Hotznplotzn

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/51028841

Archived

[...]

Last November, Takaichi publicly referenced contingency planning related to Taiwan, stating that ‘peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are directly linked to Japan’s security’ and that Tokyo ‘cannot rule out preparing for contingencies that affect our national survival’. Beijing treated the remarks as a direct violation of its red lines under its one-China principle.

What followed was a highly visible pressure campaign deploying the same mix of coercive tactics that Beijing has used against Japan, Taiwan and other countries for years.

[...]

This escalation was not an isolated reaction. Rather, it reflects a broader surge in Beijing’s public criticism of foreign governments over Taiwan. Coercion data compiled throughout 2025 for ASPI’s State of the Strait—a weekly newsletter tracking Beijing’s coercion of Taiwan—shows that China publicly criticised other countries 197 times for engaging with Taiwan-related issues, up from just 50 incidents in 2024. The United States remained the primary target, but Japan’s rise was dramatic. Tokyo went from just one public criticism in 2024 to 53 in 2025—a 5,200 percent increase—making it the second most criticised country.

The shift is most evident in how aggressively Beijing invoked the one-China principle. In 2025, alleged violations of the principle accounted for 143 public criticism incidents, up from just 24 in 2024—Japan alone accounted for 46 of these. While criticism over meetings with Taiwanese officials (32, up from 11) and arms sales (13, up from 3) also rose, they were dwarfed by the surge in one-China allegations. The data suggests Beijing is applying the principle more expansively, using it as a catch-all justification to police a widening range of foreign rhetoric and engagement related to Taiwan.

[...]

In the case of Japan, Beijing’s denunciation quickly shifted to economic coercion. It issued travel advisories, disrupted trade flows through informal restrictions and suspended bilateral exchanges. The measures were calibrated to be visible but deniable—classic boycott-style coercion designed to impose short-term pain without triggering formal trade disputes.

[...]

That retreat never came. Japanese officials declined to retract Takaichi’s remarks. Instead, they reiterated that contingency planning regarding Taiwan is consistent with Japan’s constitutional and security framework. There was no apology, no reframing and no policy concession.

[...]

Archived

[...]

Last November, Takaichi publicly referenced contingency planning related to Taiwan, stating that ‘peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are directly linked to Japan’s security’ and that Tokyo ‘cannot rule out preparing for contingencies that affect our national survival’. Beijing treated the remarks as a direct violation of its red lines under its one-China principle.

What followed was a highly visible pressure campaign deploying the same mix of coercive tactics that Beijing has used against Japan, Taiwan and other countries for years.

[...]

This escalation was not an isolated reaction. Rather, it reflects a broader surge in Beijing’s public criticism of foreign governments over Taiwan. Coercion data compiled throughout 2025 for ASPI’s State of the Strait—a weekly newsletter tracking Beijing’s coercion of Taiwan—shows that China publicly criticised other countries 197 times for engaging with Taiwan-related issues, up from just 50 incidents in 2024. The United States remained the primary target, but Japan’s rise was dramatic. Tokyo went from just one public criticism in 2024 to 53 in 2025—a 5,200 percent increase—making it the second most criticised country.

The shift is most evident in how aggressively Beijing invoked the one-China principle. In 2025, alleged violations of the principle accounted for 143 public criticism incidents, up from just 24 in 2024—Japan alone accounted for 46 of these. While criticism over meetings with Taiwanese officials (32, up from 11) and arms sales (13, up from 3) also rose, they were dwarfed by the surge in one-China allegations. The data suggests Beijing is applying the principle more expansively, using it as a catch-all justification to police a widening range of foreign rhetoric and engagement related to Taiwan.

[...]

In the case of Japan, Beijing’s denunciation quickly shifted to economic coercion. It issued travel advisories, disrupted trade flows through informal restrictions and suspended bilateral exchanges. The measures were calibrated to be visible but deniable—classic boycott-style coercion designed to impose short-term pain without triggering formal trade disputes.

[...]

That retreat never came. Japanese officials declined to retract Takaichi’s remarks. Instead, they reiterated that contingency planning regarding Taiwan is consistent with Japan’s constitutional and security framework. There was no apology, no reframing and no policy concession.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/51027997

Archived

• The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has created a global network of individuals and organizations as part of its united front system. In four democratic states—the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany—this network includes more than 2,000 organizations. These constitute latent capacity that the Party can mobilize to advance the Party’s agenda.
• Beijing’s network is the product of protracted co-optation of existing civil society organizations overseas and the global expansion of domestic united front elements. The Party has spent decades assiduously cultivating overseas Chinese community organizations, co-opting local leaders and institutions to embed its preferences within civil society. Even groups that previously spent decades supporting the Republic of China (Taiwan) now fly the flag of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
• The Party leverages this global network to support its primary goal of national rejuvenation. According to the Party’s definition, rejuvenation entails unification with Taiwan and making the PRC the global leader in terms of national power. United front work supports this goal by contributing to the PRC’s diplomatic, economic, scientific, and even military development, as well as the Party’s ability to respond to crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
• This includes engaging in malign and illegal activities in foreign countries. Overseas groups with ties to the united front have directly supported illicit technology transfer, espionage, talent recruitment, and voter mobilization on Beijing’s behalf. These groups also engage in transnational repression, monitoring, harassing, and/or intimidating dissidents, ethnic minorities, and other critics of the Party.
• In democratic countries, these groups influence political decision-making by conditioning stakeholders to consider Beijing’s interests and sensitivities. United front organizations have been instrumental in shaping the approaches of local governments and political actors, particularly where oversight is weak. They have influenced legislation and public statements, and managed official engagements with the PRC.
• Where the CCP encounters opposition, the united front functions as a political weapon to isolate, neutralize, or counter Beijing’s critics. The united front system leverages its network of organizations to remove impediments to the achievement of core CCP ambitions through influence, subversion, co-optation, and coercion. These goals include building support for and neutralizing resistance to the annexation of Taiwan.
• Constraining the CCP’s ability to interfere in democracies requires active transparency. Much of the CCP’s united front activity is at least partially visible in democratic societies. Better education and information sharing could help officials and the general public recognize risks and avoid entanglement. United front groups are rarely listed in existing foreign agent registration systems, limiting the ability of governments to monitor or investigate them.

[...]

Overseas united front work goes beyond attempts to harness the wealth and knowledge of Chinese diaspora communities to support national development goals. It also seeks to further the Party’s interests, which are increasingly global. The country is currently the world’s top trader, accounting for over 14 percent of global exports in 2023. It leads international institutions and forums with partners across the globe. And even its military is beginning to venture ever further afield and expand its international footprint.

[...]

The united front system operates on a global level. But when democratic countries recognize united front work as a problem, they rarely view it as a global issue. As a result, efforts to build information-sharing platforms or to work with allies and partners to combat CCP activities within democratic societies are minimal—if they exist at all. This includes cooperation at both the governmental and non-governmental levels. Civil society organizations frequently work to spread awareness internationally on salient issues, something that would be useful for building a better understanding of how the united front operates beyond the countries covered in this report. The attention paid to united front work in conferences and fora that focus on challenges posed by the CCP is disproportionately small given united front work’s negative impact on democratic societies. Raising the visibility of issues related to united front work helps build transparency and navigate the complex landscape of security challenges together while preserving democratic values.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/51028280

Archived

Mistral AI, the French company last valued at $13.8 billion, has made its first acquisition. The OpenAI competitor has agreed to buy Koyeb, a Paris-based startup that simplifies AI app deployment at scale and manages the infrastructure behind it.

Mistral has been primarily known for developing large language models (LLMs), but this deal confirms its ambitions to position itself as a full-stack player. In June 2025, it had announced Mistral Compute, an AI cloud infrastructure offering which it now hopes Koyeb will accelerate.

[...]

Before the acquisition, Koyeb’s platform already helped users deploy models from Mistral and others. In a blog post, Koyeb said its platform will continue operating. But its team and technology will now also help Mistral deploy models directly on clients’ own hardware (on premises), optimize its use of GPUs, and help scale AI inference — the process of running a trained AI model to generate responses — according to a press release from Mistral.

As part of the deal, Koyeb’s 13 employees and its three co-founders, Yann Léger, Edouard Bonlieu, and Bastien Chatelard (pictured in 2020), are set to join the engineering team of Mistral, overseen by CTO and co-founder Timothée Lacroix. Under his leadership, Koyeb expects its platform to transition into a “core component” of Mistral Compute over the coming months.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/51027997

Archived

• The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has created a global network of individuals and organizations as part of its united front system. In four democratic states—the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany—this network includes more than 2,000 organizations. These constitute latent capacity that the Party can mobilize to advance the Party’s agenda.
• Beijing’s network is the product of protracted co-optation of existing civil society organizations overseas and the global expansion of domestic united front elements. The Party has spent decades assiduously cultivating overseas Chinese community organizations, co-opting local leaders and institutions to embed its preferences within civil society. Even groups that previously spent decades supporting the Republic of China (Taiwan) now fly the flag of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
• The Party leverages this global network to support its primary goal of national rejuvenation. According to the Party’s definition, rejuvenation entails unification with Taiwan and making the PRC the global leader in terms of national power. United front work supports this goal by contributing to the PRC’s diplomatic, economic, scientific, and even military development, as well as the Party’s ability to respond to crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
• This includes engaging in malign and illegal activities in foreign countries. Overseas groups with ties to the united front have directly supported illicit technology transfer, espionage, talent recruitment, and voter mobilization on Beijing’s behalf. These groups also engage in transnational repression, monitoring, harassing, and/or intimidating dissidents, ethnic minorities, and other critics of the Party.
• In democratic countries, these groups influence political decision-making by conditioning stakeholders to consider Beijing’s interests and sensitivities. United front organizations have been instrumental in shaping the approaches of local governments and political actors, particularly where oversight is weak. They have influenced legislation and public statements, and managed official engagements with the PRC.
• Where the CCP encounters opposition, the united front functions as a political weapon to isolate, neutralize, or counter Beijing’s critics. The united front system leverages its network of organizations to remove impediments to the achievement of core CCP ambitions through influence, subversion, co-optation, and coercion. These goals include building support for and neutralizing resistance to the annexation of Taiwan.
• Constraining the CCP’s ability to interfere in democracies requires active transparency. Much of the CCP’s united front activity is at least partially visible in democratic societies. Better education and information sharing could help officials and the general public recognize risks and avoid entanglement. United front groups are rarely listed in existing foreign agent registration systems, limiting the ability of governments to monitor or investigate them.

[...]

Overseas united front work goes beyond attempts to harness the wealth and knowledge of Chinese diaspora communities to support national development goals. It also seeks to further the Party’s interests, which are increasingly global. The country is currently the world’s top trader, accounting for over 14 percent of global exports in 2023. It leads international institutions and forums with partners across the globe. And even its military is beginning to venture ever further afield and expand its international footprint.

[...]

The united front system operates on a global level. But when democratic countries recognize united front work as a problem, they rarely view it as a global issue. As a result, efforts to build information-sharing platforms or to work with allies and partners to combat CCP activities within democratic societies are minimal—if they exist at all. This includes cooperation at both the governmental and non-governmental levels. Civil society organizations frequently work to spread awareness internationally on salient issues, something that would be useful for building a better understanding of how the united front operates beyond the countries covered in this report. The attention paid to united front work in conferences and fora that focus on challenges posed by the CCP is disproportionately small given united front work’s negative impact on democratic societies. Raising the visibility of issues related to united front work helps build transparency and navigate the complex landscape of security challenges together while preserving democratic values.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/51027997

Archived

• The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has created a global network of individuals and organizations as part of its united front system. In four democratic states—the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany—this network includes more than 2,000 organizations. These constitute latent capacity that the Party can mobilize to advance the Party’s agenda.
• Beijing’s network is the product of protracted co-optation of existing civil society organizations overseas and the global expansion of domestic united front elements. The Party has spent decades assiduously cultivating overseas Chinese community organizations, co-opting local leaders and institutions to embed its preferences within civil society. Even groups that previously spent decades supporting the Republic of China (Taiwan) now fly the flag of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
• The Party leverages this global network to support its primary goal of national rejuvenation. According to the Party’s definition, rejuvenation entails unification with Taiwan and making the PRC the global leader in terms of national power. United front work supports this goal by contributing to the PRC’s diplomatic, economic, scientific, and even military development, as well as the Party’s ability to respond to crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
• This includes engaging in malign and illegal activities in foreign countries. Overseas groups with ties to the united front have directly supported illicit technology transfer, espionage, talent recruitment, and voter mobilization on Beijing’s behalf. These groups also engage in transnational repression, monitoring, harassing, and/or intimidating dissidents, ethnic minorities, and other critics of the Party.
• In democratic countries, these groups influence political decision-making by conditioning stakeholders to consider Beijing’s interests and sensitivities. United front organizations have been instrumental in shaping the approaches of local governments and political actors, particularly where oversight is weak. They have influenced legislation and public statements, and managed official engagements with the PRC.
• Where the CCP encounters opposition, the united front functions as a political weapon to isolate, neutralize, or counter Beijing’s critics. The united front system leverages its network of organizations to remove impediments to the achievement of core CCP ambitions through influence, subversion, co-optation, and coercion. These goals include building support for and neutralizing resistance to the annexation of Taiwan.
• Constraining the CCP’s ability to interfere in democracies requires active transparency. Much of the CCP’s united front activity is at least partially visible in democratic societies. Better education and information sharing could help officials and the general public recognize risks and avoid entanglement. United front groups are rarely listed in existing foreign agent registration systems, limiting the ability of governments to monitor or investigate them.

[...]

Overseas united front work goes beyond attempts to harness the wealth and knowledge of Chinese diaspora communities to support national development goals. It also seeks to further the Party’s interests, which are increasingly global. The country is currently the world’s top trader, accounting for over 14 percent of global exports in 2023. It leads international institutions and forums with partners across the globe. And even its military is beginning to venture ever further afield and expand its international footprint.

[...]

The united front system operates on a global level. But when democratic countries recognize united front work as a problem, they rarely view it as a global issue. As a result, efforts to build information-sharing platforms or to work with allies and partners to combat CCP activities within democratic societies are minimal—if they exist at all. This includes cooperation at both the governmental and non-governmental levels. Civil society organizations frequently work to spread awareness internationally on salient issues, something that would be useful for building a better understanding of how the united front operates beyond the countries covered in this report. The attention paid to united front work in conferences and fora that focus on challenges posed by the CCP is disproportionately small given united front work’s negative impact on democratic societies. Raising the visibility of issues related to united front work helps build transparency and navigate the complex landscape of security challenges together while preserving democratic values.

Archived

Mistral AI, the French company last valued at $13.8 billion, has made its first acquisition. The OpenAI competitor has agreed to buy Koyeb, a Paris-based startup that simplifies AI app deployment at scale and manages the infrastructure behind it.

Mistral has been primarily known for developing large language models (LLMs), but this deal confirms its ambitions to position itself as a full-stack player. In June 2025, it had announced Mistral Compute, an AI cloud infrastructure offering which it now hopes Koyeb will accelerate.

[...]

Before the acquisition, Koyeb’s platform already helped users deploy models from Mistral and others. In a blog post, Koyeb said its platform will continue operating. But its team and technology will now also help Mistral deploy models directly on clients’ own hardware (on premises), optimize its use of GPUs, and help scale AI inference — the process of running a trained AI model to generate responses — according to a press release from Mistral.

As part of the deal, Koyeb’s 13 employees and its three co-founders, Yann Léger, Edouard Bonlieu, and Bastien Chatelard (pictured in 2020), are set to join the engineering team of Mistral, overseen by CTO and co-founder Timothée Lacroix. Under his leadership, Koyeb expects its platform to transition into a “core component” of Mistral Compute over the coming months.

[...]

Archived

• The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has created a global network of individuals and organizations as part of its united front system. In four democratic states—the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany—this network includes more than 2,000 organizations. These constitute latent capacity that the Party can mobilize to advance the Party’s agenda.
• Beijing’s network is the product of protracted co-optation of existing civil society organizations overseas and the global expansion of domestic united front elements. The Party has spent decades assiduously cultivating overseas Chinese community organizations, co-opting local leaders and institutions to embed its preferences within civil society. Even groups that previously spent decades supporting the Republic of China (Taiwan) now fly the flag of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
• The Party leverages this global network to support its primary goal of national rejuvenation. According to the Party’s definition, rejuvenation entails unification with Taiwan and making the PRC the global leader in terms of national power. United front work supports this goal by contributing to the PRC’s diplomatic, economic, scientific, and even military development, as well as the Party’s ability to respond to crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
• This includes engaging in malign and illegal activities in foreign countries. Overseas groups with ties to the united front have directly supported illicit technology transfer, espionage, talent recruitment, and voter mobilization on Beijing’s behalf. These groups also engage in transnational repression, monitoring, harassing, and/or intimidating dissidents, ethnic minorities, and other critics of the Party.
• In democratic countries, these groups influence political decision-making by conditioning stakeholders to consider Beijing’s interests and sensitivities. United front organizations have been instrumental in shaping the approaches of local governments and political actors, particularly where oversight is weak. They have influenced legislation and public statements, and managed official engagements with the PRC.
• Where the CCP encounters opposition, the united front functions as a political weapon to isolate, neutralize, or counter Beijing’s critics. The united front system leverages its network of organizations to remove impediments to the achievement of core CCP ambitions through influence, subversion, co-optation, and coercion. These goals include building support for and neutralizing resistance to the annexation of Taiwan.
• Constraining the CCP’s ability to interfere in democracies requires active transparency. Much of the CCP’s united front activity is at least partially visible in democratic societies. Better education and information sharing could help officials and the general public recognize risks and avoid entanglement. United front groups are rarely listed in existing foreign agent registration systems, limiting the ability of governments to monitor or investigate them.

[...]

Overseas united front work goes beyond attempts to harness the wealth and knowledge of Chinese diaspora communities to support national development goals. It also seeks to further the Party’s interests, which are increasingly global. The country is currently the world’s top trader, accounting for over 14 percent of global exports in 2023. It leads international institutions and forums with partners across the globe. And even its military is beginning to venture ever further afield and expand its international footprint.

[...]

The united front system operates on a global level. But when democratic countries recognize united front work as a problem, they rarely view it as a global issue. As a result, efforts to build information-sharing platforms or to work with allies and partners to combat CCP activities within democratic societies are minimal—if they exist at all. This includes cooperation at both the governmental and non-governmental levels. Civil society organizations frequently work to spread awareness internationally on salient issues, something that would be useful for building a better understanding of how the united front operates beyond the countries covered in this report. The attention paid to united front work in conferences and fora that focus on challenges posed by the CCP is disproportionately small given united front work’s negative impact on democratic societies. Raising the visibility of issues related to united front work helps build transparency and navigate the complex landscape of security challenges together while preserving democratic values.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/50978526

New details from eyewitnesses and medical staff in Iran’s southeastern city of Kerman indicate that security forces opened fire and killed dozens of protesters attempting to reach a statue of slain IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani in early January.

Archived

[...]

According to a member of the medical staff at a Kerman treatment center, at least 70 protester deaths were registered in the city’s hospitals. He said the figure included only those formally recorded in medical facilities and did not capture all fatalities.

Iran’s government has not provided city-level breakdowns of protest deaths but leaked documents obtained and reviewed by. Iran International shows up to 36,500 people were killed across the country on those two days.

[...]

A woman [...] described the sudden appearance of motorcyclists who vandalized banks and government buildings while security forces present at the scene did not intervene. After the motorcyclists left, she said, security forces moved against protesters. The identities and affiliations of the motorcyclists could not be independently confirmed.

[...]

The protests in Kerman focused in part on the Soleimani statue, which has become a symbol of state authority in the city where the general is buried.

Residents said many protesters viewed the monument as a representation of the political system itself. Their attempt to topple it was met by a brutal force that turned the surrounding streets into one of the deadliest flashpoints of unrest in the city.

The full death toll in Kerman remains unknown.

[...]

New details from eyewitnesses and medical staff in Iran’s southeastern city of Kerman indicate that security forces opened fire and killed dozens of protesters attempting to reach a statue of slain IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani in early January.

Archived

[...]

According to a member of the medical staff at a Kerman treatment center, at least 70 protester deaths were registered in the city’s hospitals. He said the figure included only those formally recorded in medical facilities and did not capture all fatalities.

Iran’s government has not provided city-level breakdowns of protest deaths but leaked documents obtained and reviewed by. Iran International shows up to 36,500 people were killed across the country on those two days.

[...]

A woman [...] described the sudden appearance of motorcyclists who vandalized banks and government buildings while security forces present at the scene did not intervene. After the motorcyclists left, she said, security forces moved against protesters. The identities and affiliations of the motorcyclists could not be independently confirmed.

[...]

The protests in Kerman focused in part on the Soleimani statue, which has become a symbol of state authority in the city where the general is buried.

Residents said many protesters viewed the monument as a representation of the political system itself. Their attempt to topple it was met by a brutal force that turned the surrounding streets into one of the deadliest flashpoints of unrest in the city.

The full death toll in Kerman remains unknown.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/50976930

Jimmy Lai and countless others in China are paying the price for a West too eager to compromise principles for profit.

Archived

Just about two weeks before Hong Kong pro-democracy media mogul Jimmy Lai was handed a 20-year prison sentence, the harshest under the city’s National Security Law, U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer visited Beijing. He walked the red carpet at Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, met President Xi Jinping, and attended a lavish welcome ceremony. It was widely hailed as a “break-the-ice” visit, the first by a British prime minister in six years, aimed at normalizing relations with China.

The timing, however, spoke volumes. On the eve of Lai’s sentencing, Starmer signaled that British diplomacy was prioritizing friendship with Beijing over the fate of a British citizen, Jimmy Lai. The message was unmistakable: no matter how China treats Jimmy Lai, the normalization of China-U.K. relations will carry on.

[...]

Starmer later told reporters he had raised Lai’s case with Xi, but offered no details, leaving the public to wonder if Beijing even blinked. The answer came swiftly: Lai, 78, was sentenced to what is effectively a life term. To put it bluntly, this is almost a death sentence. Lai now faces a fate akin to Liu Xiaobo, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, who perished in detention.

The severity of the sentence shocked observers. Compared with the 2024 trial of 47 pro-democracy activists, Lai’s 20-year term is twice as long as that handed to Benny Tai, who was accused of masterminding the 2020 primary legislative election. Editors, publishers, and editorial writers involved in Lai’s publications were regarded by the court as masterminds and handed sentences of up to 10 years, punished for simply doing their jobs as journalists.

[...]

Ironically, the imposition of such harsh sentences has unfolded against a backdrop of Western governments seeking to normalize relations with China. The reshaping of global politics under U.S. President Donald Trump has nudged allies to engage China. Over the past year, Western leaders who once condemned Beijing for human rights abuses – from France to Germany, Canada to the U.K. – have queued to shake Xi’s hand, sign trade deals, and signal goodwill.

As international pressure eases, the Chinese Communist Party has intensified its crackdown on dissent, acting with a level of impunity not seen in previous years. Beijing’s calculation is clear: if Western powers are eager to deepen economic ties, the diplomatic price of jailing dissidents has all but disappeared.

[...]

Now Jimmy Lai and countless others in China are paying the price for a West too eager to compromise principles for profit. Their suffering is a mirror reflecting the cost of a diplomacy that prioritizes access to China’s market and money over freedom, human rights, and justice.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/50976930

Jimmy Lai and countless others in China are paying the price for a West too eager to compromise principles for profit.

Archived

Just about two weeks before Hong Kong pro-democracy media mogul Jimmy Lai was handed a 20-year prison sentence, the harshest under the city’s National Security Law, U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer visited Beijing. He walked the red carpet at Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, met President Xi Jinping, and attended a lavish welcome ceremony. It was widely hailed as a “break-the-ice” visit, the first by a British prime minister in six years, aimed at normalizing relations with China.

The timing, however, spoke volumes. On the eve of Lai’s sentencing, Starmer signaled that British diplomacy was prioritizing friendship with Beijing over the fate of a British citizen, Jimmy Lai. The message was unmistakable: no matter how China treats Jimmy Lai, the normalization of China-U.K. relations will carry on.

[...]

Starmer later told reporters he had raised Lai’s case with Xi, but offered no details, leaving the public to wonder if Beijing even blinked. The answer came swiftly: Lai, 78, was sentenced to what is effectively a life term. To put it bluntly, this is almost a death sentence. Lai now faces a fate akin to Liu Xiaobo, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, who perished in detention.

The severity of the sentence shocked observers. Compared with the 2024 trial of 47 pro-democracy activists, Lai’s 20-year term is twice as long as that handed to Benny Tai, who was accused of masterminding the 2020 primary legislative election. Editors, publishers, and editorial writers involved in Lai’s publications were regarded by the court as masterminds and handed sentences of up to 10 years, punished for simply doing their jobs as journalists.

[...]

Ironically, the imposition of such harsh sentences has unfolded against a backdrop of Western governments seeking to normalize relations with China. The reshaping of global politics under U.S. President Donald Trump has nudged allies to engage China. Over the past year, Western leaders who once condemned Beijing for human rights abuses – from France to Germany, Canada to the U.K. – have queued to shake Xi’s hand, sign trade deals, and signal goodwill.

As international pressure eases, the Chinese Communist Party has intensified its crackdown on dissent, acting with a level of impunity not seen in previous years. Beijing’s calculation is clear: if Western powers are eager to deepen economic ties, the diplomatic price of jailing dissidents has all but disappeared.

[...]

Now Jimmy Lai and countless others in China are paying the price for a West too eager to compromise principles for profit. Their suffering is a mirror reflecting the cost of a diplomacy that prioritizes access to China’s market and money over freedom, human rights, and justice.

[...]