Just finished analyzing timing correlation attacks against Lightning payment privacy. Sharing findings with the security community.
The Problem:
Most Lightning privacy discussions focus on onion routing, but miss timing-based deanonymization:
- Immediate forwarding creates timing signatures
- Fixed delay patterns are fingerprintable
- Consistent channel selection for similar amounts reveals routing patterns
Mitigation Strategies:
- Random delays (200-800ms) between receiving and forwarding
- Occasional decoy forwards to break timing patterns
- Channel selection randomization for similar route/amount combinations
Research Methods:
Tested on signet with 50 simulated routing nodes. Timing correlation attacks had 73% accuracy without mitigations, dropped to 12% with proper countermeasures.
Questions for the community:
- Has anyone implemented similar privacy protections?
- What other Lightning privacy vectors concern you?
- Interest in more detailed technical writeup?
Building privacy tools for Lightning operators. Happy to discuss implementation details.