cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/55162696
[Op-ed by César Eduardo Santos, researcher at the Expediente Abierto center (www.expedienteabierto.org). Specialized in the authoritarian influence of China and Russia in Latin America.]
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Cooperation between China and [Latin American] countries should not be understood merely as an exchange of resources or investments, but as a broader web of institutional, technological, and ideational interactions that, in certain contexts, may contribute to the reproduction of authoritarian dynamics, as highlighted in the report Authoritarianism with Chinese Characteristics by the think tank Expediente Abierto.
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People-to-people exchanges constitute one of the most visible—and at the same time most underestimated—instruments of China’s international projection. On the surface, these mechanisms aim to foster understanding between societies. However, they form an integral part of the [Chinese Communist Party] CCP’s foreign policy and operate under strong state control, building networks of influence that connect foreign actors with China’s political apparatus.
In Latin America, and particularly in Central America, these exchanges have expanded beyond cultural or academic spheres to include sensitive sectors of the state apparatus. Delegations of police officers, military personnel, judges, and prosecutors have participated in training programs in China, where they are exposed to operational doctrines and governance models related to public order control and the administration of justice.
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In Nicaragua, officials from the National Police have held bilateral meetings with China’s Ministry of Public Security and participated in training programs that include instruction in riot-control tactics, the use of drones in police operations, criminal investigation techniques, and dignitary protection. This cooperation also extends to participation in international security platforms led by China.
Similarly, in 2024, Chinese Ambassador Zhang Yanhui, accompanied by newly appointed Defense Attaché Dai Zenggang, held an official meeting with El Salvador’s Minister of Defense, during which they discussed expanding cooperation in key defense areas, signaling a deepening of military ties between the two countries. These interactions go beyond the defense sphere and extend into the legal and prosecutorial domains. In 2023, Supreme Court President Óscar López met in Beijing with Zhang Jun, President of China’s Supreme People’s Court, where they signed judicial cooperation agreements. Subsequently, in 2024, Attorney General Rodolfo Delgado met with his Chinese counterpart to strengthen cooperation between their respective justice institutions.
A similar pattern can be observed in Honduras, where Supreme Court President Rebeca Ráquel Obando participated in a judicial cooperation forum organized by China in Quanzhou in 2023 and met with Chinese Ambassador Yu Bo in 2024 to expand bilateral legal cooperation. Such exchanges have facilitated the circulation of experiences related to judicial digitalization, criminal management, and the construction of the so-called “rule of law,” in a context where the executive branch has expanded its control over the judiciary.
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In Nicaragua, the Sandinista government has promoted systems such as SINAREM (National Emergency Response System) with Chinese assistance. This type of technological architecture, based on centralized data and integrated surveillance, has obvious applications for social control.
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Likewise, the National Library of San Salvador, built by Chinese companies, incorporates facial recognition systems and automated services. In addition, Salvadoran officials have visited companies such as Huawei, China Mobile, and BYD as part of training programs in China, where they have been exposed to 5G technologies, connectivity platforms, and digital governance solutions. Although presented under the banner of modernization, these tools expand the state’s capacity to manage data and monitor public spaces.
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Honduran officials have participated in “smart city” programs in China, where they have been exposed to “urban brain” systems based on big data, sensors, and integrated surveillance. Domestically, the national 911 emergency system—which includes license plate recognition and thousands of interconnected cameras—has been linked to technologies associated with Huawei and other related companies. Although presented as public security infrastructure, this system provides the foundations for broader monitoring capabilities.
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The significance of Chinese technology lies not only in its potential for overt repression. As recent analyses suggest, these tools enable more subtle and persistent forms of control, expanding not only the state’s capacity to repress but also its ability to govern in a preventive manner.
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The dynamics described above invite a reconsideration of China’s presence in Central America. Beyond infrastructure and trade, the evidence points to a broader framework of cooperation. On the one hand, China expands its influence within strategic sectors of the state apparatus, builds networks with ruling elites, and promotes the adoption of technological standards and regulatory frameworks aligned with its global interests. On the other hand, recipient regimes gain access to resources, technologies, and expertise that can strengthen their control capacities, reduce their dependence on Western partners, and legitimize their illiberal governing practices.
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In this sense, authoritarian cooperation should be understood not as an external imposition but as a relational process shaped by converging interests and specific political trajectories. The key question, therefore, is not whether China is “exporting authoritarianism,” but rather how its mechanisms of cooperation interact with domestic dynamics that are already moving in that direction.