investments in the country have been spectacular, rivalling nation-building efforts.”

[...]

The more Apple invests in both training these [Chinese] contracted factory workers and paying for special machinery that could only be used for its products – in 2018 the value of Apple’s “long-lived assets” in China peaked at $13.3 billion – the more it becomes bound to the country. [Apple contractor's] Foxconn hubs, for example, are now surrounded by hundreds of sub-suppliers that cater to Apple’s every whim. “Anything we wanted, we could get it,” one engineer recalls. “Whatever we needed, it would happen.”

[...]

Apple is notoriously secretive, but McGee proffers dozens of first-hand accounts of how the company essentially bumbled its way into becoming hooked on China. By the time Apple executives realise that the Chinese president Xi Jinping is ramping up repression at home and taking a more combative stance in international affairs, it’s too late to untangle the relationship: those business ties, McGee writes, are “unbreakable”. In 2016, when the Chinese authorities make it clear that they can remove, whenever they want, the cheap and plentiful labour on which Apple relies, Cook is compelled to make a trip to the Chinese Communist Party headquarters. The company pledges to invest $275 billion in China over the next five years. It does not, unsurprisingly, announce this investment to the Western press.

[...]