Would be funnier without the LLM slop
this post was submitted on 19 May 2026
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Hot take. Node is cancer. It's the new PHP but worse because it's not just websites and the dev community is more toxic.
I was saying that shit in 2015! Minus PHP, it has a soft spot in my heart ❤️.
You say as if you can't make php shell scripts or GUI apps :)
Stop giving them ideas
Them already did.
PHP was only worse because of the syntax. The ecosystem around it with composer and other tools has always been superb.
composer/packagist has the exact same dependency security risks as node.js.
composer/packagist has the exact same dependency security risks as node.js.
(Reposted)
Objectively, they all frustrate validation the same. When comparing with a SLSA3-compliant setup where every installed artifact has a signed checksum in a signed bundle from a signed resource on a signed repository, and the endpoint to this is readily available from something like authenticated SNMP into the single source of truth, they all tends to compare poorly.
The chart below completely ignores that Debs are consolidated into a single source of truth as well, and I feel violating SSoT should cost significantly because of dependency holes when artifact registry is incomplete, but SLSA doesn't care about that part.
| Ecosystem / Format | Estimated SLSA Level | Update Reliability / Model | Trust Chain & Provenance Comments |
|---|---|---|---|
| (withheld) | 3–4 | Very high; repo-based, transactional updates | Strong: signed packages + signed repo metadata + central DB; distros enforce reproducible builds. |
| OCI containers (hardened pipeline: cosign + Tekton/in-toto) | 3 | High if using automated CI/CD and policy enforcement | Strong if you use signed images + non-falsifiable provenance; this is rare but achievable. |
| DEB (distro repos) | 2 | High; repo-based, APT handles dependencies | Medium: repo metadata signed, but per-package signatures not mandatory; weaker checksum chain. |
| Flatpak runtimes (Flathub) | 2 | High; centralized runtimes, predictable updates | Medium: signed OSTree commits; build infra more centralized, but not full end-to-end provenance. |
| Flatpak apps | 1–2 | High; repo-based, automatic updates | Mixed: OSTree signing helps, but build provenance varies by publisher; no uniform SLSA guarantees. |
| Snap (strict confinement) | 1–2 | High; centralized store, auto-updates | Centralized signing by Canonical, but opaque build pipelines; trust is “trust the store operator.” |
| OCI containers (typical public images) | 0–1 | Medium; pull-latest model, tag drift common | Usually unsigned; mutable tags; no guaranteed provenance—trust is mostly social and reputation-based. |
| Snap (classic confinement) | 1 | High; same store/auto-update model | Same store trust, but classic snaps bypass sandbox; even more reliance on publisher integrity. |
| AppImage | 0–1 | Low–medium; ad-hoc self-update or manual downloads | Almost no chain of custody; signatures optional; no central repo or provenance expectations. |
| npm (JavaScript) | 0–1 | High frequency, but low reliability of safety; semver + lockfiles | Registry accounts can publish arbitrary tarballs; no default signed provenance; transitive deps explode risk. |
| PyPI / pip (Python) | 0–1 | Similar to npm; pip + requirements/lockfiles | Tarballs/wheels from arbitrary maintainers; no mandatory signing; provenance work (e.g., PEP 740) is emerging but not standard. |
| Composer / Packagist (PHP) | 0–1 | Good tooling, but same “trust the registry” model | Packages pulled from Packagist/VCS; no mandatory signatures; dependency graph trust is social, not cryptographic. |
| CPAN (Perl) | 0–1 | Mature ecosystem, but manual/legacy in many flows | Historically minimal provenance; mirrors and authors are trusted by convention, not by SLSA-style attestations. |
| Other language registries (RubyGems, crates.io, etc.) | 0–1 | Similar to npm/PyPI; lockfiles help reproducibility | Central registries, but no default SLSA provenance; integrity is mostly TLS + registry operator trust. |
Where's that slop image coming from? Did you seriously generate a slop image to add to this post?
"npm" is an abbreviation of the package vetting methodology.
No Process, Motherf***er
Do other packe manager prevent this?
it has nothing to do with the package manager and everything with JS being a very widely used language mostly by rather inexperienced web devs.
The problem isn't the package manager. Many small dependency packages multuply the attack surface of the "supply chain". (it isn't even a supply chain when a dude opensources his code as-is then a company decides to build their whole business on it)
I pulled in a webcomponent at work and got 300 plus deps. Fml.