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Finnish authorities have accused senior officers of a Russia-linked vessel that damaged undersea cables last year between Finland and Estonia of criminal offenses related to the wreckage.

They say the oil tanker, the Eagle S, dragged its anchor to damage the Estlink-2 power cable and communication links between Finland and Estonia on Dec. 25. The Kremlin previously denied involvement in damaging the infrastructure, which provides power and communication for thousands of Europeans.

The Eagle S is flagged in the Cook Islands, but has been described by Finnish customs officials and the European Union’s executive commission as part of Russia’s shadow fleet of fuel tankers. Those are aging vessels with obscure ownership, acquired to evade Western sanctions amid the war in Ukraine and operating without Western-regulated insurance.

[...]

The Eagle S was carrying 35,000 tons of oil and investigators allege it left a drag trail with its anchor for almost 100 kilometers (62 miles) on the sea bed before it was stopped and escorted to the vicinity of a Finnish port.

The senior officers, whose names were not made public, were the master, the chief mate and the second mate, Finnish police said.

[...]

The investigators’ findings have been referred to Finnish prosecutors for possible charges.

[...]

The damage to the Estlink 2, which can provide about half of the electricity needs for Estonia in winter, did not disrupt service, although it did drive up energy prices in the Baltic nations.

The cable is about 90 miles (145 kilometers) long and is located at a depth of 90 meters (295 feet) at its deepest point, across one of the busiest shipping lanes in Europe.

The undersea cables and pipelines that crisscross the sea link Nordic, Baltic and central European countries, promote trade, energy security and, in some cases, reduce dependence on Russian energy resources.

crosspostato da: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36740689

Archived

There are no detention camps in Xinjiang, Chinese authorities said once the evidence and outcry became too much to deny completely – only vocational education and training centres. And those held there, they said, are not detainees at all but trainees who benefit greatly from their stay.

“The centres provide free education,” Chinese official Aierken Tuniyazi told a session of the UN Human Rights Council in June 2019 [...] The trainees’ personal dignity and freedoms are protected and they are allowed to go home on a regular basis, he said. Many had already “graduated” from the centres to live “a happy life with better quality”.

[...]

This was the narrative carefully propagated by Chinese government and state media, and armies of online commentators. None of it corresponded with the experiences of Uyghurs, Kazakhs and others caught up in the crackdown on Xinjiang’s Muslim minorities that a 2022 United Nations report found could constitute crimes against humanity, and the United States and other countries have described as genocide.

Only a tiny fraction of the estimated one million detained in camps and prisons managed to escape abroad. I spoke with a series of them in Turkey, Kazakhstan and the US while researching my book, Those Who Should Be Seized Should Be Seized, which investigates China’s oppression of its Muslim citizens. They had been held in different facilities across Xinjiang. All described systematic indoctrination, mistreatment and torture. Similar testimony has been gathered by rights groups and journalists and is supported by numerous leaked government documents.

People were taken to the camps for exhibiting what the Chinese government deemed signs of extremism – and that could be almost anything. Praying at the local mosque, wearing a headscarf or growing a beard. Quitting smoking, travelling to see family members abroad or just receiving a phone call from a foreign number. Saying “God bless you”

[...]

Arrests came in the form of summons to a local police station or armed squads pounding on doors late at night. Detainees were driven to massive facilities then stripped of their clothing, jewellery and phones and given uniforms. They were put in crowded cells that sometimes had beds but often did not, and watched over by ceiling-mounted CCTV cameras. The cells were unbearably warm in summer and when winter came the detainees pressed together for warmth. They were given only brief access to toilets [...]. Food was meagre. Several described only a thin soup for each meal, sometimes with a small piece of bread. Others talked of even less and a terrible, gnawing hunger.

There were classes most days that involved sitting in cramped and silent rows listening to lectures on Chinese language or the legal system. Guards would make them memorise patriotic songs and elements of Xi Jinping Thought, the president’s political doctrine. There would be videos too, detailing Xi’s foreign policy achievements or the power of China’s military.

Medical attention came only in an emergency and sometimes not even then. Most detainees said they were given regular pills or injections, however. None of them knew what they were given but it fogged their minds, made them lethargic and seemed to disrupt the women’s menstrual cycles.

[...]

There was violence. Beatings with fists, boots and shock batons for the slightest infraction and sometimes for no reason at all. Detainees spoke often of the device known as the tiger chair that guards strapped people into for hours or days at a time. The worst punishments often seemed to be reserved for Uyghurs.

Women described suffering and witnessing sexual violence. One told me men in medical masks took women from the cells at night and that when it happened to her, she was raped and beaten by several guards.

[...]

Feedback period ends 18 June 2025 (midnight Brussels time).

Certain metadata processed by service providers are needed to effectively fight crime. Since no EU-wide legal framework exists requiring providers to retain metadata for a reasonable and limited period of time for criminal proceedings, data may no longer exist by the time authorities request them. The divergences between EU Member States’ laws governing the retention of data can hamper criminal proceedings and affect service providers operating across the EU. This initiative is to assess the impact of data retention rules at EU level.

crosspostato da: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36740689

Archived

There are no detention camps in Xinjiang, Chinese authorities said once the evidence and outcry became too much to deny completely – only vocational education and training centres. And those held there, they said, are not detainees at all but trainees who benefit greatly from their stay.

“The centres provide free education,” Chinese official Aierken Tuniyazi told a session of the UN Human Rights Council in June 2019 [...] The trainees’ personal dignity and freedoms are protected and they are allowed to go home on a regular basis, he said. Many had already “graduated” from the centres to live “a happy life with better quality”.

[...]

This was the narrative carefully propagated by Chinese government and state media, and armies of online commentators. None of it corresponded with the experiences of Uyghurs, Kazakhs and others caught up in the crackdown on Xinjiang’s Muslim minorities that a 2022 United Nations report found could constitute crimes against humanity, and the United States and other countries have described as genocide.

Only a tiny fraction of the estimated one million detained in camps and prisons managed to escape abroad. I spoke with a series of them in Turkey, Kazakhstan and the US while researching my book, Those Who Should Be Seized Should Be Seized, which investigates China’s oppression of its Muslim citizens. They had been held in different facilities across Xinjiang. All described systematic indoctrination, mistreatment and torture. Similar testimony has been gathered by rights groups and journalists and is supported by numerous leaked government documents.

People were taken to the camps for exhibiting what the Chinese government deemed signs of extremism – and that could be almost anything. Praying at the local mosque, wearing a headscarf or growing a beard. Quitting smoking, travelling to see family members abroad or just receiving a phone call from a foreign number. Saying “God bless you”

[...]

Arrests came in the form of summons to a local police station or armed squads pounding on doors late at night. Detainees were driven to massive facilities then stripped of their clothing, jewellery and phones and given uniforms. They were put in crowded cells that sometimes had beds but often did not, and watched over by ceiling-mounted CCTV cameras. The cells were unbearably warm in summer and when winter came the detainees pressed together for warmth. They were given only brief access to toilets [...]. Food was meagre. Several described only a thin soup for each meal, sometimes with a small piece of bread. Others talked of even less and a terrible, gnawing hunger.

There were classes most days that involved sitting in cramped and silent rows listening to lectures on Chinese language or the legal system. Guards would make them memorise patriotic songs and elements of Xi Jinping Thought, the president’s political doctrine. There would be videos too, detailing Xi’s foreign policy achievements or the power of China’s military.

Medical attention came only in an emergency and sometimes not even then. Most detainees said they were given regular pills or injections, however. None of them knew what they were given but it fogged their minds, made them lethargic and seemed to disrupt the women’s menstrual cycles.

[...]

There was violence. Beatings with fists, boots and shock batons for the slightest infraction and sometimes for no reason at all. Detainees spoke often of the device known as the tiger chair that guards strapped people into for hours or days at a time. The worst punishments often seemed to be reserved for Uyghurs.

Women described suffering and witnessing sexual violence. One told me men in medical masks took women from the cells at night and that when it happened to her, she was raped and beaten by several guards.

[...]

Archived

There are no detention camps in Xinjiang, Chinese authorities said once the evidence and outcry became too much to deny completely – only vocational education and training centres. And those held there, they said, are not detainees at all but trainees who benefit greatly from their stay.

“The centres provide free education,” Chinese official Aierken Tuniyazi told a session of the UN Human Rights Council in June 2019 [...] The trainees’ personal dignity and freedoms are protected and they are allowed to go home on a regular basis, he said. Many had already “graduated” from the centres to live “a happy life with better quality”.

[...]

This was the narrative carefully propagated by Chinese government and state media, and armies of online commentators. None of it corresponded with the experiences of Uyghurs, Kazakhs and others caught up in the crackdown on Xinjiang’s Muslim minorities that a 2022 United Nations report found could constitute crimes against humanity, and the United States and other countries have described as genocide.

Only a tiny fraction of the estimated one million detained in camps and prisons managed to escape abroad. I spoke with a series of them in Turkey, Kazakhstan and the US while researching my book, Those Who Should Be Seized Should Be Seized, which investigates China’s oppression of its Muslim citizens. They had been held in different facilities across Xinjiang. All described systematic indoctrination, mistreatment and torture. Similar testimony has been gathered by rights groups and journalists and is supported by numerous leaked government documents.

People were taken to the camps for exhibiting what the Chinese government deemed signs of extremism – and that could be almost anything. Praying at the local mosque, wearing a headscarf or growing a beard. Quitting smoking, travelling to see family members abroad or just receiving a phone call from a foreign number. Saying “God bless you”

[...]

Arrests came in the form of summons to a local police station or armed squads pounding on doors late at night. Detainees were driven to massive facilities then stripped of their clothing, jewellery and phones and given uniforms. They were put in crowded cells that sometimes had beds but often did not, and watched over by ceiling-mounted CCTV cameras. The cells were unbearably warm in summer and when winter came the detainees pressed together for warmth. They were given only brief access to toilets [...]. Food was meagre. Several described only a thin soup for each meal, sometimes with a small piece of bread. Others talked of even less and a terrible, gnawing hunger.

There were classes most days that involved sitting in cramped and silent rows listening to lectures on Chinese language or the legal system. Guards would make them memorise patriotic songs and elements of Xi Jinping Thought, the president’s political doctrine. There would be videos too, detailing Xi’s foreign policy achievements or the power of China’s military.

Medical attention came only in an emergency and sometimes not even then. Most detainees said they were given regular pills or injections, however. None of them knew what they were given but it fogged their minds, made them lethargic and seemed to disrupt the women’s menstrual cycles.

[...]

There was violence. Beatings with fists, boots and shock batons for the slightest infraction and sometimes for no reason at all. Detainees spoke often of the device known as the tiger chair that guards strapped people into for hours or days at a time. The worst punishments often seemed to be reserved for Uyghurs.

Women described suffering and witnessing sexual violence. One told me men in medical masks took women from the cells at night and that when it happened to her, she was raped and beaten by several guards.

[...]

Archived

The launch of RSF.org in Mandarin is all the more crucial as access to independent information continues to shrink for Chinese-speaking audiences. Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, the regime has reinforced its censorship apparatus — symbolised by the "Great Firewall" — and ramped up efforts to spread propaganda globally. As a result, China now ranks near the bottom of the 2025 RSF World Press Freedom Index, placing 178th out of 180 countries and territories. With at least 123 journalists and media workers currently imprisoned, China remains the world’s largest jailer of media professionals.

[...]

With the addition of both simplified and traditional Mandarin, the RSF website is now available in an increasing number of languages for a global audience. The NGO also publishes regional content in Korean, Japanese, Mongolian, Russian, Turkish, and Ukrainian. Internationally, RSF operates through 7 bureaus, 6 sections, and a network of 160 correspondents in over 140 countries.

[...]

crosspostato da: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36696301

A new report traces how China’s targeting of protesters has evolved since the Tiananmen Square massacre into part of a sophisticated transnational repression campaign using harassment, violence and surveillance.

The report by ARTICLE 19 [opens pdf], an organization that defends freedom of expression worldwide, bolsters ICIJ’s findings in China Targets, a cross-border investigation exposing the sprawling scope and terrifying tactics of Beijing’s campaign to silence its critics living overseas.

As part of the investigation, ICIJ outlined a pattern of activist detentions by local police and governments ahead of visits by President Xi Jinping. During at least seven of Xi’s 31 international trips between 2019 and 2024, local law enforcement infringed on dozens of protesters’ rights in order to shield the Chinese president from dissent, detaining or arresting activists, often for spurious reasons.

The ARTICLE 19 report goes further, interviewing 29 members of diaspora communities, including some also identified by ICIJ, to describe incidents at protests dating as far back as 2011 involving activists from mainland China, including ethnic minorities from the northwest Xinjiang region and Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Inner Mongolia.

“This report points to a campaign of international harassment and intimidation designed with one purpose: to systematically stifle global protest movements that seek to defend human rights in China,” ARTICLE 19 said in the report.

[...]

The report also highlighted the psychological toll that acts of transnational repression can take on dissidents, many of whom are already isolated as members of diaspora communities. Beyond immediate verbal and physical attacks, the protracted threat of surveillance can lead to self-censorship and burnout, the report said.

“Overseas Chinese dissidents, Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hong Kongers, and other diaspora activists know all too well the cost of protesting against human rights violations in China: its repression knows no borders,” Michael Caster, who runs ARTICLE 19’s Global China Programme, said in a statement. “And still, authorities in host countries have yet to fully grasp the dangers of transnational repression — and so support to those targeted is often severely lacking.”

[...]

A new report traces how China’s targeting of protesters has evolved since the Tiananmen Square massacre into part of a sophisticated transnational repression campaign using harassment, violence and surveillance.

The report by ARTICLE 19 [opens pdf], an organization that defends freedom of expression worldwide, bolsters ICIJ’s findings in China Targets, a cross-border investigation exposing the sprawling scope and terrifying tactics of Beijing’s campaign to silence its critics living overseas.

As part of the investigation, ICIJ outlined a pattern of activist detentions by local police and governments ahead of visits by President Xi Jinping. During at least seven of Xi’s 31 international trips between 2019 and 2024, local law enforcement infringed on dozens of protesters’ rights in order to shield the Chinese president from dissent, detaining or arresting activists, often for spurious reasons.

The ARTICLE 19 report goes further, interviewing 29 members of diaspora communities, including some also identified by ICIJ, to describe incidents at protests dating as far back as 2011 involving activists from mainland China, including ethnic minorities from the northwest Xinjiang region and Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Inner Mongolia.

“This report points to a campaign of international harassment and intimidation designed with one purpose: to systematically stifle global protest movements that seek to defend human rights in China,” ARTICLE 19 said in the report.

[...]

The report also highlighted the psychological toll that acts of transnational repression can take on dissidents, many of whom are already isolated as members of diaspora communities. Beyond immediate verbal and physical attacks, the protracted threat of surveillance can lead to self-censorship and burnout, the report said.

“Overseas Chinese dissidents, Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hong Kongers, and other diaspora activists know all too well the cost of protesting against human rights violations in China: its repression knows no borders,” Michael Caster, who runs ARTICLE 19’s Global China Programme, said in a statement. “And still, authorities in host countries have yet to fully grasp the dangers of transnational repression — and so support to those targeted is often severely lacking.”

[...]

Chinas Staats- und Parteichef Xi Jinping verspricht seit einigen Jahren „Wohlstand für alle“ und für China die „globale Führung“. Nun stagniert die Wirtschaft, die Immobilienpreise fallen ins Bodenlose und die Jugendarbeitslosigkeit lag zeitweise bei über 20 Prozent.

Xi Jinping aber lässt lieber die Statistiken zensieren und die Berichterstattung über die Krise unterdrücken. Die Jugend solle jetzt eben lernen, Bitterkeit zu ertragen, so wie der Staatschef selbst, der während der Kulturrevolution unter Mao gegen Ende der sechziger bis Anfang der siebziger Jahre auf dem Land schuften und hungern musste.

Und was machen die jungen Leute, wenn sie nach einem teuren Studium an einer Eliteuni keinen Job finden? Manche praktizieren „tang ping“ (sich flach hinlegen) und „bai lan“ (es einfach laufen lassen) als eine stille Form des Protests gegen den ständigen Leistungsdruck und die Erwartungen der Gesellschaft. Viele junge Menschen ziehen sich aus der urbanen Leistungsgesellschaft zurück und suchen nach alternativen Lebenswegen auf dem Land oder als sogenannte „bezahlte Kinder“ bei ihren Eltern.

Unser Reporter gewann das Vertrauen von drei jungen Leuten, dem 24-jährigen Uni-Absolventen Tianqing, der 30-jährigen Marketing-Managerin Qianqian und dem 28-jährigen Lieferfahrer Erchui. Die ersten beiden suchen schon länger verzweifelt nach einem neuen gut bezahlten Job und der dritte hofft auf bessere Zeiten, irgendwann…

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36624735

Archived

[...]

One Russian government official [said that after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, he asked his son, who was studying in the U.K. at the time, to come back to Russia out of fear that he would face repression for being a Russian citizen. However, the official admitted that he still wished his son could complete his education in the West.

Another official said she sent her daughter to study at a school in the European Union. The daughter later enrolled in university in that country and now refuses to return to Russia.

[Both officials spoke on condition of anonymity.]

While officials go to great lengths to keep these stories under wraps, especially after the invasion of Ukraine put renewed scrutiny on their families’ whereabouts, there are plenty of examples that we know about.

[...]

The sons of Vladimir Yakunin, the former head of state-owned Russian Railways and a former Putin ally and KGB officer, live and do business abroad.

[...]

Svetlana Gradvol, the eldest child of Bashkortostan’s head Radiy Khabirov, has lived in Austria for many years. A graduate of the Vienna University of Economics and Business, Gradvol is married to an Austrian finance professional and owns a photo studio in the Austrian capital, according to information obtained by regional news outlet Prufy.

Gradvol’s younger sister, Rita Khabirova, is also based abroad. Having graduated from King’s College London in 2020, she still lives in London and works in the marketing department of the skincare brand Skin + Me, according to an investigation by Navalny LIVE.

[...]

If these relatives were ordinary people not born into families with status and wealth (which is, in many cases, acquired through corruption), their lives would look very different.

For one, the quality of education in an average school in Russia’s regions is quite different than what you’d get at a private school abroad.

[...]

Even high-scoring school graduates from Russian regions are more likely to enroll in lower-ranked and lesser-known universities due to a lack of knowledge about the higher education system or financial barriers.

[...]

And that’s not to mention matters of basic infrastructure. At least 3,900 schools in Russia are not equipped with a sewage system, according to data analytics project To Be Precise. In the republics of Sakha and Dagestan, sewage systems are absent from as many as 41% of all school buildings; in Tyva, that is true for more than half of all schools.

[...]

Since the invasion of Ukraine, Russian lawmakers have repeatedly tried to ban politicians and officials’ children from studying abroad, a gesture likely aimed at convincing the public that the elites are standing with the Russian people in wartime.

“If you want to change the world, start with yourself. Deputies, mayors and officials not only shouldn’t have foreign citizenship or property abroad — their relatives, including their children, shouldn’t be living or studying abroad either,” State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin said in 2023.

Archived

[...]

One Russian government official [said that after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, he asked his son, who was studying in the U.K. at the time, to come back to Russia out of fear that he would face repression for being a Russian citizen. However, the official admitted that he still wished his son could complete his education in the West.

Another official said she sent her daughter to study at a school in the European Union. The daughter later enrolled in university in that country and now refuses to return to Russia.

[Both officials spoke on condition of anonymity.]

While officials go to great lengths to keep these stories under wraps, especially after the invasion of Ukraine put renewed scrutiny on their families’ whereabouts, there are plenty of examples that we know about.

[...]

The sons of Vladimir Yakunin, the former head of state-owned Russian Railways and a former Putin ally and KGB officer, live and do business abroad.

[...]

Svetlana Gradvol, the eldest child of Bashkortostan’s head Radiy Khabirov, has lived in Austria for many years. A graduate of the Vienna University of Economics and Business, Gradvol is married to an Austrian finance professional and owns a photo studio in the Austrian capital, according to information obtained by regional news outlet Prufy.

Gradvol’s younger sister, Rita Khabirova, is also based abroad. Having graduated from King’s College London in 2020, she still lives in London and works in the marketing department of the skincare brand Skin + Me, according to an investigation by Navalny LIVE.

[...]

If these relatives were ordinary people not born into families with status and wealth (which is, in many cases, acquired through corruption), their lives would look very different.

For one, the quality of education in an average school in Russia’s regions is quite different than what you’d get at a private school abroad.

[...]

Even high-scoring school graduates from Russian regions are more likely to enroll in lower-ranked and lesser-known universities due to a lack of knowledge about the higher education system or financial barriers.

[...]

And that’s not to mention matters of basic infrastructure. At least 3,900 schools in Russia are not equipped with a sewage system, according to data analytics project To Be Precise. In the republics of Sakha and Dagestan, sewage systems are absent from as many as 41% of all school buildings; in Tyva, that is true for more than half of all schools.

[...]

Since the invasion of Ukraine, Russian lawmakers have repeatedly tried to ban politicians and officials’ children from studying abroad, a gesture likely aimed at convincing the public that the elites are standing with the Russian people in wartime.

“If you want to change the world, start with yourself. Deputies, mayors and officials not only shouldn’t have foreign citizenship or property abroad — their relatives, including their children, shouldn’t be living or studying abroad either,” State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin said in 2023.

Archived

A forensic investigation - that is still ongoing - has confirmed the use of Paragon's Graphite spyware platform in zero-click attacks that targeted Apple iOS devices of at least two journalists in Europe.

Canada's Citizen Lab says that the victims were a prominent European journalists who requested anonimity and Ciro Pellegrino, a journalist at Italian publication Fanpage.it.

The researchers identified an indicator linking both cases to the same Paragon operator.

A third alleged spy case follows from a notification by Meta.

Yet to date, there has been no explanation as to who is responsible for spying on these journalists. The attacks occurred in early 2025.

"The lack of accountability available to these spyware targets highlights the extent to which journalists in Europe continue to be subjected to this highly invasive digital threat, and underlines the dangers of spyware proliferation and abuse," Citizen Lab says.

[...]