The cost quickly balloons from there for russia as the cost per flying bomb/shahed goes up from having to make them more sophisticated and capable of flying higher to penetrate Ukrainian defenses.

The idea that mass flying bomb attacks are more cost efficient than other types of attacks or that there is no way a defender can't affordably chew through mass flying bomb attacks with expensive equipment in an affordable way is not really true, under certain conditions it is but under others this is the least efficient strategy possible.

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[–] testaccount372920@piefed.zip 2 points 1 week ago (2 children)

I'm not sure if I fully can agree with your argument about cost effectiveness and I think it comes down to accuracy whether it is or isn't effective.

In the past months 5-10% of Russian drones made it past Ukrainian air defenses (which is impressively low). Let's go with 5% at a price of $50 000 per drone. That means it costs $1 000 000 per hit target. Missiles are more expensive than that afaik (and a significant percentage of those are taken down too), so the drones don't do too badly when it comes to cost.

However, if the drones are inaccurate and don't hit the intended targets, then the cost per target increases rapdidly. It's hard to say if they're really cost effective or not, because we don't know for sure if Russia is actually trying to hit relevant targets or is intentionally commiting to terror strikes v1 style. Ukraine hasn't been very open about what has been hit, but we do know that their energy infrastructure has taken serious hits.

Another point to consider is that the Russian launch capacity doesn't appear to be limited by cost, but rather by production capacity (which I suppose is ultimately also limited by cost). That basically means that the drones are almost purely an addition to their arsenal which makes it quite sensible to produce and use more. Fortunately the Russian drones don't appear to be doing nearly enough to turn the tide in Russia's favor.

[–] supersquirrel@sopuli.xyz 4 points 1 week ago (1 children)

Another point to consider is that the Russian launch capacity doesn't appear to be limited by cost, but rather by production capacity

This is a fantasy sustainable to a point, after which it shatters as this is literally physically impossible.

[–] testaccount372920@piefed.zip 1 points 1 week ago

Of course, ultimately cost limits everything, but it's not always the biggest factor in the short-ish term. It is easy/cheap to increase drone production in a short time, evident from Russia building a big production site after the war started. It is hard/expensive to increase production for advanced missiles, evident from the relatively low numbers of use and constant-ish rate. They (think they) need long-range strike capabilities and they need it yesterday, so drone usage is the sensible option even if it is more expensive.

[–] thebestaquaman@lemmy.world 2 points 1 week ago (1 children)

I think a major point here is that mass drone attacks become more viable if your enemy only has expensive means to shoot them down. If your drones are cheaper and easier to produce than the weapons the enemy is using to shoot them down, you are winning in attrition every time the enemy shoots down one of your drones (because, presumably, you can produce more of them for longer than the enemy can produce the counter-measures).

When you take that into account, it changes your equation dramatically: With a 5 % hit rate, you're spending 1 000 000 USD per target, while the enemy has spent 19 x (cost of shooting down drone) defending that target. If it costs them more than 52 500 USD (on average) to shoot down a drone, you're both hitting targets, and spending less money doing it than the enemy is spending on defending themselves. A single AMRAAM missile costs around 1 000 000 USD, so if you're using those to shoot down these drones, you're spending 20 x as much as your enemy, and still getting hit.

Enter the Gepard (or similar countermeasures). They allow you to shoot down a drone at a fraction of the cost of the drone. You might still be getting hit (around 5 % of the time), but now you're capable of fielding much more AA at a fraction of the cost. When dealing with these massive drone swarms, volume is the name of the game. A single 1 000 000 USD AMRAAM missile can never take down more than a single drone, so it's never going to be a long-term viable strategy to use them for drone defence. It's much more reasonable to field a truckload of Gepards (or similar) so that you have enough volume of fire to take down all the drones headed your way.

[–] testaccount372920@piefed.zip 1 points 1 week ago

I think we/I have some confusion about which cost effectiveness we're talking about. Your comment is about the cost effectiveness of (Ukraine's) drone defense, where the defense costs are lower than the attack costs. Ukraine is doing really well on that front to the point that they're selling tech to other countries.

My comment was about the viability/cost effectiveness of Russian drone launches. For that calculation they need a drone launch price < target value + air defense cost. Since targets tend to be quite valuable, it's not too hard to make it cost effective, although not necessarily more cost effective than other means.