this post was submitted on 12 Mar 2026
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I'm wondering what would be necessary to build GrapheneOS releases yourself, and regularly update your phone from your own servers, with your builds. The server for apps.grapheneos.org should also be replaced. Has anyone done this?

The documentation for GrapheneOS has a section about how to reproduce builds:

https://grapheneos.org/build#reproducible-builds

But it would be more involved than that.

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[–] utopiah@lemmy.ml 6 points 2 days ago* (last edited 2 days ago) (1 children)

I haven't but I did built relatively large projects before (e.g. browsers) and basically it depends mostly on 2 things :

  • are you in rush? If not just let it run over night, if you are then delegate it (if you can afford it and matches your threat model) to a cloud provider (rent a couple of instances for however long you need, that's where the hourly pricing matters)
  • is the build system properly setup for reproducibility, e.g runs in a single container on AMD64? if so just start it and move on, otherwise be prepared for an indefinite amount of tinkering

I think it's interesting to do but honestly as someone else mentioned, builds are signed. In fact at the end of https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verified-boot-key-hash you get the verified boot hash. The goal is precisely to check that you actually get what you are supposed to have running. Basically the big picture of reproducible builds is that you do NOT have to do it and can STILL verify that you have exactly, up to a single bit, what should have.

[–] liminal@lemmy.ml 6 points 2 days ago* (last edited 2 days ago) (2 children)

The fact that devs sign the builds doesn't protect you from a Jia Tan type of actor. Jia Tan had social-engineered they way to a maintainer and then dropped their backdoor in the .tar releases. If you had compiled from the tree you couldn't be affected. It's possible to fail to review malicious commits even in this case, but it is still more transparent than pre-packaged releases. And there's no point to reproducible builds if no one actually reproduces them.

[–] utopiah@lemmy.ml 1 points 1 day ago* (last edited 1 day ago)

a Jia Tan type of actor

Yes, absolutely, yet the fact that we even know who they are proves that it's definitely an odd case. It's important to remember it but it's definitely not a normal situation.

[–] Auli@lemmy.ca 0 points 1 day ago

You don't know anything about the lead developer.