zeroxy

I'm not that concerned. There is also microg

"To be clear, developers will have the same freedom to distribute their apps directly to users through sideloading or to use any app store they prefer."

Decoupling doesn't always work in favor of the people. Self-hosting can do good things but again needs to be careful navigating the regulatory regime.

If you were not concerned about executing subpoenas yourself, self host, even on an openwrt.

If you have email, the Calendar, Contacts, notes/tasks, functionality can be also replicated on a shoestring budget. You might have to write some code, but you would be ok.

I have a nagging the back of my head, that ActivityPub can we workable through databaseless almost static resources.

I generally dislike needing dbm's for deployments. I like it cheaper, static.

Rules for thee but not for me. The public wouldn't have access to the data. "They cant be trusted"

Key notes and some thoughts:

1. "It is emphasized that national legislation on storing and access to retained traffic and location data for the purpose of safeguarding national security should be exempt from future EU legislation, regardless of which national authority requests access."

2. "Some Member States highlight the fact that it would be important to bear in mind the recommendations of the High level Group regarding the enforcement of sanctions against electronic and other communications service providers which do not comply with requirements regarding the retention and provision of data."

3. "Some Member States stress that access rules at EU level should not interfere with national rules on the admissibility of data."

4. One could argue the opposite. One could argue that the admissibility of any data that are subject to disclosure should be subjectable to a negative protection test regarding their admissibility, in accordance to proportionality and procedural safeguards, therefore by instituting exclusionary rules. Those exclusionary rules of data subject to disclosure, should be the subject of harmonization. This is the best way to protect fundamental rights, while reducing impediments to investigations. Any data retention obligation should be only be the competence of members states (by national laws). It would be those laws that should be the subject of future litigation in terms of their validity and compliance with the EU primary law, and of the general principles (of EU law). "Therefore argue that a new EU data retention regime should not rely on a literal application of those rulings to individual cases, but rather on an assessment of the principle of proportionality in line with the CJEU’s general guidelines as they result from the application of the Charter (CFREU), combined with appropriate mechanisms for oversight by independent bodies or judicial authorities to ensure full protection of fundamental rights." We have seen how certain competent authorities duck replying - courts per CFREU, the treaties and the general principles of EU law, courts must reply, otherwise they are not courts.

5. "Member States consider that EU legislation should not define the concept of ’serious crime‘ " This is an interesting take that allows any member state crime to be defined as serious.

6. "Member States consider that targeted data retention would be insufficient to achieve a good outcome for the investigations, since law enforcement authorities will not always know in advance by whom, when, and where a crime is going to be committed."

7. "Member States also mention the importance of aligning future data retention rules with existing ... regulation in the field of consumer protection." So we break consent for supposedly crime investigation purposes but we also want it applied in civil actions. Using the power to compel under criminal law for civil actions, that's something

8. "Some Member States and the EU Counter-terrorism coordinator agree that over-the-top (OTT) services should be subject to retention obligations due to their dominance in communications "

9. "Most Member States express general support for future legislation to have the broadest possible scope of application"

10. "Other Member States point out that the system should be based on general retention combined with robust access safeguards." So back to the wording of the old directive in essence.

11. So they want what they had in the past. They are talking about subjecting correspondence that is transported through technological means, to a "mandatory" retention obligation, yet no one seems to even assess the implications for software developers in regards to their freedom speech in terms of writing software and the conscientious objections they might have with a measure of a broadest scope of application (indiscriminate). There isn't any assessment either regarding the (compelled) self-incrimination part, which is instituted by such regime, because any party to a correspondence would be compelled under criminal law, to forcibly disclose and make available self incriminating correspondence, even in civil proceedings.