It’s a complex answer to why I’d personally hold a drone operator in 2001ish to a similar but higher standard than a guard at their post, versus the IAF today. The former are working with semi limited/limited information: this uniform = enemy but there’s a dark shape in an alley, there’s the front line of contact but why is that person digging by the roadside, drone rolled up from its 32hr autonomous flight plan and now there’s live intel feed - all limited information. In those scenarios genuine, honest mistakes are possible but always avoidable. That’s the “fog” part of the ‘fog of war’ - making life or death decisions quickly with limited knowledge.

All that doesn’t apply to the IAF right now… The fog is clear now; the ISR and SIGINT capabilities of Israel are very strong, drones and satellites are all over Gaza, the bombing targets are clearly identified along with the “collateral” civilian deaths it will cause:

In the early days of the offensive, the head of its air force spoke of relentless, “around the clock” airstrikes… but he added: “We are not being surgical.”

Describing the unit’s targeting process, an official said: “The operatives of Hamas are not immune – no matter where they hide.”

Multiple sources told the Guardian and +972/Local Call that when a strike was authorised on the private homes of individuals identified as Hamas or Islamic Jihad operatives, target researchers knew in advance the number of civilians expected to be killed. Each target, they said, had a file containing a collateral damage score that stipulated how many civilians were likely to be killed in a strike.

That’s no longer an “ooops, well we tried hard to limit civilian deaths” if you’re callous about the human cost to achieve your political/military goals. But as long as they’re not your people I guess?