Military

I know that the situations aren’t the same (more different than similar, honestly), but earlier I was reading a reassessment of the vastly overrated Axis Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and I could not help but be reminded of this:

Although the [Axis] had lost heavily since 26 May, with 9,568 Italian and 12,430 German casualties, by 30 August a massive supply effort by the Italians gave Rommel sixty-seven infantry battalions (including thirty-nine Italian), 536 guns (336 Italian), 515 tanks (281 Italian), 119 armoured cars (72 Italian), and 777 aircraft (427 Italian).⁷¹ But he squandered them in an attack with no prospect of success, against [an Allied] enemy alerted by Ultra and without his Italian intelligence.

By 3 September, he had taken 2,450 additional casualties, lost 50 guns and 400 AFVs, and wasted 10,000 tons of fuel. As early as 7 July Cavallero had foreseen disaster, and two months later Rommel delivered it. Having used up his fuel and reinforcements, he now adopted the same system of capisaldi (‘strong points’) used by Graziani in 1940, and for the same reasons.

Too weak to attack, lacking the resources for a viable mobile defence, under orders not to retreat, and unable to construct a defence in depth, the Axis forces could only await the inevitable [Allied] attack, and hope to survive it.⁷²

(Emphasis added. Source.)