this post was submitted on 02 Jun 2025
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[–] webghost0101@sopuli.xyz 161 points 1 week ago* (last edited 1 week ago) (71 children)

The sad thing is the concept wasn’t.

Selling NFTs with no physical existence is what is pointlessly stupid.

Before they came along i considered the idea of a blockchain linked video camera where metadata of footage gets written into the chain to combat fake news and misinformation.

The goal would be to create a proof and record of original footage, to which media publishers and people who share can link towards to verify authenticity/author.

If the media later gets manipulated or reframed you would be able to verify this by comparing to the original record.

It was never a finished idea but when i first read nft i thought this is the right direction.

And then capitalism started selling apes and what the actual disgusting money possessed fuck was that.

[–] e8d79@discuss.tchncs.de 21 points 1 week ago (10 children)

This still fundamentally suffers from the oracle problem like all blockchains solutions. You can always attack these blockchain solutions at the point where they need to interact with the real world. In this case the camera is the "oracle" and nothing prevents someone from attacking the proposed camera and leveraging it to certify some modified footage. The blockchain doesn't add anything a public database and digitally signed footage wouldn't also achieve.

[–] drathvedro@lemm.ee 1 points 1 week ago (3 children)

This is a very legit concern. But to my understanding, it is possible to make the the camera that's very hard to crack, by putting security enclave or whatever it is that makes phones hard to unlock, right inside the CCD chip. Even if somebody manages to strip off the top layer, chart out the cryptographic circuit, probe the ROM inside, etc and extract the private key, it should be possible upon finding it to revoke the key to that camera or even the entire model and make it even more painful in further models.

Another concern is of camera being pointed to the screen with a fake image, but I've searched and yet to find a convincing shot that doesn't look like, well, a photo of a screen. But for this concern I think the only counter-measure would be to add photographer and publisher signatures to the mix, so that if anyone is engaging in such practice is caught, their entire library goes untrusted upon revocation. Wouldn't be completely foolproof, but better than nothing, I guess.

[–] Saledovil@sh.itjust.works 2 points 1 week ago (1 children)

That's security by obscurity. Given time, an attacker with physical access to the device will get every bit data from it. And yes, you could mark it as compromised, but then there's nothing stopping the attacker from just buying another camera and stripping the key from that, too. Since they already know how. And yes, you could revoke all the keys from the entire model range, and come up with a different puzzle for the next camera, but the attacker will just crack that one too.

Hiding the key on the camera in such a way that the camera can access it, but nobody else can is impossible. We simply need to accept that a photograph or a video is no longer evidence.

The idea in your second paragraph is good though, and much easier to implement than your first one.

[–] MotoAsh@lemmy.world 0 points 1 week ago (1 children)

No, it is not security through obscurity. It's a message signature algorithm, which are used in cryptography all the time.

You're falling for the classic paradox of security: it has to work for someone. OF COURSE if you get all of the keys and every detail of the process you can crack it. That's true of ALL CRYPTOGRAPHY. If someone knows everything including the keys, it's too late for any 'secure' device.

[–] Saledovil@sh.itjust.works 2 points 1 week ago

No, it is not security through obscurity. It’s a message signature algorithm, which are used in cryptography all the time.

Yes it is. The scheme is that when you take a picture, the camera signs said picture. The key is stored somewhere in the camera. Hence the secrecy of the key hinges on the the attacker not knowing how the camera accesses the key. Once the attacker knows that, they can get the key from the camera. Therefore, security hinges on the secrecy of the camera design/protocol used by the camera to access the key, in addition to the secrecy of the key. Therefore, it is security by obscurity.

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