Tervell

A few senior officials in Israel are starting to voice concern about the escalating, open-ended attack on Iran — and suggesting possible exit ramps that might halt the war before it further damages the region and the global economy. Talk of an endgame is early, and a decision about whether to stop the attacks rests largely with President Donald Trump, who continues to seek all-out victory. But in a telephone conversation Sunday, a senior Israeli official familiar with the planning and strategy for the Iran war discussed alternatives to Trump’s call for “unconditional surrender.” The official requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the Iran situation. Trump has wavered among several conceptions of the outcome. He spoke at first about a negotiated settlement with pliable members of the regime but has since demanded surrender because, he said, his preferred negotiating partners are dead. Like Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said he wants to press on to what he described Saturday as “the moment of truth.” The disdain for negotiations expressed by Trump and Netanyahu may deepen after Sunday’s announcement that Iran’s new supreme leader will be Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the previous head of state who was killed in a massive airstrike on his compound Feb. 28. The new leader is a hard-liner who, if anything, is even closer to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps than his father was. Not a man for the bargaining table.

What concerns this official and others I’ve spoken with the past few days is that the cost of the war continues to rise — for gulf states pounded by Iranian missiles, for a global economy that’s facing steep increases in oil and natural gas prices that could trigger a worldwide economic crisis, and for Trump himself, who took the United States to war without a popular base of support for the conflict. “I’m not sure it’s in our interest to fight until the regime is toppled,” said the Israeli official. “Nobody wants a never-ending story.” The official said the Israeli and American bombing campaign was nearing the point of achieving its military objectives. It was close to destroying what was left of Iran’s nuclear program after U.S. bombardment in June, as well as its ballistic missile inventories and weapons-making factories,

uh huh, sure

along with the top tiers of its military, intelligence and internal security forces. When I asked how long it would take to complete this military mission, the official wouldn’t answer. “Of course, we wish to topple the regime, but that’s not the only endgame,” the Israeli said. Once the major military targets have been eliminated, “Israel would have achieved its goals,” he explained. “Iran won’t surrender, but it can send messages to accept a ceasefire with U.S. conditions.” To be clear, this official wasn’t speaking for Netanyahu, who said Sunday that in the next phase of the war, Israel wants “to destabilize the regime, to enable change.” But the official’s views do appear to express a view shared by some within the defense establishment, which became frustrated with Netanyahu’s determination to continue combat in Gaza without a clearly defined endgame and remains skeptical about his strategic planning. “We don’t see anyone who can replace the regime,” the Israeli official said, summarizing a view shared by U.S. and Israeli intelligence analysts. He said the regime’s centralized command-and-control structure was weakening, and there were early signs of internal rifts — but nothing to indicate that a crack-up is close. The Israeli said he doubted that arming the Kurds or other minorities would be a good strategy because it would alienate the Iranian majority.

Israeli defense planners appear to have two other concerns. One is the risk that Netanyahu will order major ground operations in Lebanon to complete the destruction of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah militia. “We don’t want to be dragged into the quagmire,” the official said, expressing concern at another point about “the slippery slope of Lebanon.” “We are willing to engage with Lebanese officials,” including President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, to “reach agreement on a ceasefire” there, the Israeli said. He said Israeli ground troops were inside Lebanon to attack the remnants of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force near Israel’s northern border, but “we are not planning large ground operations.” Israel wants to avoid a repeat of the 1982 ground invasion all the way to Beirut, which many Israelis came to view as a bad mistake. A second concern expressed by the Israeli official was maintaining good relations with the United States at a time when Americans in both political parties are voicing growing concern about the alliance. “We won’t drag the U.S. into an endless war,” the official said. “Israel is a reliable ally,” not a burden, he argued. Trump has set his course for the annihilation of the Iranian regime. He speaks about creating a new Iran that reflects that country’s yearning for freedom and modern life. But he doesn’t appear to have anything approaching a plan for achieving this worthy goal. And he’s going to have to answer the Iraq War-era question I heard reprised this weekend: Tell me how this ends?

The Pentagon needs an additional $12 billion through 2031 to boost declining readiness rates of the F-35 fighter, the world’s biggest weapons program and a key part of the US arsenal in the Iran War, program officials have told congressional auditors. The additional funding — mostly for spare parts — would add to the $1.2 trillion the Pentagon has already estimated it will cost to support the planned fleet of 2,470 Air Force, Navy and Marine jets over decades of service. That’s separate from the program’s $485 billion development and production phase. The disclosure comes as Marine Corps F-35C jets continue flying missions over Iran from the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier. The new data raises questions about the level of effort needed to keep those aircraft flying and the impact of sustaining that use on the remaining fleet. The Pentagon’s spending plans won’t provide any immediate relief to F-35Cs currently flying in the Mideast, which are likely drawing down on parts from other regions, according to a Government Accountability Office official. “We know from our prior work the program surges parts to support deployed operations,” said GAO Defense Capabilities and Management Director Diana Maurer, who’s supervising the readiness work. “But since there aren’t enough parts and other support to go around, non-deployed units suffer.”

Officials at the Pentagon’s F-35 program office and Lockheed Martin Corp. didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment. The concerns about the program aren’t new. Last year, the overall “mission capable” rate of the Marine Corps’ F-35C model — a measure of which aircraft are deemed safe and ready to perform one mission — dipped to 64.2% from 66% in 2024, according to fresh data provided to the GAO for a report to be published later this year. The service is supposed to maintain that rate at 85%. The gap is even wider when it comes to meeting “full mission capable rates”— the percentage of time during which aircraft are fully capable of accomplishing all assigned missions. The Marine Corps’ C-model rate for that metric was 22%, down from a high of nearly 30% in fiscal 2022. The program’s goal is 75%. The comparable full-capability rate for the Air Force, which is buying 1,763 F-35s, isn’t much better: 28.5% against a goal of 80%, according to the newly disclosed data.

Raising fleet-wide readiness rates “even 10% means dozens more mission capable F-35s ready to address other contingencies,” said Maurer. “Recent discussions regarding the aircraft’s “Fully Mission Capable” status, such as those highlighted in the GAO report, require additional context,” said a Marine Corps statement. “Due to the F-35’s highly integrated mission and vehicle systems, a single minor degradation can cause the aircraft to report as ‘not FMC,’ even when the issue does not materially affect its combat capabilities.” The Corps with the F-35 Joint Program Office “has made achieving maximum FMC rates a top priority” and “we are maximizing our funding towards” a “Global Supply System Reset” initiative, which is “‘a comprehensive effort to enhance the availability of replacement parts across the fleet” so “we are confident this initiative will yield significant, measurable improvements in F-35 readiness over the next five years,” it said.

A reversal appears to be taking shape in the pace of strikes in Iran. During the first five days of the war, the United States carried out more than three times as many attacks as Israel, according to data from the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). In that period, U.S. forces struck about 2,000 targets in Iran, compared with roughly 600 Israeli strikes. Over the weekend, however, after both Israel and the United States announced a transition to the “next phase” of Operation Roaring Lion, the trend shifted. Since then, the Israel Defense Forces have carried out nearly three times as many strikes as the U.S. military, hitting about 2,800 targets compared with roughly 1,000 American strikes. Overall, according to INSS figures, the United States has attacked about 3,000 targets in Iran since the start of the operation. Israel has struck around 3,400 targets in Iran, in addition to about 600 more in Lebanon. The data suggest that after the transition to the new phase of the campaign, Israel sharply accelerated its strikes in Iran, while the United States has largely maintained the operational tempo it set earlier in the war. Behind the numbers may lie a broader story reflecting different approaches by Israel and the United States to managing the conflict.

Possible limits on US strike pace

One possible reason the United States has not significantly increased its strike rate may involve munitions supplies and interceptor inventories. Days before the war broke out, according to a report in The Washington Post, U.S. Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine warned President Donald Trump and senior administration officials that U.S. weapons stockpiles were not large. Separately, the Financial Times reported that Israeli intelligence had concluded the U.S. forces deployed in the Middle East have only a limited ability to sustain prolonged strikes against Iran. According to the report, which cited an Israeli intelligence official, the United States could conduct an intensive air campaign for “four to five days,” or sustain a lower-intensity strike pace for about a week. In the early days of the conflict, concerns were also raised about the U.S. supply of interceptor missiles. Trump quickly rejected those claims, saying the United States had an “almost unlimited” supply of critical munitions, and Pentagon officials also sought to reassure the public, stating that U.S. forces have sufficient ammunition.

US reinforcing forces in the region

Since then, the United States has moved additional military assets toward the Middle East, some of which are still en route. These include the aircraft carrier USS George Bush and its strike group, which includes three destroyers. In recent days, four U.S. B-1 bombers have also arrived in Britain. At RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire, the massive C-5M Super Galaxy transport aircraft has also been spotted. The aircraft is capable of carrying two M1 Abrams tanks, six Apache helicopters or 36 military vehicles.

Israel accelerating operations

From Israel’s perspective, the shift in strike tempo as the campaign enters its next phase may reflect progress in the fighting. It may also indicate concern that Trump could halt the operation due to public opinion in the United States. Israeli officials reportedly understood early in the war that it would be important to maximize operational gains quickly. At the same time, Trump has said several times that the war could last a month or even longer, and there are signs the campaign is far from over. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said overnight that “this is only the beginning.” Trump also said the final decision on when the war ends will ultimately rest with him, though Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will have influence over the timing.

The main reason why Hezbollah is increasingly successful in causing casualties among our soldiers and carrying out terror against northern communities is the fact that the IDF is concentrating its intelligence and air efforts in Iran. The concentration of this effort inevitably impairs the ability to quickly gather intelligence on Hezbollah's operations in Lebanon, and especially in southern Lebanon, and to respond to them effectively. As you may recall, in the second year of the war, in 2024, Hezbollah struck our forces and the Air Force's control facilities with anti-tank missiles launched from ranges of five to six kilometers from the border. The IDF then invested special intelligence and firepower, and succeeded in pushing the Shiite terrorist organization north of the Litani River and beyond the effective range of most of the anti-tank missiles it had in its possession. Hezbollah is now returning small squads of anti-tank launchers to the areas from which it withdrew, and is striking IDF forces that have gone out to frontal defense to prevent attacks on northern communities. Paradoxically, the deployment of IDF forces to frontline defense inside Lebanese territory brought our forces closer to the range of Hezbollah's anti-tank missiles and mortars in the "Bader" area north of the Litani, and this fact is actually the main reason for the increase in the number of casualties among our forces. The IDF will need to improvise a more powerful intelligence and air fire effort and do so quickly, while the campaign in Iran is ongoing, in order to once again reduce Hezbollah's ability to inflict damage on us. Hezbollah currently has about 20% of its military and firepower capabilities remaining. It has about 25,000 missiles and rockets, most of them short-range, and hundreds of them are accurate and can cause damage to the Dan bloc. In addition, it has thousands more anti-tank missiles that have not yet been destroyed and coastal missiles that threaten the gas rigs at sea, and the Radwan Force has also renewed its strength and currently numbers about 5,000 fighters, deployed on the ground in a more dispersed manner than before, mainly in the "Bader" area north of the Litani.

Radon Hazard: Physical Movement and Electronic Signals

The Radwan Force, which mainly includes anti-tank squads, is deployed about five kilometers from the border or even less, from where they collect intelligence on our forces and locate targets for their short-range, high-altitude weapons, and especially for the anti-tank missiles of all types they have. According to what is being published in Lebanon and the Western media, Radwan's forces are managing to locate, through ground observations and with the help of drones and UAVs, the concentrations of our forces inside Lebanese territory, operating in the first and second line of villages adjacent to the border with Israel. Radwan's forces operate these collection means both day and night, and are managing to spot logistical convoys and dense forces of our fighters, some of whom are in outposts or improvised defensive compounds, and most of whom are moving in the area while exposed to enemy observation within the villages and also in the buildings where the forces are staying or which serve as headquarters for our forces. The reinforced forces that entered Lebanese territory as part of the IDF's forward defense effort produce many physical movements and electronic signals that Hezbollah knows how to detect, and it exploits them. In fact, the Radwan force is launching its anti-tank missiles and short-range rockets from the area north of the Litani, which was supposed to serve as a staging area for the attack that the Radwan force was planning into Israeli territory, to conquer the Galilee. From this area, the Radwan men were supposed to move to staging areas in the villages adjacent to the border with Israel, but now the Radwan force has returned to these staging areas, and from there it is launching the anti-tank missiles and inserting small squads of fighters with the aim of approaching our forces, kidnapping fighters and causing them casualties.

The number of Radwan Force units within the "Bader" area has increased greatly recently, and some of them are also crossing the Litani into the area south of the river. When they try to do this openly, the Lebanese army stops them in Aden, but when they penetrate the southern Lebanese area through secret routes, the Lebanese army is unable to do so. In addition, Hezbollah still has the ability to fire Iranian-made "Almas" anti-tank missiles, which Radwan force members in small squads can launch from hiding places or from a back slope. These missiles, which are actually copies of Israeli Gil missiles that the Iranians copied, can be aimed with great precision at their target using an optical homing mechanism installed on the head of the missile, allowing it to be launched from hiding both day and night.

Compromise in Iran and a woodworking maneuver

It is worth noting that, unlike what was the case during the "Iron Swords" War and Operation "Northern Arrows" before Nasrallah's assassination, this time there is a complete disconnect between the Iranians and Hezbollah as a result of the IDF's assassination operations that have been underway in Lebanon in recent days. This fact means that Hezbollah is acting on its own, completely disconnected from its Iranian patrons, and this is also evident in its activities. Either way, with each passing day, Hezbollah is better prepared and equipped for guerrilla warfare, on both sides of the Litani. This fact requires the IDF to make three efforts:

• The first and most important effort is an increased intelligence-gathering effort using every resource that can be diverted from the effort focused on Iran, to locate the anti-tank squads that Hezbollah has managed to infiltrate north and south of the Litani, as well as the short-range launchers and mortars that are in that area and are attacking our forces in the outposts and in the area between them.
• The second effort must be rapid fire and belts of fire that will accompany the forces on the ground, including artillery fire that will land on areas from which Hezbollah may launch missiles at our forces, even without clear information that Hezbollah is there. The problem with this fire effort is that every aircraft, whether it is a UAV, a helicopter, or fighter jets, will be subtracted from the forces attacking Iran, and therefore the fire effort, just like the intelligence effort, requires concessions and compromises between the two fronts.
• The third effort is, of course, the operational conduct of our forces in frontline defense inside Lebanese territory. This requires smoke masking, movements in small forces, and especially intensive artillery fire coverage of any movement in the field, including the forces stationed in posts. All three of these efforts must be conducted intensively despite the operation in Iran, otherwise we will be captured.

Hezbollah's arrays for launching heavier rockets and drones actually cause less damage, because Israel's air defense system has improved greatly, and most of the drones and rockets or missiles that Hezbollah launches in increasing quantities are intercepted.

lol, sure

The problem, as mentioned, is the forces on the ground who are exposed to anti-tank missiles and short-range launchers. The solution to all this, including launches deep into Israel, is probably a ground-based maneuver into Lebanese territory to the launch centers in the "Bader" area, that is, between the Litani and Awali, in the Beirut area and in the Bekaa region. But as long as the campaign in Iran is ongoing, the IDF must continue to concentrate its efforts there and wait until conditions allow, if it is still necessary, to carry out a ground-based maneuver into Lebanese territory. Chances are, for example, that if the regime in Iran begins to crumble, Hezbollah will have to recalculate its course anyway and will probably hold off on the fire.

the famous military strategy of "just do nothing and hope the enemy collapses"

In addition, the pressure from the population in Lebanon, including the Shiite population, more than half a million of whom were forced to flee from the southern Lebanon and Dahiyya regions, will send its signals to Hezbollah, and if it causes it to cease firing, perhaps a ground-to-ground maneuver, as the IDF is planning and preparing for, will be unnecessary.