this post was submitted on 17 May 2026
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I believe you are mistaken, comrade. I am not actually Nikita Khrushchev nor am I Mao Zedong. Any "double-standard" you see with Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Opening Up as a result of problems with the late Mao era and the Gang of Four must be considered from that context, and not merely from one aspect of Mao's critique of Khrushchev's policy before the Gang of Four era.
Regarding the Gang of Four, they were largely an extension of Mao's incorrect lines towards the end of his life, without most of his positive lines. Deng Xiaoping corrected the course for the new era of development, having inherited a basically industrialized economy but with widespread poverty and backwards technology.
As for China outmaneuvering the west, I agree. This is pretty plainly what happened, despite what the west thought they could get away with, China maintained a dictatorship of the proletariat and maintained political control in the socialist market economy.
You’ve probably misunderstood me again, Comrade.
What you call Deng Xiaoping’s "openness," Mao called Khrushchev’s "revisionism."
Deng did exactly what Khrushchev had attempted to do—only later. Or do you consider it a mistake on Mao’s part that he didn’t beat Khrushchev to the punch and establish relations with the West first?
I don't understand why you—a man with the mindset of a dialectical materialist—are always prone to idealizing things. It is still a Party, and the same internal Party struggle is at play.
Let me tell you how it all unfolded in the USSR. When Gorbachev came to power and launched Perestroika, a great many members of the Central Committee were opposed to it. This was the so-called "Old Guard"—or, if you prefer, you could call them the "Gang of Four." These were Brezhnev's people. Within a very short timeframe—and very quietly—these individuals were either removed from their posts or sidelined for one reason or another; some were compromised and forced to step down. It wasn't as loud, brutal, or theatrical as the affair involving the original "Gang of Four," but the result was the same: the entire Old Guard—that "Gang of Four"—simply dissolved into the ether of existence...
To suggest that the "Great Helmsman" Deng was thinking about the people or about reforms back then—much as Gorbachev supposedly was during Perestroika while simultaneously purging his rivals—is, at the very least, naive, Comrade! At that time, they were thinking about one thing and one thing only: power.
And I recently told you something untrue. Gorbachev did have a plan. It was the "Acceleration" plan—a concept originally conceived by Andropov. Andropov had entrusted its development to three individuals: Ryzhkov, Gorbachev, and... well, I’ve forgotten the third one. This "Acceleration" plan concerned exclusively economic reforms—there were absolutely no political or ideological components to it!
Over the course of two years—largely thanks to Ryzhkov—the plan was fully developed, and in 1985, Gorbachev officially launched it. He immediately presented it during the very first plenary session of the Central Committee. It was Andropov’s "Acceleration" plan.
It was a plan for economic reforms!
Then, in 1987—when Perestroika truly began (that is, when the term Perestroika first started appearing in the newspapers)—the scope of the reforms expanded to encompass not only economic matters but also state-level and ideological issues. Ryzhkov opposed this expansion and subsequently resigned. This comes from the memoirs of Ryzhkov himself, who passed away not long ago.
Yakovlev—who at the time served as the USSR's chief ideologue—bears the entire blame. It was he who persuaded Gorbachev to undertake ideological reform. This was a fatal error!
However, to this day, I still cannot determine whether or not the CIA had a hand in it.
This is because Yakovlev spent a great deal of time working at the Soviet Embassy in Canada. Gorbachev, too, traveled there at Yakovlev's invitation—long before he became president. Yakovlev arranged a meeting between Gorbachev and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau—presumably, the modern-day Trudeau is his son or grandson. While in Canada, Gorbachev also met with representatives from the United States. This took place in the early 1980s. It would be fascinating to know what exactly they discussed there. I do not rule out the possibility that Yakovlev was working for the CIA—perhaps even unwittingly.
Yes, I agree that retaining political control is to Mao's credit, as he built the foundation of the state apparatus.
Deng did not do what Khrushchev did, for the following key reasons:
Deng upheld Stalin and Mao, refusing to create a historical nihilism among the people.
Deng did not state that class struggle was over, but instead that it was alive and well, and must be constantly watched out for.
Deng turned a largely backwards economy into a more progressive form, Khrushchev weakened a more advanced economy into a more regressive one.
I appreciate the added background detail for the Soviet perspective, but to equate Khrushchev and Deng is to make a clear error.
No, that’s not at all what I mean, Comrade!
I am talking about double standards:
The Chinese CPC labeled Khrushchev’s rapprochement with the West as "Khrushchev’s revisionism."
Some time later, Deng initiated a rapprochement with the West. The Chinese CPC called this "opening up."
Khrushchev was a pale, insignificant figure compared to Stalin—and likely compared to Mao, too.
Someone in China once said—I don’t recall the exact words or who said it—that Mao was the matador and Khrushchev the bull.
Comparing Mao and Khrushchev is indeed inappropriate—except, perhaps, regarding their education and experience in economic management. In every other respect, Mao was a far more significant figure. A characteristic trait of Khrushchev’s during the Stalin era was that he executed orders very well but never showed initiative. That is likely how Khrushchev differed from Mao; Khrushchev was a sycophant and a careerist.
For instance, during the purges, Khrushchev ranked second in terms of the number of people on the lists of suspects he submitted to Stalin for approval. He was zealous in his efforts to curry favor with Stalin.
And then he accused Stalin of the very thing he himself did better than anyone else... )))
It's widely acknowledged that the later Mao era and the era of the Gang of Four was filled with mistakes, and that Reform & Opening Up was a course correction. You may call this "double standards," but learning from mistakes when practice doesn't live up to expectations is how we grow.
We’ve finally reached a consensus, Comrade! There’s just a slight discrepancy regarding the dates. You say the late Mao era began in 1968, whereas I maintain that the late Mao era you’re referring to actually began after Stalin’s death. Let me just clarify one more thing: from 1950 onwards—after suffering four strokes—Stalin didn’t really make any major decisions in the country. A triumvirate was formed—Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov—to prepare all key state projects, while Stalin merely affixed the final approval. So, in essence, Stalin had already died back in 1950.
If we settle on a middle ground... say, 1959—would that work for you, Comrade?... ))))
I don't think we are going to come to an agreement here. I wouldn't put a hard date on it.
Comrade, just so you know: if I use ")))", it means I'm joking.
Of course, one shouldn't date events that way.
I wanted to highlight the fact that you agreed with me on at least one thing!)))
I understand )))! Just not used to seeing it.
When you see that ")))", you’ll realize you’re talking to a Russian or a Russian speaker.
Okay, in that case, let’s talk about humor.
Let’s talk about folklore. Folklore isn't about the state; it’s about the people. Folklore reflects the collective mindset of the people—I think you’d agree with that... Vox populi, vox Dei.
Here’s a Soviet-era joke; these few lines capture the whole essence:
"To launch a satellite, the Chinese formed a human pyramid a thousand stories high, but it collapsed because the guy on the three-hundred-and-seventeenth floor hadn't properly mastered Mao's Little Red Book."
You’re an intelligent person, so you surely understand that my views were formed back in early childhood. It’s something ingrained at a subconscious level.
So, please forgive me for my past stubbornness.
I understand and can empathize with your views, I just have disagreements on certain aspects. These of course are colored by both of our upbringings, you within the Soviet Union and me entirely disconnected from socialism.
I very often fill gaps in my theoretical knowledge with personal experience—please forgive me for that!
I would also like to note that the interpretation of Marx's theory in the USSR was somewhat simplified. For instance, the USSR acknowledged the existence of a primitive communal system but not the "Asiatic mode of production." I only heard about the latter recently. I would like to highlight this aspect; perhaps the key to what is currently happening in China lies there.
Given that my knowledge of Marx's theory is superficial—and considering that Marx did not outline a precise model for constructing socialism (his work was largely a theoretical analysis of capitalism and its consequences)—it is worth noting that philosophy never sets concrete tasks for the individual.
Regarding your view of Marx's philosophy, I can also point out an inaccuracy. You state that Marx envisioned the construction of socialism only within the context of developed capitalism, based on highly advanced productive forces.
However, that is not entirely the case. In a letter to Vera Zasulich (dated March 8, 1881),
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%97%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%83%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%87,_%D0%92%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B0_%D0%98%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%B0
Karl Marx stated that Russia could bypass the painful stage of capitalism. He emphasized that his theory was not a universal historical prescription and that the Russian peasant commune could, under certain conditions, become the nucleus of socialist development. Marx told Zasulich at the time that education was one of the most crucial factors in the possibility of bypassing the agonizing stage of capitalism.
The bottom line is this: Lenin and Trotsky supported the NEP, whereas Stalin sided with "Zasulich." Stalin turned out to be entirely right, and he did not deviate from Marx's theory by even a millimeter.
In the preface to the 1882 Russian edition of the Manifesto, Marx and Engels say that the Russian commune could “pass directly to the higher form of Communist common ownership” only if the Russian Revolution (which he saw as inevitable, though it was not inevitable that it would "take[] place in time" (first draft of letter to Zasulich), and in the Letter to Otecestvenniye Zapisky he says that if Russia continues on its path, it will have lost this chance to skip the phase of capitalist development) is supported by wider revolution in the West. Otherwise, the Russian commune “must [] first pass through the same process of dissolution such as constitutes the historical evolution of the West.”
There’s zero approval by Marx here for the notion of skipping the phase of private production/property in one country without a wider revolution.
No he didn’t.
You misinterpret Marx's statement. I'm fully aware of Marx's views on the Russian commune movement, the problem is that you assume the Soviet model is what Marx was referring to, and that a more classically Marxist understanding of socialism was not what he meant. Marx was fairly explicit in what a socialist state would be, one where public ownership is principal and the working classes control the state. The Russian peasantry could have bypassed the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and went straight to a dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, but they would not be able to avoid the problem of transitioning small ownership to large, industrialized ownership without the aid of markets.
The fact of the matter is that private property existed de facto in the USSR. One of the mistakes of former socialism was merely trying to punish private ownership, rather than subordinate it to the public sector. Marx analyzed markets as being enormously useful in stitching together all of the small owners and building up productive forces, and public ownership as being superior at running large industry.
Stalin ending the NEP early was a matter of survival, and was correct. China's conditions are different, and now occupies a more classically Marxist economy. It isn't even the same as the NEP, China was closer to the NEP under Mao, the socialist market economy of China is a more classically Marxist economy, with the ability to be so precisely because the imperialists cannot afford to decouple from them.