I've been wondering whether nationalism is inherently a left-wing or a right-wing ideology.
Historically, the answer doesn't seem obvious. During the French Revolution, nationalism was largely associated with the Left. It challenged monarchy, aristocratic privilege, and the old dynastic order by arguing that sovereignty belonged to the nation rather than to a king. In that context, nationalism was a revolutionary and emancipatory force.
Today, though, the picture seems much more complicated.
In many countries, nationalism is primarily associated with the Right: conservative movements, anti-immigration politics, cultural traditionalism, or ethnic conceptions of the nation. Examples could include much of the contemporary European far right or various forms of right-wing populism.
At the same time, there are clearly left-wing nationalist movements. Irish republicanism is probably one of the best-known examples, where nationalism has often been intertwined with socialism, anti-colonialism, and labor politics. Similar patterns can be found in other anti-colonial or national liberation movements.
What's even more interesting is that the same national movement can contain both right-wing and left-wing currents.
Ukraine seems like a good example. There is an explicitly right-wing nationalist current, represented by groups such as Azov and similar organizations, emphasizing military traditions, conservative values, and ethnic nationalism.
But there is also a distinctly left-leaning current of Ukrainian nationalism, often represented by younger activists and parts of civil society. Their understanding of national identity is frequently combined with feminism, LGBTQ rights, decolonial theory, and other progressive ideas. Ukrainian feminism, for example, draws on a long tradition of influential women writers and intellectuals, while decolonial studies have become increasingly important in interpreting Ukraine's relationship with the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.
Am I missing something here, or is nationalism better understood as a politically neutral framework that can be adopted by both the left and the right?
I think Lenin's framework is interesting, but I would be careful about taking it at face value, because the historical practice of Leninism complicates the picture quite a lot.
The distinction between oppressed and oppressor nations is a useful analytical tool, and I agree that nationalism does not have an identical meaning in every historical context. A national movement of a people trying to escape imperial domination is not the same thing as the nationalism of an imperial power trying to maintain control over other peoples.
However, the problem is that Lenin himself did not always treat the right of self-determination as an unconditional democratic principle. He was quite explicit that recognizing the right to secession was also a political strategy something that could reduce resistance to the new state and make voluntary unity more likely. In other words, the promise of self-determination was not only about respecting national rights, but also about creating conditions where those nations would choose to remain within a socialist framework.
This becomes especially important when looking at what happened after 1917. The Bolsheviks proclaimed the right of nations to self-determination, including the possibility of secession, but when Ukraine and other nations of the former Russian Empire actually attempted to use that right, the situation changed very quickly. Ukrainian independence movements, as well as movements among other non-Russian peoples, were opposed militarily by the Bolshevik government. This suggests that the principle was applied differently depending on whether national self-determination threatened the new central authority.
That is why I think the Norway–Sweden example is more complicated than it first appears. It works well as a theoretical example of how socialists from a dominant nation should behave toward a weaker nation. But the situation of Ukraine in 1917–1921 was different: Ukraine was not simply another independent country seeking recognition; it was part of the territory over which the Bolsheviks were trying to establish a new political order. The question was no longer only about supporting self-determination, but about whether that self-determination could actually limit the power of the revolutionary state.
This does not mean that Lenin's distinction between oppressor and oppressed nations is useless. I think there is still an important point there: nationalism from a position of domination and nationalism from a position of resistance are not the same thing. But the historical lesson is also that even a theory built around liberation can become a political instrument when the people applying it have their own state interests.
So I would separate two things: the idea that leftists should oppose imperial domination and support the right of nations to decide their own future which is a principle that can be defended independently and Lenin's own political strategy, where the recognition of that right was often conditional on whether it helped or hindered the revolutionary project.
Ukraine is a difficult example, and I think we can safely say that the Soviet approach didn't work, and that's a key example that we can look at when evaluating the theory.
Like you said, Lenin's approach in practice wasn't consistent with his theoretical arguments. The approach was supposed to be a compromise between those concerns, as well as strategic concerns (the risk of divide and conquer) and political concerns (different factions calling for different things). But whatever his intents or justifications, the fact that Ukraine is such a mess today says that something went wrong in a big way.
It's easy to say that Ukraine should have just been given full independence, and that's probably correct, but we also don't know for sure what would've happened. What implications would that have had for WWII? Perhaps the strategic difficulties would have been offset by presenting a better image to other countries and getting more support.
Applying the theory to the present conflict gets even messier. In theory, Ukraine being independent would be a good thing, but in the current conflict it's really more about which sphere of influence it's in. The question of what to do when there's a secesionist movement within a nation that's not fully developed is particularly thorny. I really can't see any way things could work out for that region, unfortunately, so my stance is just to leave it alone.
In general, it's an enormously difficult and complex question, especially in practice, and the best we can do is to try to establish basic guidelines in the abstract, while looking at each situation case-by-case.