anon

Merci pour le lien, c’est un point de départ utile et intéressant. Je vais regarder plus en profondeur. Je note dans le résumé :

De manière générale, 40 % des personnes condamnées en 2019 sont en état de récidive ou de réitération. Cette part est de 8 % pour les condamnés pour crime et de 40 % pour ceux condamnés pour un délit (14 % au titre de la récidive légale, 26 % au titre de la réitération).

Depuis 2005, la proportion de récidivistes augmente aussi bien en matière délictuelle (+ 8 points) que criminelle (+ 5 points). En revanche, la proportion de condamnés en état de réitération est stable.

Je n’ai pas indiqué mes sources, donc il me semble inopportun de juger d’une éventuelle ligne éditoriale - en l’occurrence, c’est la moyenne de plusieurs sources.

Par ailleurs, que ce soit du vent ou pas, une hypothèse n’est que cela - une suspicion qui attend d’être confrontée à des données. Je viens ici pour demander si ces données existent.

Je ne comprends pas trop cette attitude qui consiste à sous-entendre que la démarche ne vaut rien car elle n’est pas fondée, lorsque mon but est justement d’en tester le fondement. Cela va un peu à l’encontre de l’esprit de discussion de ce fil, me semble-t-il.

Observateur distant de l’actualité judiciaire française, j’ai une hypothèse (superficielle à ce stade) que les récidivistes et réitérants représentent une part disproportionnellement élevée des délits et crimes.

Les preuves dont je dispose sont essentiellement anecdotiques : des faits divers rapportés dans la presse dont les auteurs étaient déjà très “défavorablement connus” pour des faits similaires, selon la formule consacrée. Certains en ont appelé au retour des peines plancher, ou l’instauration de peines exponentielles.

Existe-t-il des données publiques juxtaposant le nombre de délits et de crimes commis en France d’une part, et les antécédents judiciaires de leurs auteurs d’autre part ? Ce qui permettrait de faire une analyse de Pareto (et le cas échéant rejeter cette hypothèse).

Suck it Karl Popper!

Just because he called it an apparent paradox doesn’t mean that Popper disagrees with you. He merely said that open societies should first fight intolerance with reason and civil discourse; but if that fails, the tolerant majority should hold the right to suppress intolerant opinions.

In my country, absolutely not. Religion is a pretty subdued and private matter to begin with. It does not interfere with politics and attempts at doing so get shut down pretty quickly.

Or did you mean to ask in the context of a specific country, Op?

I think I speak for most of the world when I say “Netflix still does DVDs??”

I mean, you literally do, because that service apparently only existed in the US.

What’s the alternative to the will of the majority, though?

The legislature is meant to be ≈ representative, but that ranges from 1:1 in places like Switzerland (direct votation on everything) to indirect representation such as a bicameral system where the higher chamber (typically, the senate) is supposed to embrace the long view and provide some degree of perennial wisdom that the masses sometimes lack (especially in reaction to current events).

I agree that the mean has regressed toward populism and reactionary sentiment toward social progress (e.g., LGBTQ rights) among Western democracies in the last couple of decades. But I also look at this as history (with a lowercase h) ebbing and flowing, while History (with an uppercase H) trends unidirectionally toward more open and progressive societies. In other words, one step back, two steps forward. Every generation seems to be more tolerant than the previous, and holistically there’s been steady progress (in the “progressive” acceptance of the word) on societal matters over the 19th and 20th century to date.

I also feel that an absolutist free speech position, while dogmatically progressive and permissive on the surface, is actually regressive in its byproducts (cf. Popper’s paradox of intolerance). I also feel that most Western democracies, through their imperfect but somewhat representative legislatures, have struck a nuanced position on free speech that wisely forbids advocating for discriminatory speed (all the way to handing down hefty fines and prison sentences for neonazi speech in Europe, for instance).

That makes me not in favor of naively experimenting with relaxing those rules and risking hate speech (however thinly disguised) become banal once again.

I haven’t watched the vid and cannot right now. But responding to the comment above, it should be “forbidden to say unpleasant things” when the law makes it illegal, because the law comes from the elected legislature in a democracy (i.e., ≈ the collective will of the people). This is not about cushioning people from unpleasantness, it’s about not breaking laws that exist for a reason.

When should it be made illegal to say such things? When we collectively and democratically agree that it leads to net negative societal outcomes; for example, quoting the worst of the Old Testament, or Hitler’s Mein Kampf in the context of uncritically calling for genocide or apartheid is already illegal in some countries, because we know exactly where this leads. It’s not the books themselves that are problematic, it’s advocating for illegal things like discrimination or mass murder based on race, beliefs, etc. Anyone advocating for such things is already legally liable under several jurisdictions, regardless of whether they couch their argument in some third-party written text.

Such laws were enacted precisely because of historical lessons learned at an expensive cost to humanity. We don’t have to repeat the same experiments just because we didn’t live through that era.

According to the [GeekBench 6] test, the M3 performed over 20% faster than both chips [M2 Max and M2 Pro] and scored 3,472 points in the single-core tests and 13,676 points in the multi-core tests. The numbers place the M3 above its predecessor, the M2 Max and M2 Pro [even though the M3 has fewer cores].

Source: https://hypebeast.com/2023/3/apple-m3-chipset-performance-estimation-report

In the US, perhaps. But the logic that “if you work at a Catholic school you gotta do their shit” is precisely the problem here, and what needs to change. In many other countries, a contract is unenforceable if it contains discriminatory terms. The onus ought to be on religious schools to adapt to contemporary societal norms if they want to engage with society through labor, procurement, etc contracts. Otherwise we’re just tolerating and perpetuating little islands of discrimination and bigotry in the name of religious freedom.

In many other countries, such contractual provisions would be considered abusive and be thrown out by the court, so that a religious school (or any bigoted employer) could not enforce discriminatory terms under the guise of institutional or personal beliefs. I find it doubly weird that this situation can be boiled down so casually to contract law when it ought to be a constitutional matter.

U.S.* court, Op. It’s important to add that to the title and not let readers have to figure it out.