cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47847537

Archived

China’s manipulation of the Interpol Red Notice system has reached a level of sophistication that poses a far-reaching danger to international law enforcement. Russia often remains the focus for many, as it is viewed as being the most prolific abuser of the system. But China is fast emerging as the more insidious threat.

As our readers will know, Red Notices are requests for provisional arrest pending extradition, circulated among police forces worldwide. The system works: thousands of dangerous fugitives are apprehended each year as a result. But authoritarian regimes have weaponised it. By issuing Red Notices through Interpol, states with poor human rights records can harness the police forces of democracies to pursue their opponents abroad.

China’s approach is different from Russia’s. Rather than relying primarily on extradition, Chinese authorities use Red Notices as one tool in a broader campaign of transnational repression. The notice locates the target. Then the pressure begins: threats against family members back home, asset freezes, surveillance, and relentless calls urging “voluntary” return. The so-called “persuasion to return” programme is profoundly misleadingly named.

The pretexts are revealing. Financial crime is the charge of choice – allegations of fraud, embezzlement, or money laundering that are difficult to verify and easy to fabricate. As one expert put it: if someone accuses you of murder, there needs to be a body; if someone accuses you of financial crimes, it is ones and zeros in the wrong ledger somewhere. China has used these charges to pursue businesspeople who have “Westernised,” political dissidents, Uyghur activists, followers of Falun Gong, and anyone else deemed a threat to the Chinese Communist Party.

[...]

The UK government’s recent overtures to Beijing make vigilance more pressing. Despite China’s well-documented human rights abuses – the persecution of Uyghurs, the crackdown in Hong Kong, the targeting of dissidents abroad – economic interests continue to drive policy. Those targeted by Chinese Red Notices often discover that economic relationships between states provide little protection when they find themselves detained at an airport or frozen out of the banking system.

Interpol has taken steps to address abuse. The Notices and Diffusion Task Force screens Red Notice requests before publication. But its review is limited – it cannot investigate the merits of every case, and as a result politically motivated requests can slip through.

[...]

China is not currently subject to Interpol’s corrective measures – enhanced scrutiny or suspension from the network – despite mounting evidence of systematic abuse. This makes vigilance all the more important. Those who find themselves in the crosshairs of a Chinese Red Notice must understand that the system offers them limited protection – and that experienced legal representation is essential from the outset.

[...]

Targeted by China Through Interpol? Your Options Explained -- (archived)

Red Notices are just one tool in a broader strategy of transnational repression that includes surveillance, asset freezes, and intense pressure on family members back home. If you find yourself in Beijing’s crosshairs, understanding the full picture is essential.

In 2025, incidents of transnational repression—efforts primarily by authoritarian governments to intimidate, harm, or even kill people they consider threats to their states, typically members of their diaspora, outside their borders—increased substantially worldwide.

Archived

[...]

Authoritarian states including China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and others have stepped up digital and in-person transnational repression worldwide, including in developed states in Asia, Europe, North America, and the United Kingdom.

[...]

The global spike in transnational repression has gained particular traction in Southeast Asia, among other parts of the world. According to UN experts, Southeast Asia has seen an “escalating wave of transnational repression [of activists, other dissidents, and refugees] by or linked to authorities in China and several Southeast Asian countries.” Thailand has become a hub of such acts this year. Human Rights Watch in 2025 called the kingdom “a ‘swap mart’ of dissidents from other regional states, who pay Bangkok back by targeting Thai critics living in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.”

[...]

The biggest offenders driving the trend

[...]

The gruesome incidents involving Southeast Asian dissidents across borders [include] Thai activists who were found handcuffed and dead in the Mekong River, with their stomachs opened and concrete poured into their bodies in what appeared to be an assassination in Laos. The Human Rights Watch investigation found that other Thai anti-monarchy activists have disappeared or been detained in Vietnam, or secretly deported back to Thailand, while other activists have disappeared in Cambodia and Laos, their cases conspicuously unsolved. The report also shares instances of other nationals going missing, killed, or abducted in Thailand, such as the disappearance [PDF] of Laotian democracy and human rights advocates and a Malaysian transgender LGBT rights influencer who was repatriated.

[...]

A major reason that transnational repression across borders has increased is because of “a significant number of cases of Chinese transnational repression.” For instance, an April report by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) showed that Chinese transnational repression had recently become so omnipresent that it is effective in at least twenty-three countries, as well as at the United Nations. China is by far the biggest user of transnational repression in the world.

[...]

The United States, Europe, and many other developed states are devoting fewer resources to addressing the problem, despite warnings by some lawmakers and attempts to pass legislation about transnational repression as well as surveillance by major autocratic powers. (Congress introduced the Transnational Repression Policy Act in 2025, but it has not passed, and Canada has begun to take steps to combat transnational Chinese repression.)

In part, this decline in enforcement and highlighting of transnational repression is because, as mentioned above, many developed countries have refocused their human rights policies on other issues. While some states have pushed back against such repression in the past, many countries are now prioritizing closer ties to authoritarian economic powers and downplaying repressive and even fatal actions by their authoritarian counterparts.

[...]

In one of many examples of this trend, in June 2025 Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met on the sidelines of the G-7 summit in Canada. They agreed to a reset in relations, including re-establishing high commissions in Delhi and Ottawa. This reset came following two years of significant bilateral diplomatic tensions after Justin Trudeau, who was then Canada’s prime minister, publicly accused India of orchestrating the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar—a Canadian citizen and prominent Sikh separatist—outside Vancouver in 2023.

[...]

Other global leaders have taken the same approach as Carney toward China, India, Russia and other autocratic states. Germany and Vietnam have in recent years rapidly expanded their strategic and economic links, even though Germany accused Vietnam, one of the most authoritarian states in the world, of abducting a Vietnamese businessman from Berlin in 2017. French President Emanuel Macron recently visited China and held warm meetings with Xi, even though Beijing has stepped up intimidation of critics of the Chinese regime in France. China has even tried to use French laws to silence Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities living in France.

[...]

There will likely be more instances of these kinds of efforts in the future, especially since there appear to be fewer efforts to defend against human rights abuses. Having sent the message to China, India, Russia, and others that there are fewer safeguards against autocrats’ power beyond their borders, developed countries—and the world—will likely have to contend with these types of intimidation tactics and crimes occurring more often within their own.

This paper sets out a repertoire of repression operating to criminalise and repress recent climate and environmental protest globally. Deploying a novel mixed methods approach, involving a comparative quantitative and qualitative analysis of a sample of 14 countries, we identify that repression and criminalisation are global phenomena – spanning the Global South and North. The repertoire of repression includes: i) enactments of new anti-protest laws; ii) creative and strategic use of existing legislation and legal processes; iii) police action, such as arrests, surveillance, harassment and other forms of police violence; iv) disappearances and killings; and v) vilification. We argue that this repression is a complex eco-system involving state and non-state actors, laws and legal processes, social and media discourses which operate to deplete, deter and delegitimise protest, and distract attention from violent or harmful political structures.

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/43763604

Archive link

European and Ukrainian leaders have officially launched an International Claims Commission in The Hague, marking a significant step toward accountability and reparations for the damage caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The new body is tasked with processing and adjudicating claims related to losses suffered by the Ukrainian state, businesses, and individuals since the start of the war.

The establishment of the Commission reflects growing international consensus that victims of the conflict should have access to a structured, legal mechanism to seek compensation. According to European officials, more than 80,000 claims have already been submitted, highlighting the vast scale of destruction to infrastructure, housing, industry, and livelihoods across Ukraine.

...

The International Claims Commission is designed to operate as an independent and rules-based mechanism. Its mandate includes reviewing evidence, assessing damages, and determining the validity and value of claims arising from the conflict. While it does not itself enforce payments, the Commission represents a crucial institutional framework that could underpin future compensation arrangements.

Locating the Commission in The Hague — a city internationally recognized as a center for justice and international law — underscores the legal and symbolic weight of the initiative. European leaders emphasized that the Commission complements existing international justice efforts and reinforces the principle that violations of international law carry consequences.

...

For Ukraine, the launch of the Commission represents an important diplomatic achievement and a step toward long-term recovery and reconstruction ... For Europe, the Commission sends a broader message: accountability and reparations are integral to any durable peace. By creating a formal mechanism now, European states aim to ensure that compensation is not treated as an afterthought, but as a core element of post-war justice laying the groundwork for future reparations and reinforcing the international rules-based order.

...

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47329586

Archived

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Despite legal prohibitions, the employment of minors persists, especially in less-developed regions like the Western and rural provinces. Children from these areas are often recruited into small workshops, informal sectors, and manufacturing supply chains, including electronics and toy production. A specific form of exploitation involves the student-worker system, where vocational schools place students, sometimes as young as 16, into factories for long hours of repetitive labor irrelevant to their studies. Refusal to participate in these mandatory “internships” often results in the student being threatened with the loss of funding or graduation status, creating a coercive labor condition.

A distinct and systemic issue is the state-sponsored coercive labor programs operating in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). This system compels Uyghur and other ethnic minority populations, including minors, into forced labor through mass internment and “labor transfer programs.” This exploitation is embedded in state policy, targeting industries like cotton and solar polysilicon for the goal of forced assimilation and social control. The coercive nature of this state-enforced labor represents a severe human rights abuse in the supply chain.

[...]

Effective enforcement is hampered by systemic challenges and a lack of resources. The number of labor inspectors is insufficient to monitor the vast number of workplaces, especially in the informal sector where violations are common. Enforcement relies on periodic, campaign-like factory investigations rather than routine supervision. A lack of transparency and accountability, coupled with local officials prioritizing economic interests, prevents the rigorous application of the law. Inadequate penalties and sporadic enforcement are often insufficient to deter employers from violating child labor prohibitions.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/43381608

EU warns of 'cultural erasure' in China as human rights situation in the country shows 'no substantive sign of improvement'

The EU criticizes China's "systemic and severe restrictions on the exercise of fundamental freedoms and on the right of minorities" to enjoy their own culture, and to use their own language, in private and public, including in the field of education, a statement by the EU Delegation in China reads.

"These restrictions risk leading to cultural erasure."

In spite of many engagements, "unfortunately, the overall human rights situation in China showed no substantive sign of improvement," the EU statement reads.

The situation in Xinjiang remains serious. Numerous credible reports, including the assessment issued by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), indicate serious human rights violations that “may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity”. The EU remains deeply troubled by continuing reports of forced labour and state‑imposed labour transfer schemes involving Uyghurs both within Xinjiang and to other provinces.

The human rights situation in Tibet remains equally alarming. This applies both to the Tibet Autonomous Region and to Tibetan areas of Qinghai, Sichuan and Gansu provinces, where similar patterns of restrictions have been reported. Reports continue to document far-reaching state control over religious life, intensified surveillance of monasteries, and the imposition of mandatory boarding schools, where Tibetan children are separated from their families and educated primarily in Mandarin. The closure of Tibetan-language schools, and the marginalisation of Tibetan-language instruction are deeply troubling.

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The EU continues to criticize the enforced disappearance since 1995 of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the 11th Panchen Lama. No credible information is provided on his whereabouts or well-being. We continue to call on China to respect and protect the rights of persons belonging to religious groups to exercise their religious freedoms without interference. The selection of religious leaders should happen without government interference and in accordance with religious norms, including for the succession of the Dalai Lama.

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The EU also remains concerned about the situation in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, where policy shifts have resulted in a marked reduction in the use of Mongolian as a language of instruction and a narrowing of space for cultural and linguistic expression. The move from Mongolian as a vehicle of instruction to its relegation as a stand‑alone subject stands in contrast with official commitments to ethnic harmony and cultural diversity, and risks accelerating the erosion of the Mongolian community’s cultural and linguistic identity.

...

The EU ... calls for the immediate and unconditional release of, among others, Gulshan Abbas, Anya Sengdra, Ekpar Asat, Chadrel Rinpoche, Rahile Dawut, Ding Jiaxi, Ding Yuande, Dong Yuyu, Pastor Mingri (Ezra) Jin, Gao Zhen, Gao Zhisheng, Go Sherab Gyatso, Golog Palden, He Fangmei, Huang Qi, Huang Xueqin, Hushtar Isa, Yalkun Isa, Ji Xiaolong, Li Yanhe, Peng Lifa, Qin Yongming, Ruan Xiaohuan, Tashi Dorje, Tashpolat Tiyip, Sakharov Prize winner Ilham Tohti, Wang Bingzhang, Pastor Wang Yi, Kamile Wayit, Xie Yang, Xu Na, Xu Zhiyong, Yang Hengjung, Yang Maodong, Yu Wensheng, Pastor Zhang Chunlei, Tara Zhang Yadi and Zhang Zhan, as well as EU citizen Gui Minhai whose right to consular access must be respected.

...

The EU underscores the essential role of freedom of expression, media independence and access to information in ensuring accountable and effective governance. In China, these freedoms remain severely constrained ... The EU strongly promotes global gender equality and women and girls full enjoyment of human rights [and] reaffirms its commitment to LGBTI persons’ full enjoyment of human rights.

"We are concerned about the rising challenges faced by China's LGBTI community, including the restriction on the freedom of association, online censorship, and intimidation of activists," the EU says.

...

In Hong Kong, fundamental rights and freedoms have further eroded.

...

China must also respect the principle of non-refoulement, and refrain from any extraterritorial activity, including transnational repression, that is not in line with international law.

...

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/43319573

Web archive link

Over 1,000 documented TNR [Transnational Repression] cases have occurred since 2014, affecting individuals across 100 countries and involving at least 44 perpetrator states. Europe has emerged as a critical venue for TNR, with a growing number of targeted journalists, human rights defenders, political opponents, and whistleblowers seeking safety and protection on European soil.

Despite the scope of the problem, there is currently no binding European or international legal instrument specifically addressing TNR. Existing human rights instruments, including the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), while applicable in principle, do not offer comprehensive safeguards tailored to the realities of TNR.

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/43231602

Web archive link

The regime of North Korea has continued to exploit the war in Ukraine to spread its propaganda. This week we learnt that Ukrainian children, abducted by Russia, are being sent to an infamous North Korean summer camp. The children have reportedly been taught to ‘destroy Japanese imperialists’ and heard from North Korean soldiers who destroyed the USS Pueblo, a spy ship captured and sank by North Korea in 1968.

This Ukrainian children have been at the Songdowon International Children’s Camp, located near the port city of Wonsan on the country’s east coast. Well known as a popular tourist hotspot for North Korean elites, Wonsan has recently gained infamy for the newly-opened Wonsan-Kalma tourist resort, which has been not-so-affectionately nicknamed ‘North Korea’s Benidorm’. Wonsan, too, has a significant place in North Korean history. It was where Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un spent much of his childhood.

The children’s camp is hardly a new creation. Established in 1960 amid the backdrop of the Cold War, the camp became one additional facet of North Korean cultural diplomacy, as Pyongyang sought to develop ties with communist and communist-friendly countries. Whether from North Korea’s Cold War patrons of Russia and China or communist-sympathising states further afield, such as Laos, Tanzania and even Syria, children would be sent to the camp to engage in a range of activities, including cooking, swimming, rock climbing, or marathon running. For the North Korean regime, the goal was simple: spread the virtues of socialism, North Korea-style, and become friends with like-minded states.

...

Although little is known about the Ukrainian abductees sent to North Korea, cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow in areas beyond security looks to continue to grow, especially as peace in Ukraine looks evermore elusive. North Korea and Russia signed a mutual defence pact in June 2024, but these renewed ties were not limited to the domain of security. It was no coincidence that only a week after the ink was dry, Grigory Gurov, Head of the Russian Federal Agency for Youth Affairs, announced that around 250 Russian children, mainly from the Russian Far East, would visit Songdowon, making them one of the first groups to visit the camp following North Korea’s draconian three-year border closure, owing to coronavirus, in January 2021.

...

Russia and North Korea are yet to respond to the reports that Ukrainian abductees are being sent to Songdowon. Pyongyang will probably just say the children were participating in a cultural exchange – helping out an ally. We need only go back to February this year when Russia’s ambassador to North Korea, Alexander Matsegora, announced that how ‘hundreds of wounded [Russian] soldiers’ fighting against Ukraine were being treated in North Korean hospitals, epitomising the ‘brotherly attitude’ between the two Cold War allies.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/46747896

Archived

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has just received confirmation from local sources that Chinese journalist and photojournalist Du Bin has been held by the authorities at the Shunyi Detention Centre in Beijing since 15 October 2025. The former New York Times photographer is accused of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble”, an offence punishable by five years in prison and routinely used by the Chinese regime to suppress journalists and press freedom defenders.

The photojournalist’s family has repeatedly requested to see the written detention order, but the authorities have refused to provide one. The officer in charge of the case has also declined to give further information, citing confidentiality. Through his photos, books and documentary films, Du Bin has extensively documented human rights abuses committed by the Chinese regime. His work has been published in major international media outlets, including The New York Times, Time magazine and The Guardian.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/46639484

Archived

Here is the report The party’s AI: How China’s new AI systems are reshaping human rights - (pdf)

The Chinese Communist Party's AI: A new report shows how Beijing is using LLMs as ‘precision tools’ of censorship and repression at home and abroad

The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming China’s state control system into a precision instrument for managing its population and targeting groups at home and abroad, a report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) finds.

China’s extensive AI‑powered visual surveillance systems are already well documented. This report reveals new ways that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is using large language models (LLMs) and other AI systems to automate censorship, enhance surveillance and pre‑emptively suppress dissent.

Key summary:

Chinese LLMs censor politically sensitive images, not just text.

• While prior research has extensively mapped textual censorship, this report identifies a critical gap: the censorship of politically sensitive images by Chinese LLMs remains largely unexamined.
• To address this, ASPI developed a testing methodology, using a dataset of 200 images likely to trigger censorship, to interrogate how LLMs censor sensitive imagery. The results revealed that visual censorship mechanisms are embedded across multiple layers within the LLM ecosystem.

The Chinese Government is deploying AI throughout the criminal‑justice pipeline—from AI‑enabled policing and mass surveillance, to smart courts, to smart prisons.

• This emerging AI pipeline reduces transparency and accountability, enhances the efficiency of police, prosecutors and prisons, and further enables state repression.
• Beijing is pushing courts to adopt AI not just in drafting basic paperwork, but even in recommending judgements and sentences, which could deepen structural discrimination and weaken defence counsels’ ability to appeal.
• The Chinese surveillance technology company iFlyTek stands out as a major provider of LLM‑based systems used in this pipeline.

China is using minority‑language LLMs to deepen surveillance and control of ethnic minorities, both in China and abroad.

• The Chinese Government is developing, and in some cases already testing, AI‑enabled public‑sentiment analysis in ethnic minority languages—especially Uyghur, Tibetan, Mongolian and Korean—for the explicitly stated purpose of enhancing the state’s capacity to monitor and control communications in those languages across text, video and audio.
• DeepSeek and most other commercial LLM models have insufficient capacity to do this effectively, as there’s little market incentive to create sophisticated, expensive models for such small language groups. The Chinese state is stepping in to provide resources and backing for the development of minority‑language models for that explicit purpose.
• China is also seeking to deploy this technology to target those groups in foreign countries along the Belt and Road.

AI now performs much of the work of online censorship in China.

• AI‑powered censorship systems scan vast volumes of digital content, flag potential violations, and delete banned material within seconds.
• Yet the system still depends on human content reviewers to supply the cultural and political judgement that algorithms lack, according to ASPI’s review of more than 100 job postings for online‑content censors in China. Future technological advances are likely to minimise that remaining dependence on human reviewers.

China’s censorship regulations have created a robust domestic market for AI‑enabled censorship tools.

• China’s biggest tech companies, including Tencent, Baidu and ByteDance, have developed advanced AI censorship platforms that they’re selling to smaller companies and organisations around China.
• In this way, China’s laws mandating internal censorship have created market incentives for China’s top tech companies to make censorship cheaper, faster, easier and more efficient—and embedding compliance into China’s digital economy.

The use of AI amplifies China’s state‑supported erosion of the economic rights of some vulnerable groups abroad, to the financial benefit of Chinese private and state‑owned companies.

• ASPI research shows that Chinese fishing fleets have begun adopting AI‑powered intelligent fishing platforms, developed by Chinese companies and research institutes, that further tip the technological scales towards Chinese vessels and away from local fishers and artisanal fishing communities.
• ASPI has identified several individual Chinese fishing vessels using those platforms that operate in exclusive economic zones where Chinese fishing is widely implicated in illegal incidents, including Mauritania and Vanuatu, and ASPI found one vessel that has itself been specifically implicated in an incident.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/46377338

Opinion piece by Li Qiang, founder and executive director of China Labor Watch, and a human rights advocate with over 30 years of experience investigating global supply chains.

Archived

[...]

China’s low rights model is no longer a domestic labor issue but a systemic challenge to global labor standards, supply chain governance, and fair market competition. Without a coordinated civil society response, the global baseline for worker rights will continue to fall.

I call China’s economic model a “low rights” one because it has long relied on suppressing labor costs to maintain industrial competitiveness. As a result, trade imbalances between China, the United States, and Europe are strategically linked to China’s ability to attract multinational companies through low-cost labor and policy incentives. At the same time, Chinese companies internalized the technology and management know-how of these foreign companies into their domestic systems, gradually transforming what were originally Western competitive advantages into China’s own strengths.

[...]

In recent years, China’s “low-standard, low-cost” development model has expanded beyond its borders. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, it has spread globally, exporting labor, environmental, and governance risks to host countries. Nowhere is this more evident than in Indonesia’s nickel sector, where mining and smelting contracts are so short that they function like countdown clocks, pressuring companies to recoup capital as fast as possible.

[...]

This “low-cost” model has been permitted to exist due to an increasingly shrinking civic space. Independent labor monitoring inside China has become dramatically harder in the past decade. Today, only a few independent organizations remain capable of conducting investigations, such as China Labor Watch. Yet, political risks deter most international funders from supporting work inside China, leaving independent oversight critically under-resourced in an area where it is needed most.

[...]

To counter this dynamic, civil society organizations must be central to any strategy for raising global labor standards. We can advance change in three key ways.

First, increase public awareness. We can collectively highlight that consumers must recognize the real costs behind low-priced products: long working hours, low pay, job displacement, low labor standards. The public must understand that declining labor standards ultimately harm every society. In reality, with wages stagnating in many Western countries, more consumers rely on cheaper products that are produced by workers who are, in fact, competing with them for similar types of jobs in the global labor market.

Second, advocate and partner with authorities for the rigorous enforcement of forced-labor laws. Import bans, labor regulations, and due diligence laws already exist. But enforcement depends on independent organizations holding authorities accountable, and providing evidence if there are enforcement gaps. It also requires sufficient and sustained funding to ensure that these laws can be implemented in practice, rather than remaining symbolic commitments.

[...]

The EU Forced Labor Regulation and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) had their scope narrowed during the legislative process, while U.S. forced labor import enforcement remains inconsistent and lacks clear direction, making the global regulatory landscape by significant uncertainty. If global civil society does not intervene now, global labor standards will not simply stagnate; they will be redefined downward by a model built on speed, opacity, and the suppression of rights.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/46147523

Archived

UN Special Procedures experts warn of an escalating wave of transnational repression by or linked to authorities in China and several Southeast Asian countries.

In joint communications to China, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), they detail at least 150 cases in which human rights defenders, dissidents, members of marginalised groups, and their family members were subjected to violence, refoulement, harassment, and intimidation by States or their proxies outside their territories.

[...]

Patterns of repression include:

Physical attacks, assassinations, and enforced disappearances: At least nine political exiles from Thailand, Cambodia and Laos have been assassinated or forcibly disappeared in neighbouring countries. Cases cited include the killing of Cambodian opposition figure Lim Kim Ya in Thailand, and the enforced disappearances of Thai dissidents Wanchalearm Satsaksit in Cambodia and Surachai Darnwattananusorn in Laos.

Refugees and dissents refouled: In violation of the principle of non-refoulement, authorities have forcibly returned refugees and asylum seekers to places where they face persecution. Thailand returned 40 Uyghur men to China after nearly 11 years in detention, and seven United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)‑recognised Cambodian opposition activists and family members to Cambodia. Laos returned Chinese human rights lawyer Lu Siwei to China, and Malaysia returned Thai dissident and asylum seeker Praphan Pipithnamporn to Thailand; both were subsequently imprisoned.

Legal harassment: Hong Kong authorities issued National Security Law arrest warrants and HKD 1 million (approximately USD 128,000) bounties for at least eight overseas activists in exile, including Anna Kwok, Carmen Lau, Ted Hui, Frances Hui, and Chloe Cheung. Vietnam further criminalised civil society by designating Montagnards Stand for Justice and Boat People SOS as terrorist entities.

Surveillance and intimidation: In the United Kingdom, associates of Hong Kong activist Carmen Lau received flyers urging them to report her to Hong Kong authorities or bring her to the Chinese Embassy, citing the bounty on her head. In Thailand, a Vietnamese security delegation, accompanied by Thai police, reportedly entered refugee communities near Bangkok to pressure Montagnard refugees to return to Vietnam.

Retaliation against families: As Hong Kong activists such as Anna Kwok, Carmen Lau, and Ted Hui continued their advocacy overseas, their relatives in Hong Kong were interrogated, arrested, or publicly shamed in state media. In Cambodia, the father of France‑based activist Sorn Dara was imprisoned on fabricated charges.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/45707079

Archived

In late November 2022, for a brief moment, Shanghai appeared to loosen the grip that had defined its pandemic years. On Wulumuqi Road normally an unremarkable thoroughfare residents gathered with candles to mourn ten people who died in a fire in far-off Urumqi. Local accounts later described how the victims, trapped behind locked exits during a COVID lockdown, became symbols of a policy that had exhausted the country long before the flames claimed their lives.

What began as a quiet vigil on 26 November evolved into the most overt public challenge to the Chinese leadership since the Tiananmen demonstrations more than three decades earlier. The crowds swelled, some chanting slogans that would have been unthinkable only weeks before. Yet the opening proved fleeting. By the morning of 28 November, the street was deserted. The sudden silence was not organic it was engineered.

The speed with which authorities restored control demonstrated not only the strength of China’s policing apparatus but the degree to which three years of pandemic management had equipped the state with an unusually detailed map of its citizens’ movements, networks, and vulnerabilities. The crackdown that followed was not a spontaneous reaction to dissent. It was the culmination of a system refined through data, surveillance, and the routinisation of extraordinary powers.

The turning point came in the early hours of 27 November. As more demonstrators assembled some holding blank A4 sheets as understated rebuttals to censorship plainclothes officers blended into the crowd. Witnesses later described people being pulled into police vans at around 4:30am. Among those seized was Ed Lawrence, a BBC journalist detained and beaten while covering the protest. Beijing later insisted he had “failed to identify himself”, a claim rejected by the broadcaster.

[...]

The censorship campaign that followed was comprehensive and efficient. Searches for “Shanghai,” “Wulumuqi Road,” and “Urumqi fire,” which normally generated millions of posts, began returning only a handful. References to “white paper,” “A4,” and related hashtags vanished across Weibo and WeChat.

[...]

By Monday morning, the authorities had all but erased digital traces of the protest. The memorials had been cleared, and the street resumed its familiar subdued rhythm.

[...]

Where previous generations of Chinese protest movements relied on anonymity faces in a crowd the demonstrators of 2022 faced an entirely different environment. China’s security apparatus had spent years constructing one of the world’s most extensive networks of facial recognition cameras, combined with compulsory health-code apps, QR-based movement tracking, and real-time linkage of mobile phone data to personal identity.

This infrastructure, designed and justified through the zero-COVID period, played a decisive role in identifying attendees. Multiple participants later reported receiving calls or home visits from police within 24 hours of the vigil. One, a protester identified only as Zhang, took elaborate steps to avoid detection: wearing a balaclava, switching jackets, and navigating backstreets. Yet his phone had connected to towers near the demonstration. The next day, police rang to ask about his whereabouts: minutes later, they arrived at his door.

[...]

Those detained included university graduates, publishing editors, and a state media journalist, Yang Liu. Among the most well-known was Cao Zhixin, an editor at a publishing house, who was taken into custody alongside several friends. Videos recorded before their arrests pleaded that if they disappeared, it was because they had attended the vigil.

[...]

Comparisons with 1989 are inevitable, but they also illustrate how China’s methods have evolved. Where Tiananmen relied on overwhelming military force, Shanghai’s protest was extinguished with algorithms, phone data, and targeted detentions. The absence of visible violence made the repression less conspicuous but no less effective.

This model carries implications far outside China’s borders. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has supplied surveillance infrastructure including camera networks, cloud-based monitoring systems, and facial recognition software to dozens of countries. Several African states have adopted variants of these tools to monitor domestic unrest. Human rights groups warn that the technology exported is often calibrated using data gathered from China’s own population, sometimes optimised for use on minority ethnic groups abroad.

The Shanghai crackdown demonstrated how these systems can function when deployed at scale: quick identification, quiet detentions, minimal public spectacle.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/45599434

Archived

[...]

A new investigation by People of Baikal reveals another tactic the Russian military has employed to stem personnel losses: torturing the friends and family of deserters. Journalists reporting from the Transbaikal region spoke to Olga Vtorushina, the mother of a 24-year-old man named Pavel.

On November 2, 2025, masked men kidnapped her son, drove him outside of town, and tortured him with a stun gun, demanding that he help them locate his cousin Pyotr, who’d recently failed to return to his unit. The men who abducted and tortured Pavel wore camouflage uniforms and masks, but Olga said she’d seen them around town and had recognized one as a member of the local military police. She told journalists that the men beat her son and shocked him repeatedly with a stun gun until he passed out several times. Pavel wasn’t released until he telephoned Pyotr and lured him to a meeting where he was later apprehended.

[...]

A 25-year-old contract soldier who deserted his unit when the military ordered him back to duty after he sustained a head injury [...] escaped to his hometown and spent several months in hiding. To find the missing soldier, masked men tracked down his father and tortured him with a stun gun. They also beat his friend. The soldier’s mother told journalists that the assailants were not military police but a search group from her son’s military base. Her son is now in the army’s custody.

[...]

Military police officers tracked down 36-year-old Viktor at his friend’s home. They tased him, broke his nose, stuffed him in the trunk of a car, and drove him 300 miles away. Viktor had failed to return to his unit on time, staying at home to assist his wife, who was expecting their third child any day. She gave birth a week later. Viktor’s mother told People of Baikal that the men who took her son are the same ones who tortured Pavel on November 2.

Similar raids have been reported in towns throughout the Transbaikal region. In Ushmun, for example, masked men were spotted patrolling the streets. According to a local newspaper, these were military police officers. Authorities in Trubachevo and Novoshirokinsky confirmed to People of Baikal by phone that locals had been subjected to “measures of force.”

[...]

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/41779805

[As a personal note by OP: This is about Australia, but it perfectly applies to any democracy on the globe as well imho.]

Warnings this week from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) about sabotage threats marked an important shift in tone.

And they raise important questions about how the Australian government should respond.

Breaking from past practice, ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess said Chinese state-linked hackers have scanned, mapped and in some cases infiltrated Australian critical infrastructure.

According to Burgess, these groups are no longer focused on stealing information. They are preparing to disrupt or shut down key systems in a future crisis.

...

Burgess described [that] this threat does not involve persuasion or interference in debate. It is about the ability to disable telecommunications, shut down water systems, interrupt electricity supplies or damage the financial system.

This is preparation to use coercion during a crisis. One can imagine a scenario where Australia’s ability to respond to a blockade or invasion of Taiwan is hampered by a shutdown of critical infrastructure.

Burgess is therefore right to highlight the seriousness of the threat. China has shown that control of digital systems is central to geopolitical competition. Maintaining access to foreign infrastructure is a strategic advantage. As Australia becomes more reliant on digital networks, weaknesses in those systems become national security concerns.

...

There is, however, a second issue that deserves attention. In responding to foreign cyber threats, Australia risks adopting some of the very same digital tools used in authoritarian states such as Russia and China.

Research on digital authoritarianism shows that many authoritarian governments use control of digital networks to manage their own populations. They monitor citizens, limit information and use technology to enforce political order.

...

Burgess’ warning suggests this model is being exported. The aim is to control digital life at home, but also to gain the ability to interfere with digital systems overseas if needed.

In recent years, Australian governments have proposed measures that go well beyond traditional cybersecurity. These include mandatory age checks for social media, strict online limits for minors and expanding the duties of technology companies to assist with national security goals.

These proposals are framed as necessary for public safety. Yet they show a willingness to extend state power deeper into digital life.

...

Burgess’ speech at a business conference reinforces this trend. He addressed government agencies but also corporate boards, telling them national security is now their responsibility, as well.

Much of Australia’s critical infrastructure is owned or operated by private companies. Expecting these companies to act as extensions of national security policy risks blurring the line between public and private roles.

...

A defining feature of digital authoritarianism is the merger of state security priorities with corporate behaviour. If this boundary weakens, Australia could slowly move toward practices it has long opposed.

It is possible to strengthen national resilience without taking this path. A democratic society can defend its networks and deter cyber threats while maintaining openness and accountability.

Burgess is correct that Australia faces a serious and evolving challenge. China’s cyber operations reflect wider geopolitical changes. But an effective response requires protecting both infrastructure and democratic norms.

...

Stronger cyber defences are necessary, but they must come with clear limits on state power, transparent rules for data access and protections for speech.

China’s cyber operations, which are part of a wider strategic contest, are indeed a serious threat. But if Australia reacts by expanding security powers without restraint, it risks weakening the freedoms it aims to defend.

Op-ed by Laura Murphy, professor of Human Rights at Sheffield Hallam University in the UK. Her work focuses on Modern slavery. Murphy became prominent recntly when Sheffield Hallam apologised to her for removing their support for her work on forced labour in China.

Archived

In august last year a senior colleague informed me that the university where I work, Sheffield Hallam University (shu), would not publish my team’s research exposing Uyghur forced labour in the critical-minerals sector in China. I was also told that, if necessary, shu was prepared to take the highly unusual step of voluntarily returning hundreds of thousands of pounds in grant funding rather than have future projects bear the imprimatur of the Helena Kennedy Centre (hkc), the university’s human-rights research institute for which I had been working since 2019.

What could possibly induce a university to make such a surprising decision, especially one that had spent years standing up to harassment from Chinese authorities for its research on Uyghur forced labour, and whose own chancellor had been hit with sanctions by the Chinese government for her criticism of rights abuses in China?

[...]

The research in question was a series of reports my team had published documenting the systematic use of forced labour in the Uyghur region of China (known in China as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region). Government-imposed forced labour affects at least a fifth of the Uyghur and Kazakh population in the region, making it probably the largest system of state-imposed forced labour the world has seen since the Holocaust. The Chinese government and Chinese companies had for years tried to stop my team from publicising the resulting risk to the integrity of international supply chains—including for solar modules, clothing, cars, electronics, chemicals and, not inconsequentially, critical minerals.

[...]

Academic freedom is the cornerstone of knowledge production in democratic societies. Preserving it requires that universities shelter researchers from the retaliation of authoritarian governments by refusing to surrender to threats or put harnesses on their faculty’s research agenda. Universities protect that freedom in part by securing the necessary insurance to cover their researchers. And they provide financial and administrative support to faculty to pursue the questions that animate them, regardless of whether they are considered “sensitive”.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/44906377

Archived

Russia arrests the [Ukrainian] children’s parents, separates them from their families, and takes the children to Russia, preparing them for forced adoption. During this time, the children remain under the control of the Russian state, often in conditions of confinement. This propaganda might work on the Russian population — it may even be primarily targeted at them. Russia wants to present itself as morally upright, showing that it’s “rescuing” Ukrainian children through these evacuations. But I don’t really see this narrative gaining traction internationally. The real problem is different: on the international level, there is still very little awareness about this practice —especially in certain regions of the world, such as Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia. For many, this is entirely new information.

[...]

Authoritarian leaders tend to support one another situationally because they share a common worldview. They see people as objects to be governed. They deny rights and freedoms not only to others but also to their own citizens.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/5321915

The UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights has called for urgent action to prevent goods produced with forced labour from entering the country, warning that existing laws fail to protect workers or hold companies accountable.

In its new report, the Committee found that the UK’s current approach based largely on voluntary corporate reporting under the Modern Slavery Act is fails to prevent exploitation.

The report follows a long inquiry into how the UK addresses forced labour in global supply chain. The Committee received extensive evidence, including submissions from Walk Free.

The lack of meaningful enforcement and the absence of mandatory due diligence requirements mean that goods made with forced or child labour are likely being imported and sold in the UK.

...

Walk Free’s Global Slavery Index estimates the UK imports around US$26 billion in goods at risk of forced labour each year, including US$14.8 billion worth of solar panels.

The Committee highlighted the need to address forced labour risks in the green energy transition. Especially sourcing key materials used in solar panels, wind turbines, and electric vehicle batteries.

Cobalt, lithium, and rare earth elements are essential components of renewable energy technologies. But these are frequently mined or processed in regions with high rates of labour exploitation.

More than 70% of the world’s cobalt supply comes from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where forced and child labour in artisanal mining is well documented.

China produces around 90% of the world’s polysilicon, most originating in Xinjiang. Investigations have revealed the use of state-imposed forced labour involving Uyghur and Turkic Muslim minorities.

...

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/44529566

• Report alleges China and Russia tried to block funding
• China and Russia may gain influence as US retreats, report says
• Chinese mission to UN says resources of human rights have grown
• UN human rights budgets under strain amid funding crisis

A small group of countries led by China and Russia has repeatedly tried to block funding for human rights-related work at the United Nations over a five-year period, according to a report by the non-profit International Service for Human Rights.

The report cited proposals for major cuts to the U.N. Human Rights Office and for the elimination of funding for some U.N. investigations, in what it called a weaponisation of the budget process.

While those attempts, made in closed-door U.N. meetings, did not succeed, the authors voiced concern about them at a time when the United Nations is suffering from a financial crisis and as the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump steps back from multilateralism.

"The proposals that China and Russia have put forth are clearly about crippling OHCHR (the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights)," said Angeli Datt, one of the authors of the 97-page report titled "Budget Battles at the U.N.".

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/44324540

The targeted repression of human rights activists across borders is becoming more frequent and sophisticated, according to the latest annual U.N. report detailing acts of intimidation and reprisals inside the international organization.

The report lists new allegations of reprisals from two dozen countries including China, echoing the findings of ICIJ’s China Targets investigation, which revealed how suspected proxies for the Chinese government surveilled or harassed activists at the U.N. headquarters in Geneva, the center of the human rights system.

Two Hong Kong pro-democracy activists and a Uyghur linguist are among the cases compiled by the secretary-general between May 2024 and 2025, alongside updates on reprisals included in previous reports.

“Allegations of transnational repression across borders have increased, with examples from around the world,” the report said. “Targeted repression across borders appears to be growing in scale and sophistication, and the impact on the protection of human rights defenders and affected individuals in exile, as well as the chilling effect on those who continue to defend human rights in challenging contexts, is of increasing concern.”

[...]

Raphäel Viana David, the China and Latin America program manager at the International Service for Human Rights, a nonprofit that trains activists in U.N. advocacy, said the report reflected a shift within the U.N. in recognizing transnational repression as a tool states use to carry out reprisals.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/44096052

Archived

[...]

For China, the U.N. summit on October 13-14 is the final, triumphant act of a yearlong show of force from its diplomatic and media mouthpieces seeking to center its “historic achievements in women’s development” and position China as a global model for women’s rights protection.

Yet as officials trumpet their “30 years of progress” to assembled dignitaries, the voices of the country’s own feminists will be conspicuously absent.

That’s because many are in prison, while others face threats and harassment intended to keep them silent – whether they still live in China, or have had to flee abroad.

China’s self-congratulatory narrative on women’s rights has been pushed not just at home, but also abroad: from the halls of the United Nations to the pages of local embassies and media markets in, for example, South Africa, Tanzania, Liberia, Ghana and Grenada. Last month, state-run press even published two compilations of Xi Jinping’s speeches in English for the explicit purpose of “help[ing] international readers gain a deeper understanding of Xi’s views” on women’s rights and much more ahead of the U.N. meeting in Beijing.

[...]

Xi’s views are clear on one point: that shutting down space for critical voices and public discussion on human rights, including topics of women and gender, are essential matters of national security.

Over the last decade, the Chinese state has continued to implement laws and policies that suppress feminist activism – and in doing so has convicted women human rights defenders one by one.

[...]

The five women made famous by their 2015 criminal detentions for advocacy on International Women’s Day continue to work in civil society and to push for policy change – but they are careful to do so in ways that keep them and their families safe. Following their detentions, the costs of speaking out publicly have only risen. For four years, #MeToo activist and journalist Huang Xueqin has been locked up for “inciting subversion of state power” for her social media posts and her efforts to learn about and discuss non-violent movements.

Many other women activists – such as Li Qiaochu, Chen Jianfang, Xu Yan and Zhang Zhan – have languished in prison based on similarly spurious convictions. Vaccine safety advocate He Fangmei was convicted of “picking quarrels” and (absurdly) bigamy in 2024; when she’s released in 2027 she will have spent seven of the last eight years in detention. Her family doesn’t know where her daughters – the youngest one born while she was in detention – are located.

[...]

When Chinese officials wax poetic about the country’s progress on women’s rights, it is essential to remember that this is not the whole story. The government postures on anti-discrimination, locks up women defenders, and criminalizes feminist activism – all out of fear that the system the CCP has built might come crashing down on their heads.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/44066965

Archived

Ireland: University professor turns down invitation to meet with representatives of "deeply hypocritical" Chinese human rights organisation

An academic with Trinity College Dublin (TCD), has expressed surprise that officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and staff from the Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA) are separately meeting with representatives of what she says is a “deeply hypocritical” Chinese human rights organisation.

Dr Isabella Jackson, assistant professor of Chinese history, turned down an invitation from the IIEA to attend a meeting with visiting representatives of the China Foundation for Human Rights Development in the institute’s Dublin offices on Tuesday.

Dr Jackson told the institute she could not “in good conscience” attend a meeting with what she said was a white-washing state body “that exists to pretend China cares about human rights despite the severe abuses of human rights throughout the country but especially in Tibet and Xinjiang”.

“I am happy to engage with Chinese diplomats conducting diplomacy, but not a body as deeply hypocritical as this,” she told the institute. Dr Jackson told The Irish Times that, globally, the Beijing government is “trying to change the narrative so we can’t talk about Chinese abuses of human rights” and the foundation was part of this effort.

She was “quite surprised” that officials from the Department were meeting with the foundation which, she said, sought to highlight “hypocrisy” in the West over human rights abuses while seeking to deflect attention from even worse human rights abuses in China. “The foundation is trying to present China as a positive international actor for human rights whereas the opposite is the case,” she said.

“It’s just propaganda.”

[...]

She declined an invitation to attend a meeting in Berlin a number of years ago with the Chinese foundation “for the very same reasons.”

According to its website, the Chinese Foundation for the Development of Human Rights is registered with Beijing’s ministry for foreign affairs and its “business advisor” is the publicity department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC).

[...]

Senator Malcolm Byrne, co-chair of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, said it “strikes me as odd” that IIEA was facilitating a meeting with the Chinese delegation.

It was very important to have good relations with China and to trade with China, he said, but “the CPC has a particular mission and that mission does not have respect for human rights, and they need to be called out on it”.

[...]

Considered Ireland’s premier think tank on international affairs, the IIEA is funded mainly by member subscriptions and state grants.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/43833960

Archived

The exiled Chinese civil society organization “Chinese Human Rights Defenders Families Network” has released a nearly 30,000-word specialized research report titled: “Collateral Childhoods: The Psychological Impact of State Violence on the Children of Human Rights Defenders.”

It marks the first systematic study [...] to unveil the situation and profound psychological trauma suffered by the children of human rights defenders in an environment of state violence.

Zhou Fengsuo, Executive Director of Human Rights in China (HRIC), who has long provided humanitarian aid to the families of human rights defenders (HRDs), stated that under the reality of authoritarian rule and high-pressure politics, the children of Chinese HRDs are often forced to endure the associative harm resulting from the persecution of their parents: their education is interrupted, their daily lives lose stability, and their psychological sense of security is repeatedly shattered.

The associated repression by state violence that these children suffer is akin to the barbaric ancient system of ‘guilt by association'. Because they lack adequate cognitive and defense mechanisms, the scars left by these traumas are often deeper and more difficult for society and the system to recognize.

Key findings:

1. Severe Deprivation of the Right to Education: Used as a Tool of Repression. The report found that children in nearly all cases experienced educational interruption or denial. Some were outright rejected by schools due to their parents’ identity, others faced forced displacement and multiple transfers, and some were publicly shamed as “children of political prisoners” by teachers and peers in the classroom. The education system, meant to ensure equal development, has been weaponized for political persecution.

2. Widespread Mental Health Crisis: Self-Harm and Suicidal Ideation. Multiple children and adolescents exhibited severe symptoms like depression, anxiety, insomnia, and hypervigilance. Furthermore, some reached a point where “they sought ‘liberation’ by abandoning life,” resulting in documented cases of self-harm and attempted suicide. Prolonged exposure to high-pressure, fear-inducing environments prevents them from achieving normal identity formation and socialization during adolescence, posing severe risks for their adulthood.

3. Frequent Fragmentation of Family Structure. In the majority of cases, one or both parents were subjected to long-term imprisonment, restriction of freedom, or forced exile. Children lost their primary attachment figures during critical developmental stages, relying on single parents or fragmented kinship care. This chronic separation led to severe attachment disorders and a pervasive sense of insecurity.

4. Continuation and Silencing of Intergenerational Trauma. The parents’ fear, shame, and powerlessness are often transmitted to their children through emotional atmosphere and behavioral patterns, forming a “silent legacy.” Some children even normalize torture and humiliation, prematurely adopting the role of “protecting their parents,” thereby losing the safety and freedom of childhood through premature adultification.

5. Exile Abroad: Not an End, But a New Predicament. While some children were fortunate enough to leave China, they faced new difficulties abroad: language barriers, cultural isolation, identity anxiety, economic hardship, and the persistence of trauma responses. Exile marks a relative start to safety but simultaneously represents a continuation of isolation and compounded adversity.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/43815611

Archived

“Marriage and childbirth are not only a family affair related to personal happiness, but also a major event for the survival and development of the country and the nation.” -- China Family Planning Association

“First forced abortions, now pressured into pregnancy.” -- Chinese netizen online, What’s On Weibo

Key findings:

• The Chinese leadership faces unique challenges to sustainable population growth. The legacy of the One-Child Policy is proving difficult to reverse, and stubborn systemic factors are equally hard to address, including the rising costs of raising children and workplace discrimination against women of childbearing age.
• Beijing has shifted its goal from containing population growth to boosting it. China’s shrinking population poses a threat to economic growth and its ambitions to be a global superpower, so the authorities are trying to raise the birth rate. The repercussions of Beijing’s demographic successes and failures will reverberate across the world.
• Central and local governments have rolled out a patchwork of incentives, with uneven outcomes. The most recent is China’s first nationwide child subsidy of CNY 3,600 (EUR 430) per child per year, until age three. Substantial investment is still lacking.
• Many citizens remain skeptical of government efforts. The mismatch between people’s desires (often to remain single, or to have small families) and government interventions is likely to deepen social discontent.
• Population pressures have been elevated to a national security issue, trumping women’s freedom of choice and bodily autonomy. Online discussions show signs of resistance from women and other parts of the population who have been openly critical of the shift.
• Some regions have introduced coercive policies. New pro-natalist policies and campaigns frame women primarily as mothers and caregivers, eroding gender equality gains. These steps raise concerns about women’s rights.

[...]

Large and persistent propaganda campaigns have been aimed at the public, both online and offline. To get free promotional content, for instance, the CFPA [China Family Planning Association] launched a competition for slogans praising the three-child policy. This quickly backfired, as people mostly criticized the initiative and highlighted the CFPA’s role in previous coercive campaigns under the One-Child Policy.35 Other much criticized initiatives included local authorities cold-calling married women to ask about their plans for children.

[...]

Local Women’s Federations have organized mass weddings to give young people an affordable wedding, complete with a certificate praising their patriotic gesture.

[...]

Educational courses on ”healthy families” and ”marriage and love.” For example, in December 2024, a state-run publication from the National Health Commission called on universities to set up “marriage and love education courses” to encourage students to think positively about marriage.

[...]