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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36830782

Archived

Director of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Sergey Naryshkin, has claimed that Ukraine and the United Kingdom are allegedly preparing acts of sabotage in the Baltic Sea. It is another disinformation campaign from the Kremlin, according to Andriy Kovalenko, head of Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation at the National Security and Defense Council.

"Ukraine, together with the British, is preparing provocations in the Baltic Sea. One of the scenarios involves staging a fake Russian torpedo attack on a US Navy ship," Naryshkin said.

However, Kovalenko dismissed these claims as false.

"Naryshkin from the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service keeps doing the only thing he knows - fabricating nonsense. This time, he invented a fake story about Ukraine and the UK preparing sabotage operations in the Baltic Sea. And this is the same Naryshkin who organized cable sabotage against NATO using ships of the tanker fleet," he said.

[...]

"So now Naryshkin comes up with nonsense and provocations to win favor with Putin. Only Russia is capable of planning sabotage in the Baltic, as it has done before," the head of the Center for Countering Disinformation notes.

[...]

On December 25 of last year, it was reported that underwater communication cables between Estonia and Finland had been damaged.

Arto Pahkin, a representative of Finnish electricity transmission system operator Fingrid, noted that two vessels were in the area at the time the connection was severed.

Later, it emerged that Finnish authorities were investigating an oil tanker suspected of being part of Russia's so-called shadow fleet.

According to media reports, by stopping the Russian shadow fleet tanker, Finland may have prevented several more serious sabotage operations.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36830782

Archived

Director of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Sergey Naryshkin, has claimed that Ukraine and the United Kingdom are allegedly preparing acts of sabotage in the Baltic Sea. It is another disinformation campaign from the Kremlin, according to Andriy Kovalenko, head of Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation at the National Security and Defense Council.

"Ukraine, together with the British, is preparing provocations in the Baltic Sea. One of the scenarios involves staging a fake Russian torpedo attack on a US Navy ship," Naryshkin said.

However, Kovalenko dismissed these claims as false.

"Naryshkin from the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service keeps doing the only thing he knows - fabricating nonsense. This time, he invented a fake story about Ukraine and the UK preparing sabotage operations in the Baltic Sea. And this is the same Naryshkin who organized cable sabotage against NATO using ships of the tanker fleet," he said.

[...]

"So now Naryshkin comes up with nonsense and provocations to win favor with Putin. Only Russia is capable of planning sabotage in the Baltic, as it has done before," the head of the Center for Countering Disinformation notes.

[...]

On December 25 of last year, it was reported that underwater communication cables between Estonia and Finland had been damaged.

Arto Pahkin, a representative of Finnish electricity transmission system operator Fingrid, noted that two vessels were in the area at the time the connection was severed.

Later, it emerged that Finnish authorities were investigating an oil tanker suspected of being part of Russia's so-called shadow fleet.

According to media reports, by stopping the Russian shadow fleet tanker, Finland may have prevented several more serious sabotage operations.

[...]

Archived

Director of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Sergey Naryshkin, has claimed that Ukraine and the United Kingdom are allegedly preparing acts of sabotage in the Baltic Sea. It is another disinformation campaign from the Kremlin, according to Andriy Kovalenko, head of Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation at the National Security and Defense Council.

"Ukraine, together with the British, is preparing provocations in the Baltic Sea. One of the scenarios involves staging a fake Russian torpedo attack on a US Navy ship," Naryshkin said.

However, Kovalenko dismissed these claims as false.

"Naryshkin from the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service keeps doing the only thing he knows - fabricating nonsense. This time, he invented a fake story about Ukraine and the UK preparing sabotage operations in the Baltic Sea. And this is the same Naryshkin who organized cable sabotage against NATO using ships of the tanker fleet," he said.

[...]

"So now Naryshkin comes up with nonsense and provocations to win favor with Putin. Only Russia is capable of planning sabotage in the Baltic, as it has done before," the head of the Center for Countering Disinformation notes.

[...]

On December 25 of last year, it was reported that underwater communication cables between Estonia and Finland had been damaged.

Arto Pahkin, a representative of Finnish electricity transmission system operator Fingrid, noted that two vessels were in the area at the time the connection was severed.

Later, it emerged that Finnish authorities were investigating an oil tanker suspected of being part of Russia's so-called shadow fleet.

According to media reports, by stopping the Russian shadow fleet tanker, Finland may have prevented several more serious sabotage operations.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36828953

Archived

The Apple and Google app stores continue to offer private browsing apps that are surreptitiously owned by Chinese companies, more than six weeks after they were identified in a Tech Transparency Project report. Apple and Google may also be profiting from these apps, which put Americans’ privacy and U.S. national security at risk, TTP found.

[...]

After the Financial Times asked Apple for comment on these findings, two of the apps linked to Qihoo 360—Thunder VPN and Snap VPN—were pulled from its app store. When TTP checked again in early May, another Qihoo 360-connected app called Signal Secure VPN had been quietly removed. But two other apps linked to Qihoo 360—Turbo VPN and VPN Proxy Master—remained available in the U.S. Apple App Store, along with 11 other Chinese-owned apps identified in TTP’s report.

The Google Play Store, meanwhile, offered four Qihoo 360-connected apps—Turbo VPN, VPN Proxy Master, Snap VPN, and Signal Secure VPN—as well as seven other Chinese-owned VPNs identified in TTP’s initial report.

The linked article lists several China-owned VPN apps identified by the Tech Transparency Project (TTP).

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36828953

Archived

The Apple and Google app stores continue to offer private browsing apps that are surreptitiously owned by Chinese companies, more than six weeks after they were identified in a Tech Transparency Project report. Apple and Google may also be profiting from these apps, which put Americans’ privacy and U.S. national security at risk, TTP found.

[...]

After the Financial Times asked Apple for comment on these findings, two of the apps linked to Qihoo 360—Thunder VPN and Snap VPN—were pulled from its app store. When TTP checked again in early May, another Qihoo 360-connected app called Signal Secure VPN had been quietly removed. But two other apps linked to Qihoo 360—Turbo VPN and VPN Proxy Master—remained available in the U.S. Apple App Store, along with 11 other Chinese-owned apps identified in TTP’s report.

The Google Play Store, meanwhile, offered four Qihoo 360-connected apps—Turbo VPN, VPN Proxy Master, Snap VPN, and Signal Secure VPN—as well as seven other Chinese-owned VPNs identified in TTP’s initial report.

The linked article lists several China-owned VPN apps identified by the Tech Transparency Project (TTP).

[...]

Archived

The Apple and Google app stores continue to offer private browsing apps that are surreptitiously owned by Chinese companies, more than six weeks after they were identified in a Tech Transparency Project report. Apple and Google may also be profiting from these apps, which put Americans’ privacy and U.S. national security at risk, TTP found.

[...]

After the Financial Times asked Apple for comment on these findings, two of the apps linked to Qihoo 360—Thunder VPN and Snap VPN—were pulled from its app store. When TTP checked again in early May, another Qihoo 360-connected app called Signal Secure VPN had been quietly removed. But two other apps linked to Qihoo 360—Turbo VPN and VPN Proxy Master—remained available in the U.S. Apple App Store, along with 11 other Chinese-owned apps identified in TTP’s report.

The Google Play Store, meanwhile, offered four Qihoo 360-connected apps—Turbo VPN, VPN Proxy Master, Snap VPN, and Signal Secure VPN—as well as seven other Chinese-owned VPNs identified in TTP’s initial report.

The linked article lists several China-owned VPN apps identified by the Tech Transparency Project (TTP).

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36828391

Archived

What started with masked soldiers in Crimea and covert proxies in Donbas has evolved into a complex, multi-layered hybrid strategy employed by the Kremlin against the West. Over the past decade, the Kremlin has refined its Soviet-inherited playbook of active measures, combining coordinated campaigns of subversion, sabotage, cyberattacks and disinformation to weaken democratic institutions, undermine public trust, and fracture European and Euro-Atlantic unity. It has stepped up its funding of anti-establishment parties across the EU while deploying covert operatives and disinformation strategies to maximize its reach without triggering open confrontation.

Documented attacks increased fourfold between 2022 and 2023 and threefold in 2024 compared to 2023. In this regard, the Kremlin has increased both the range of targets, from critical infrastructure to transportation hubs, and the tactics used, including explosives and improvised tools. This evident escalation reflects the Kremlin’s shift towards more aggressive and adaptable hybrid disruption tactics, designed to remain just below the threshold of triggering a unified European response.

[...]

Poland, Ukraine’s leading supporter and a central hub for NATO logistics, has become a primary target of the Kremlin’s hybrid attacks against critical infrastructure. One striking example came in May 2025, when Polish authorities confirmed that Russian intelligence was behind the fire that destroyed the large shopping centre in Warsaw the previous year, damaging over 1,400 shops and service outlets.

[...]

Numerous instances of Russian hybrid attacks have been recorded across the Baltic states and Romania. The Kremlin has directed these attacks against critical infrastructure, undersea cables and electoral systems.

[...]

In March 2025, Kremlin-linked agents conducted an arson attack on an IKEA store in Lithuania, along with the Russian sabotage of the Baltic Sea cable system, disrupting the country’s internet connectivity.

[...]

Since 2024, Estonia has seen a notable spike in cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. In particular, there has been an increase in satellite-based cyberattacks, which have disrupted the operations of airport infrastructure. Currently, the country is working actively to track the Kremlin’s “shadow fleet”.

[...]

Romania is one of the recent stark examples of the Kremlin’s application of modern hybrid warfare tools. In December 2024, the country’s constitutional court annulled the 2024 presidential election after the country’s intelligence services confirmed Russian interference via fake social media accounts and cyberattacks on election systems.

[...]

A western response should not remain purely defensive. It has to counter the Kremlin’s hybrid attacks that fall below the threshold of triggering a unified European response and incorporate offensive measures. This way, the West can ensure that the Kremlin is discouraged and, if necessary, respond with targeted retaliatory actions against its covert operations, particularly across the EU member states. Otherwise, the Kremlin will continue leveraging hybrid warfare tools to undermine democracies in the West.

Archived

What started with masked soldiers in Crimea and covert proxies in Donbas has evolved into a complex, multi-layered hybrid strategy employed by the Kremlin against the West. Over the past decade, the Kremlin has refined its Soviet-inherited playbook of active measures, combining coordinated campaigns of subversion, sabotage, cyberattacks and disinformation to weaken democratic institutions, undermine public trust, and fracture European and Euro-Atlantic unity. It has stepped up its funding of anti-establishment parties across the EU while deploying covert operatives and disinformation strategies to maximize its reach without triggering open confrontation.

Documented attacks increased fourfold between 2022 and 2023 and threefold in 2024 compared to 2023. In this regard, the Kremlin has increased both the range of targets, from critical infrastructure to transportation hubs, and the tactics used, including explosives and improvised tools. This evident escalation reflects the Kremlin’s shift towards more aggressive and adaptable hybrid disruption tactics, designed to remain just below the threshold of triggering a unified European response.

[...]

Poland, Ukraine’s leading supporter and a central hub for NATO logistics, has become a primary target of the Kremlin’s hybrid attacks against critical infrastructure. One striking example came in May 2025, when Polish authorities confirmed that Russian intelligence was behind the fire that destroyed the large shopping centre in Warsaw the previous year, damaging over 1,400 shops and service outlets.

[...]

Numerous instances of Russian hybrid attacks have been recorded across the Baltic states and Romania. The Kremlin has directed these attacks against critical infrastructure, undersea cables and electoral systems.

[...]

In March 2025, Kremlin-linked agents conducted an arson attack on an IKEA store in Lithuania, along with the Russian sabotage of the Baltic Sea cable system, disrupting the country’s internet connectivity.

[...]

Since 2024, Estonia has seen a notable spike in cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. In particular, there has been an increase in satellite-based cyberattacks, which have disrupted the operations of airport infrastructure. Currently, the country is working actively to track the Kremlin’s “shadow fleet”.

[...]

Romania is one of the recent stark examples of the Kremlin’s application of modern hybrid warfare tools. In December 2024, the country’s constitutional court annulled the 2024 presidential election after the country’s intelligence services confirmed Russian interference via fake social media accounts and cyberattacks on election systems.

[...]

A western response should not remain purely defensive. It has to counter the Kremlin’s hybrid attacks that fall below the threshold of triggering a unified European response and incorporate offensive measures. This way, the West can ensure that the Kremlin is discouraged and, if necessary, respond with targeted retaliatory actions against its covert operations, particularly across the EU member states. Otherwise, the Kremlin will continue leveraging hybrid warfare tools to undermine democracies in the West.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36813071

Archived

Here is the full report (pdf).

China and Russia’s deepening strategic partnership Despite a shared history of rivalry, conflict and mistrust, today China and Russia share a broad interest in undermining what leaders in both countries perceive to be a world order dominated by the West. Both countries see the US as their prime adversary, and undermining NATO – the strongest US-led alliance – as a common goal, according to a report published by the China Strategic Risks Institute in the UK (CSRI).

[...]

These shared interests are the backdrop to a deepening strategic partnership between Russia and China, in which the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific are increasingly perceived by both actors as a unified security theatre.

TLDR:

• Undersea cables underpin economic security and global prosperity in the digital age, carrying 99% of intercontinental data traffic. Undersea cables are vital for both civilian and defence infrastructure, including future AI-powered technologies.

• A series of suspicious breakages in the Baltic Sea and Taiwan Strait indicate that China and Russia may be using undersea sabotage as part of broader grey-zone operations against their adversaries – including NATO and its member states.

• This paper examines 12 suspected undersea cable sabotage cases from January 2021 to April 2025. Of the 10 with identified vessels, 8 are linked to China or Russia by flag or ownership.

• The involvement of Chinese vessels in cable breakages in Europe, and Russian vessels near Taiwan, suggests plausible China-Russia coordination amid deepening ties in both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific.

• As a key hub in Euro-Atlantic cable infrastructure, the UK is a likely target for future Russian and Chinese grey-zone operations – posing a new and complex challenge for its maritime defence and surveillance systems.

The UK must be clear-eyed and proactive in addressing grey-zone threats to undersea infrastructure. Recommendations include:

• Enhancing monitoring and surveillance: The UK should use NATO mechanisms to regularly share best practice and intelligence on undersea cable threats, including Russia and China’s shadow fleets, and extend cooperation to experienced partners like Taiwan and Japan.

• Strengthening mechanisms for accountability: International law on undersea cables is outdated and insufficient. The UK should work with partners to strengthen accountability powers through utilising Port State Controls and publishing vessel blacklists. It must also tighten domestic laws and establish protocols for rapid pursuit, interdiction, and detention of suspect vessels.

• Improving redundancy, repair and resilience: The UK government should work with private operators to ensure guaranteed access to cable repair vessels capabilities during crises or national emergencies, as well as strategic stockpiling of cable repair parts.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36813071

Archived

Here is the full report (pdf).

China and Russia’s deepening strategic partnership Despite a shared history of rivalry, conflict and mistrust, today China and Russia share a broad interest in undermining what leaders in both countries perceive to be a world order dominated by the West. Both countries see the US as their prime adversary, and undermining NATO – the strongest US-led alliance – as a common goal, according to a report published by the China Strategic Risks Institute in the UK (CSRI).

[...]

These shared interests are the backdrop to a deepening strategic partnership between Russia and China, in which the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific are increasingly perceived by both actors as a unified security theatre.

TLDR:

• Undersea cables underpin economic security and global prosperity in the digital age, carrying 99% of intercontinental data traffic. Undersea cables are vital for both civilian and defence infrastructure, including future AI-powered technologies.

• A series of suspicious breakages in the Baltic Sea and Taiwan Strait indicate that China and Russia may be using undersea sabotage as part of broader grey-zone operations against their adversaries – including NATO and its member states.

• This paper examines 12 suspected undersea cable sabotage cases from January 2021 to April 2025. Of the 10 with identified vessels, 8 are linked to China or Russia by flag or ownership.

• The involvement of Chinese vessels in cable breakages in Europe, and Russian vessels near Taiwan, suggests plausible China-Russia coordination amid deepening ties in both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific.

• As a key hub in Euro-Atlantic cable infrastructure, the UK is a likely target for future Russian and Chinese grey-zone operations – posing a new and complex challenge for its maritime defence and surveillance systems.

The UK must be clear-eyed and proactive in addressing grey-zone threats to undersea infrastructure. Recommendations include:

• Enhancing monitoring and surveillance: The UK should use NATO mechanisms to regularly share best practice and intelligence on undersea cable threats, including Russia and China’s shadow fleets, and extend cooperation to experienced partners like Taiwan and Japan.

• Strengthening mechanisms for accountability: International law on undersea cables is outdated and insufficient. The UK should work with partners to strengthen accountability powers through utilising Port State Controls and publishing vessel blacklists. It must also tighten domestic laws and establish protocols for rapid pursuit, interdiction, and detention of suspect vessels.

• Improving redundancy, repair and resilience: The UK government should work with private operators to ensure guaranteed access to cable repair vessels capabilities during crises or national emergencies, as well as strategic stockpiling of cable repair parts.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36813071

Archived

Here is the full report (pdf).

China and Russia’s deepening strategic partnership Despite a shared history of rivalry, conflict and mistrust, today China and Russia share a broad interest in undermining what leaders in both countries perceive to be a world order dominated by the West. Both countries see the US as their prime adversary, and undermining NATO – the strongest US-led alliance – as a common goal, according to a report published by the China Strategic Risks Institute in the UK (CSRI).

[...]

These shared interests are the backdrop to a deepening strategic partnership between Russia and China, in which the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific are increasingly perceived by both actors as a unified security theatre.

TLDR:

• Undersea cables underpin economic security and global prosperity in the digital age, carrying 99% of intercontinental data traffic. Undersea cables are vital for both civilian and defence infrastructure, including future AI-powered technologies.

• A series of suspicious breakages in the Baltic Sea and Taiwan Strait indicate that China and Russia may be using undersea sabotage as part of broader grey-zone operations against their adversaries – including NATO and its member states.

• This paper examines 12 suspected undersea cable sabotage cases from January 2021 to April 2025. Of the 10 with identified vessels, 8 are linked to China or Russia by flag or ownership.

• The involvement of Chinese vessels in cable breakages in Europe, and Russian vessels near Taiwan, suggests plausible China-Russia coordination amid deepening ties in both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific.

• As a key hub in Euro-Atlantic cable infrastructure, the UK is a likely target for future Russian and Chinese grey-zone operations – posing a new and complex challenge for its maritime defence and surveillance systems.

The UK must be clear-eyed and proactive in addressing grey-zone threats to undersea infrastructure. Recommendations include:

• Enhancing monitoring and surveillance: The UK should use NATO mechanisms to regularly share best practice and intelligence on undersea cable threats, including Russia and China’s shadow fleets, and extend cooperation to experienced partners like Taiwan and Japan.

• Strengthening mechanisms for accountability: International law on undersea cables is outdated and insufficient. The UK should work with partners to strengthen accountability powers through utilising Port State Controls and publishing vessel blacklists. It must also tighten domestic laws and establish protocols for rapid pursuit, interdiction, and detention of suspect vessels.

• Improving redundancy, repair and resilience: The UK government should work with private operators to ensure guaranteed access to cable repair vessels capabilities during crises or national emergencies, as well as strategic stockpiling of cable repair parts.

Archived

Here is the full report (pdf).

China and Russia’s deepening strategic partnership Despite a shared history of rivalry, conflict and mistrust, today China and Russia share a broad interest in undermining what leaders in both countries perceive to be a world order dominated by the West. Both countries see the US as their prime adversary, and undermining NATO – the strongest US-led alliance – as a common goal, according to a report published by the China Strategic Risks Institute in the UK (CSRI).

[...]

These shared interests are the backdrop to a deepening strategic partnership between Russia and China, in which the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific are increasingly perceived by both actors as a unified security theatre.

TLDR:

• Undersea cables underpin economic security and global prosperity in the digital age, carrying 99% of intercontinental data traffic. Undersea cables are vital for both civilian and defence infrastructure, including future AI-powered technologies.

• A series of suspicious breakages in the Baltic Sea and Taiwan Strait indicate that China and Russia may be using undersea sabotage as part of broader grey-zone operations against their adversaries – including NATO and its member states.

• This paper examines 12 suspected undersea cable sabotage cases from January 2021 to April 2025. Of the 10 with identified vessels, 8 are linked to China or Russia by flag or ownership.

• The involvement of Chinese vessels in cable breakages in Europe, and Russian vessels near Taiwan, suggests plausible China-Russia coordination amid deepening ties in both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific.

• As a key hub in Euro-Atlantic cable infrastructure, the UK is a likely target for future Russian and Chinese grey-zone operations – posing a new and complex challenge for its maritime defence and surveillance systems.

The UK must be clear-eyed and proactive in addressing grey-zone threats to undersea infrastructure. Recommendations include:

• Enhancing monitoring and surveillance: The UK should use NATO mechanisms to regularly share best practice and intelligence on undersea cable threats, including Russia and China’s shadow fleets, and extend cooperation to experienced partners like Taiwan and Japan.

• Strengthening mechanisms for accountability: International law on undersea cables is outdated and insufficient. The UK should work with partners to strengthen accountability powers through utilising Port State Controls and publishing vessel blacklists. It must also tighten domestic laws and establish protocols for rapid pursuit, interdiction, and detention of suspect vessels.

• Improving redundancy, repair and resilience: The UK government should work with private operators to ensure guaranteed access to cable repair vessels capabilities during crises or national emergencies, as well as strategic stockpiling of cable repair parts.