5
submitted 11 months ago by himazawa@infosec.pub to c/nixos@infosec.pub

Used nix last year but dropped it after home-manager decided to unlink the apps from the Applications directory.

How is the current situation on usability of nix-Darwin + home-manager + brew?

Packages still fails to get indexed correctly in spotlight? I really like a fully repro environment but the fact that the usu ability was low bothered me a lot.

[-] himazawa@infosec.pub 29 points 11 months ago

BG3 is unmatchable, not only for hogwarts legacy but for every other game.

Starfield on the other end.. is the same oblivion stuff but in 2023 and without 2023 capabilities

2
submitted 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago) by himazawa@infosec.pub to c/ergomechkeyboards@lemmy.world

I am looking for a low profile keyboard compatible with the choc switches. I plan to put the choc sunset on it. I was looking for something similar to the Corne, just without the ergo-split thing. A standard 65-75% would work.

Bonus for hot swappable and no soldering required.

[-] himazawa@infosec.pub 7 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago)

WannaCry targeted hospitals, businesses and similar machines.

WannaCry targeted everything with SMB exposed, blindly.

Also, you should read more about security through obscurity, the fact that "no one will target you because you are a low-value target" is a false sense of security.

[-] himazawa@infosec.pub 3 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago)

I believe the risk of running outdated software is super inflated and mediatic, 99% of people would be absolutely fine running a version of Android from 3 years ago or Windows 8.

That's the same thing people running windows XP on internet were thinking in 2017.

Then WannaCry arrived and they got their data encrypted :)

[-] himazawa@infosec.pub 3 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago)

Perhaps images, video, font etc. rendering could be compromised?

Yes, it already happen in the past. Also the Wi-Fi and Bluetooth stack got exploited, like multiple kernel drivers.

But it shouldn't be a matter of "in the past was X exploited?" but more on having a correct security posture.

Honestly if you are arguing about wasting a "perfectly working phone" you should blame it on the vendor, especially Android devices vendors have this let's say "defect" of dropping the support after 4/5 years.

Also not going to talk about custom ROMs (with the super rare exclusion of some) managed by god knows who, without any security team behind.

Since even the NFC and Cellular Network stack got vulnerabilities the only way you would consider an old phone "safe" to use is just turning it into the equivalent of a local ARM server.

Also pretty fun seeing the replies in the original post talking about how Google Play store shouldn't have malware on it.

[-] himazawa@infosec.pub 6 points 1 year ago

Do anyone knows if it support local-only without joining the p2p network?

[-] himazawa@infosec.pub 5 points 1 year ago

So in the end you got removed.. I honestly have no idea how they want to do an IPO like that

[-] himazawa@infosec.pub 5 points 1 year ago

Thanks. I have never seen the last thing, what the numbers indicates?

[-] himazawa@infosec.pub 9 points 1 year ago

What am I looking at?

5
submitted 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago) by himazawa@infosec.pub to c/exploitdev@infosec.pub
3
submitted 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago) by himazawa@infosec.pub to c/infosecpub@infosec.pub

What about setting the new language of a post to English? There are people that don’t know how lemmy works that keep on opening new posts and leaving the language to “Undetermined” by mistake so no one can answer them.

[-] himazawa@infosec.pub 9 points 1 year ago

Soon, people will join the strange and buggy world of YouTube alternative frontends

[-] himazawa@infosec.pub 19 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago)

Take a look at my answer there. It was my fault apparently.

TL;DR: I set the image channel icon to /etc/paswd and forgot about it, people saw a suspicious call and panicked, sorry.

[-] himazawa@infosec.pub 14 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago)

Is this, by any chance, originated from the sub called ignore? In that case is probably my bad because is set as the image of the channel. (I was playing with lemmy in the previous version and forgot about it, sorry. It will not work since your browser can't access local file that easily without breaking the sandbox :))

Edit: I removed it so you shouldn't see the alert anymore. What I wasn't expecting is that apparently every sub is loaded even if you don't visit it.

/cc @shellsharks@infosec.pub

2
10

cross-posted from: https://beehaw.org/post/789646

An official FBI document dated January 2021, obtained by the American association "Property of People" through the Freedom of Information Act.

This document summarizes the possibilities for legal access to data from nine instant messaging services: iMessage, Line, Signal, Telegram, Threema, Viber, WeChat, WhatsApp and Wickr. For each software, different judicial methods are explored, such as subpoena, search warrant, active collection of communications metadata ("Pen Register") or connection data retention law ("18 USC§2703"). Here, in essence, is the information the FBI says it can retrieve:

  • Apple iMessage: basic subscriber data; in the case of an iPhone user, investigators may be able to get their hands on message content if the user uses iCloud to synchronize iMessage messages or to back up data on their phone.

  • Line: account data (image, username, e-mail address, phone number, Line ID, creation date, usage data, etc.); if the user has not activated end-to-end encryption, investigators can retrieve the texts of exchanges over a seven-day period, but not other data (audio, video, images, location).

  • Signal: date and time of account creation and date of last connection.

  • Telegram: IP address and phone number for investigations into confirmed terrorists, otherwise nothing.

  • Threema: cryptographic fingerprint of phone number and e-mail address, push service tokens if used, public key, account creation date, last connection date.

  • Viber: account data and IP address used to create the account; investigators can also access message history (date, time, source, destination).

  • WeChat: basic data such as name, phone number, e-mail and IP address, but only for non-Chinese users.

  • WhatsApp: the targeted person's basic data, address book and contacts who have the targeted person in their address book; it is possible to collect message metadata in real time ("Pen Register"); message content can be retrieved via iCloud backups.

  • Wickr: Date and time of account creation, types of terminal on which the application is installed, date of last connection, number of messages exchanged, external identifiers associated with the account (e-mail addresses, telephone numbers), avatar image, data linked to adding or deleting.

TL;DR Signal is the messaging system that provides the least information to investigators.

2

cross-posted from: https://beehaw.org/post/789646

An official FBI document dated January 2021, obtained by the American association "Property of People" through the Freedom of Information Act.

This document summarizes the possibilities for legal access to data from nine instant messaging services: iMessage, Line, Signal, Telegram, Threema, Viber, WeChat, WhatsApp and Wickr. For each software, different judicial methods are explored, such as subpoena, search warrant, active collection of communications metadata ("Pen Register") or connection data retention law ("18 USC§2703"). Here, in essence, is the information the FBI says it can retrieve:

  • Apple iMessage: basic subscriber data; in the case of an iPhone user, investigators may be able to get their hands on message content if the user uses iCloud to synchronize iMessage messages or to back up data on their phone.

  • Line: account data (image, username, e-mail address, phone number, Line ID, creation date, usage data, etc.); if the user has not activated end-to-end encryption, investigators can retrieve the texts of exchanges over a seven-day period, but not other data (audio, video, images, location).

  • Signal: date and time of account creation and date of last connection.

  • Telegram: IP address and phone number for investigations into confirmed terrorists, otherwise nothing.

  • Threema: cryptographic fingerprint of phone number and e-mail address, push service tokens if used, public key, account creation date, last connection date.

  • Viber: account data and IP address used to create the account; investigators can also access message history (date, time, source, destination).

  • WeChat: basic data such as name, phone number, e-mail and IP address, but only for non-Chinese users.

  • WhatsApp: the targeted person's basic data, address book and contacts who have the targeted person in their address book; it is possible to collect message metadata in real time ("Pen Register"); message content can be retrieved via iCloud backups.

  • Wickr: Date and time of account creation, types of terminal on which the application is installed, date of last connection, number of messages exchanged, external identifiers associated with the account (e-mail addresses, telephone numbers), avatar image, data linked to adding or deleting.

TL;DR Signal is the messaging system that provides the least information to investigators.

[-] himazawa@infosec.pub 6 points 1 year ago

Especially Adblock 😵

view more: next ›

himazawa

joined 1 year ago
MODERATOR OF