But beyond Russia rekindling old ties and worrying about domestic extremism, the big shift in the Russian relationship with Israel is rooted in Moscow’s increasingly close bilateral security relationship with Iran. I don’t think we can emphasize this enough. This development puts the rest of us—the United States and Europe—in quite a predicament. Russia is now engaged with Iran in two different conflicts, Ukraine and Israel/Gaza. Obviously, this is in quite different ways, but the Russia/Iran relationship greatly complicates the situation in the Middle East, Israel, and Gaza, and the battlefield in Ukraine. Russia’s relationship with Iran—not just Zelenskyy’s Jewish heritage, or all the Russian speakers of Jewish Ukrainian heritage in Israel—as well as the U.S. role in support of both Ukraine and Israel start to draw the two sets of conflicts into the same geopolitical frame.

I think prior to October 7, the Russians were very interested in the idea of the Israelis having a breakthrough with Saudi Arabia that they could then capitalize on economically and politically. Putin may even think that he can still bounce back with Israel at some point when the dust settles in Gaza, although I doubt that. I heard a prominent Israeli at a recent event say that Russia has now moved itself into the enemy category with Israel after decades of relations improving. And Russia has also always had a somewhat complex and awkward relationship with Saudi Arabia, even though they’ve been recently touting that relationship—we saw Putin on a sort of semi-victory tour of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in early December last year.

In the context of energy relationships, where Saudi Arabia is so important, Russia has often not gone along with what OPEC+ and the Saudis have wanted in terms of committing to production cuts to bolster oil prices. Russia is always thinking about its own bottom line, and volume is often better for Moscow than just price. Putin is continually focused on trying to make sure that Russia’s energy revenues are not imperiled in any way—especially given Moscow’s loss of its dominant position in Europe’s energy markets after the invasion of Ukraine. And then there is Iran, and Saudi Arabia’s difficult relationship and regional rivalry with Tehran. This is one of the reasons why Putin went to the UAE and Saudi Arabia in December 2023, to cozy up to the Gulf Cooperation Council/leading Gulf states and Saudi Arabia to balance Russia’ closer security ties with Iran.

What is Russia’s role in the Israel-Gaza crisis?