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this post was submitted on 26 Mar 2024
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Asklemmy
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What does imply it's presence, then? The emergence of comparable effects is implied by isomorphic complexities. If you can't define the foundational structure which implies emergence, you can only fall back on a probabilistic approach.
Unless you can define exactly what structure it is that belies the emergence of consciousness, you must acknowledge that the comparative complexity of a more complex system is undoubtedly probabilistically suggestive of at least comparable, if not far more complex, emergent behavior.
The proposition that consciousness is emergent, but only at a very specific and narrow band of complexity, falls quickly to Occam's razor. It's logically and probabilistically ridiculous.
My point is that not all complex systems are the same. Maybe it depends on your definition of consciousness but from what I know we have only ever observed that in a very specific set of complex systems which is brains and possibly fungi. Two different systems being complex isn't enough in my view to infer that they would have the same properties unless there are other similarities.
It absolutely depends on your definition of consciousness. Every conversation about a concept depends on the definition of that concept. My definition is based upon sensation, processing, and decision-making, in regards to the self and the environment. I'd argue that plants and even cells exhibit simple forms of consciousness. If you take the emergent-property perspective, I'd argue even molecules and individual particles have a broad and abstract consciousness, although certainly several orders of magnitude less sophisticated than yours or mine.
The statement "we have only ever observed that in a very specific set of complex systems which is brains and possibly fungi" tells me less about consciousness than it does about our ability to observe it.