miz

joined 8 months ago
[–] miz@hexbear.net 18 points 1 day ago* (last edited 1 day ago) (1 children)

reminds me of this, I hope you like it. (seeing Trump wildly mash buttons on the imperial console has made this age well imo)


On a small scale, direct democracy is great, the problem is when you try to scale it up, direct democracy transforms into its opposite and becomes the greatest hindrance to democracy.

The problem is, and I know leftcoms don't like to hear this, but regular people are not omniscient! The large the scale of the election, the more difficult it is for a person to even grasp the full scale of what they're voting for.

Take, for example, the US presidential election. If Joe Biden had a 5 minute conversation with every single American of voting age, it would take almost 2000 years to complete. It's not physically possible for regular people to come to know a candidate on an election of this scale organically.

How do they come to know them, then? Simple, through media institutions. You cannot vote for someone without knowing who they are, and hence, whoever is placed on the media will be the first step in the nomination process to decide who can get elected, since it will be impossible for voters to even know who they are voting for without the media.

Who ran for president in the US last election? You can probably say Joe Biden, Donald Trump, maybe if you followed it closely you'd know some less known candidates like Bernie or Howie.

In reality, 1,216 people ran for president in 2022. Yet, you don't know of almost any of them. Because you only know of who the media told you about. And it's even worse in the US because the media is controlled by money so a candidate's viability is directly linked p with how much money they raise to appear in the media.

In practice, large-scale direct democracy always just devolves into a dictatorship of the media. Whatever small group has control over the media will control all of society, because regular people are not omniscient and won't understand how to run a country as big as China with over a billion people, and will rely on the TV to tell them how to vote, not because they're not smart, but because nobody is that smart. You aren't either, nor am I.

With some exceptions like national referendums on issues people might actually generally know about, in general, all elections should be very small in scale, or else they will be easily susceptible to manipulation.

Yes, for a large society, this requires many layers of elections, but it originates from small scale direct democratic elections at the base, and every layer going up is subject to the right to recall by the one below it. Each election is small enough so that people know who they are voting for at every step, so it is a rational system and not a chaotic one, producing efficient government that has its roots in the public.

This is far more functional than some chaotic direct democracy where 1+ billion Chinese people vote on every single issue. Such a thing would be a complete disaster and not democratic at all.

It also adds a benefit of making it rather difficult to climb to the top. To be president, you have to constantly prove yourself on every layer. You have to start small, directly elected at the root, and prove yourself at a local level, and eventually work your way up until you eventually prove you can manage towns, cities, whole provinces, until you can even be considered to be at the helm of the entire nation.

Adding these layers not only makes it more democratic and rational as a system but it also has a benefit of inherently injecting merit into the process.

The obsession over direct democracy for everything needs to go. It works well for somethings, small-scale elections at the base for the first layer of representatives, and occasionally on natural referendums where certain issues affect everyone. But it is not some cure-all silver-bullet for everything and is in fact a complete disaster if you try to apply it to everything.

—zhenli真理

[–] miz@hexbear.net 18 points 1 day ago (3 children)

Matt Christman has a good Inebriated Past that is closely related to this, Chapo Trap House Ep 329

[–] miz@hexbear.net 35 points 1 day ago* (last edited 1 day ago)

Hell Joseon

[–] miz@hexbear.net 1 points 1 day ago

spoiler

{我|wǒ}{操|cào} {中|zhōng}{国|guó}{人|rén}{怎|zěn}{么|me}{那|nà}{么|me}{坏|huài}{啊|a}

"fuck! how can Chinese people be so bad!?"

[–] miz@hexbear.net 20 points 1 day ago* (last edited 1 day ago) (1 children)

it was wild learning a 2x4 isn't 2"x4"

shrinkflation smh

[–] miz@hexbear.net 15 points 1 day ago
[–] miz@hexbear.net 77 points 1 day ago* (last edited 1 day ago) (1 children)

Leaked Data Reveals Massive Israeli [sic] Campaign to Remove Pro-Palestine Posts on Facebook and Instagram | Drop Site News

A sweeping crackdown on posts on Instagram and Facebook that are critical of Israel [sic]—or even vaguely supportive of Palestinians—was directly orchestrated by the government of Israel [sic], according to internal Meta data obtained by Drop Site News. The data show that Meta has complied with 94% of takedown requests issued by Israel [sic] since October 7, 2023. Israel [sic] is the biggest originator of takedown requests globally by far, and Meta has followed suit—widening the net of posts it automatically removes, and creating what can be called the largest mass censorship operation in modern history.

[–] miz@hexbear.net 16 points 1 day ago* (last edited 1 day ago)

they told me I had no rights

freedom-and-democracy shining city on a hill

[–] miz@hexbear.net 2 points 1 day ago

Hulagu is a really fun name to say

[–] miz@hexbear.net 30 points 1 day ago* (last edited 1 day ago)

Tim Apple Turnover kelly

 

could not figure out what comm to put this in

 

The release of three Israeli female prisoners in Gaza by Hamas’s military wing, the Qassam Brigades, in exchange for 90 Palestinian detainees, triggered a media frenzy in the occupation state.

The dramatic “scene” – fighters emerging amidst the ruins of war, surrounded by a jubilant crowd – undermined official Israeli narratives about the war, its goals, and the treatment of Israeli captives. It raised a sobering question for Israelis: What were we doing in Gaza for 15 months?

The Qassam Brigades orchestrated every detail of the event to maximize impact. From the branded gift bags to the polished uniforms of the fighters, the display exuded calculated precision. A military procession was even held in Saraya Square – an area heavily besieged by Israeli occupation forces. The site’s selection was deliberate, showcasing continued resilience in a location meant to symbolize Tel Aviv's defeat in its longest military campaign ever.

Sources in Hamas inform The Cradle that the selection of Gaza City – positioned north of the Gaza Valley and the Netzarim axis, a divide created by the Israeli army to split the strip into two sections, soon expected to be dismantled – was a deliberate and symbolic decision, chosen over other alternatives for its strategic and political implications.

Of course, Hamas had the option to release the female prisoners in “safer” locations, such as central or southern Gaza, but it intentionally chose the square.

Strength through strategy

The delay in handing over the three Israeli prisoners for several hours caused confusion among Israelis, leading to multiple violations of the ceasefire agreement. The Qassam Brigades then surprised the Israeli public by announcing the prisoners' names before the Israeli government, military, or Hebrew media could do so. Minor logistical issues also briefly delayed the release of the 90 male and female Palestinian prisoners but were quickly resolved.

The three Israeli captives were handed release certificates in both Hebrew and Arabic – mirroring Israeli practices with Palestinian prisoners – and were given souvenirs from Gaza, including a detailed map of the entire strip. According to the sources, these “deliberate and carefully planned steps” were intended to send a clear message to Israel: Hamas is neither defeated nor on the brink of elimination.

Israel’s Channel 12 called the ceasefire agreement a “bag of sarcastic surprises,” but the prisoner exchange's strength lay elsewhere. For months, Israeli negotiators had tried through Qatari and Egyptian mediation – and failed – to extract a list of the Palestinian prisoners to be freed.

Hamas refused, citing security risks, and forced Israel to pay a far higher price than in earlier deals. The initial truce on 24 November 2023 saw three Palestinians exchanged per Israeli. Now, after 15 grueling months of war, Israel had to release 10 times that ratio, a clear indication of Tel Aviv's lost leverage.

That first, brief six-day truce gave Palestinian resistance factions a chance to regroup. Sources reveal that several battalions, battered by relentless Israeli bombings, managed to regain their operational footing during the break. While Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had pushed for continuous pressure without any pause in Israel's brutal military campaign, the short truce showed Hamas was resilient enough to spring back into form quickly.

Did Hamas achieve victory in Gaza?

All of this raises the central question: Did Hamas achieve victory in Gaza, and if so, how and why? To answer fully, one must first analyze the foundational and evolving sources of the resistance movement’s strength, examine the mechanisms behind its adaptability and renewal, and finally consider who currently leads the organization, particularly within the Gaza Strip.

Hamas today remains deeply present not only in the Palestinian street but also across the broader Arab and Islamic worlds. Despite the devastation of war, Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, which was launched on 7 October 2023, continues to resonate strongly, shaping public and personal sentiment across the globe. Moreover, sources tell The Cradle that these events have fueled significant recruitment, with thousands of young Palestinians joining Hamas’s ranks.

Even Hebrew media, despite its often propagandistic tone, has acknowledged this phenomenon. While much of Israel's narrative aims to justify prolonged conflict or the potential resumption of war, occasional admissions reveal the growing appeal of resistance among Palestinians.

Hamas sources argue that Israel has created “a vendetta for generations,” describing the war as not merely a battle against the resistance movement, but a war on all citizens of Gaza. The widespread massacres and destruction have unified the Palestinian street, blurring distinctions between Hamas supporters and others.

“Those who are not part of Hamas inevitably become part of the resistance,” one source explains, emphasizing that even if Hamas were to cease, a new and perhaps stronger movement would emerge in its stead.

A European security official reportedly shared similar concerns with a Hamas representative in Lebanon. The official warned that Gaza’s estimated 18,000 orphans, created by this war alone, could form a new “liberation army” within a decade, one even fiercer than its predecessors.

Adaptability and strategic learning

Hamas has leveraged this dire situation for reconstruction and renewal, refining its strategies and operations. By the sixth month of the war, it was evident that its focus extended beyond ammunition and weaponry to the cultivation of leadership and cadres.

The Qassam Brigades has prioritized the safety of fighters and the efficiency of operations, ensuring that resources are not squandered and that retreat paths remain secure. Israel’s starvation policy, particularly in northern Gaza, aimed to weaken resistance fighters by restricting vital nutritional elements like animal proteins. Despite these tactics, Hamas adapted swiftly, mitigating the impact through preemptive measures.

Another critical factor in Hamas’s resilience is its systematic approach to leadership development. Before the war, its military arms, particularly the Qassam Brigades, operated training programs and maintained a semi-official military academy.

This structure allowed the group to maintain high-caliber leadership despite the assassination of many of the movement's commanders. Expertise in manufacturing weapons and missiles was rapidly transferred, ensuring continuity in operations.

Intel warfare

Hamas’s intelligence apparatus also played a pivotal role, in which “secrecy” was maintained over key information. Sources tell The Cradle that the movement’s security infrastructure, including the intelligence arm of the Qassam Brigades, General Security, and Internal Security, was critical in preserving the organization's structure and integrity throughout the war.

“As long as the security apparatus is strong, the movement will endure,” one source notes. Even as Israeli forces targeted intelligence members, Hamas adapted, employing thousands, securing prisoners, and transferring money – within its existing security frameworks and new methods developed during the war.

The resistance movement also demonstrated remarkable counterintelligence capabilities. Israeli forces, dissatisfied with their aerial and technical surveillance, resorted to storming locations not just for military gains but to install surveillance equipment to try to fill their intel gaps. Meanwhile, Hamas prioritized operational secrecy, closely monitoring journalists and photographers among displaced communities to prevent leaks that could endanger fighters or their families. The source explains it thus:

“As long as the security apparatus is present and strong, the movement will remain fine ... It does not matter how weak it is militarily, politically, or even financially; what is important is that security remains fine. After months of military combat, the battle turned into an intelligence war, specifically between the Qassam Intelligence and the Shin Bet.”

Leadership in Gaza: Who leads Hamas?

Following the martyrdom of Yahya Sinwar – the powerful and intelligent Hamas leader and ‘architect’ of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood – the resistance movement refrained from announcing a new political bureau chief, leaving questions about its leadership unanswered. The Cradle sources confirm, however, that the movement is currently governed by a five-member committee representing Gaza, the West Bank, and the diaspora, with Musa Abu Marzouk playing a key role in international relations.

Israeli media has frequently speculated about the role of Mohammad Sinwar, Yahya’s brother, portraying him as a central, uncompromising figure in Hamas’s decision-making. The younger Sinwar's life is no less mysterious than that of the Qassam Brigades Military Commander Mohammed Deif, and he has also been subjected to six assassination attempts during the last 30 years.

While Mohammad Sinwar lacks a political or security background, his expertise as a brigade and operations commander has made him a formidable figure in Gaza's resistance. Reports suggest that during negotiations, Israel even proposed deporting the younger Sinwar to resolve the conflict – an offer Hamas dismissed.

Although Israeli reports often personalize and exaggerate leadership roles – often right before an assassination attempt – insiders stress that Hamas operates as an institution, not as a personality-driven movement. This institutional framework has been key to its resilience, enabling it to withstand external pressure and internal challenges.

Despite the devastation wrought by the war, Hamas has succeeded in fortifying its institutional framework and maintaining cohesion – a rare feat among Palestinian factions. While Yahya Sinwar’s leadership during pivotal operations, such as Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, demonstrates the movement’s strategic acumen, the true source of Hamas’s strength lies in its collective and institutional structure. This framework has enabled it to endure even the most extreme challenges.

Without this institutional resilience, Hamas’s gains would likely have disintegrated early in the conflict, handing the occupation state the decisive political victory it sought – a victory that remains unattained.

 

 

whatever happened to free markets???1!?

 
 

I like it. maltier than I am used to but I like the rice notes and it has a nuttiness

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