Materialism is not about "matter" in the physical sense but in the philosophical sense, which is some observable thing identifiable in a discrete empirical observation based on its observables. That is how it will be used here, not to refer to particles with mass specifically, which is the physical definition.
The materialist philosopher Friedrich Engels described materialism as about "matter in motion," because we do not just believe in matter, which is the ontology of the world, but also that this matter is never static and it is constantly changing, i.e. it has dynamics, motion.
The dynamics, the "motion," is part of the nomology of the world, that is to say, it is part of the laws of physics that govern the motion of matter. There are no external, non-material objects that "cause" matter to behave in the way it does, rather, it is just in its nature to do so, and the point of the material sciences is to study and uncover the nature of matter, as well as to even figure out how to properly characterize it.
Physicalism arguably arose with the discovery of fields in the mid-1800s by Faraday and Maxwell. If you scatter some iron filings around a magnet, they will conform to the force lines of the field. Physicalists reified the mathematics of the field into a physical object, into the ontology of the world, saying that fields really do exist as an object in the world that "causes" particles to respond to it in the way that they do.
This does not qualify as "matter" and so it is not materialist because fields are not defined in terms of their observable properties. You cannot observe a field. You observe the effects of the field. You observe the iron filings conform to the force lines of the field and assume the field is causing them to do that.
However, fields can just as well be treated as part of the nomology of the world. We can say it is merely in the nature of the iron filings to conform to the force lines described by the mathematics of the electromagnetic field when they are near a magnet. The mathematics of the field is not interpreted to be an ontological thing, but a way to describe the dynamics of the filings. They just do that, and we can capture what they do in this mathematical model.
Why should we think about things in this way? Because physicalism leads to a metaphysical abyss which I have never seen a physicalist give a good counterargument to.
You see, if we reify parts of the nomology by moving them into the ontology, i.e. if take parts of the mathematics that describes the motion of matter and reify it into onologically-existing objects in the world, then your ontology becomes ambiguous and contingent entirely on historical coincidences.
This is because you can always reformulate the mathematics in a way that is mathematically equivalent, and thus makes the same empirical predictions, yet if you were to reify it, would imply a different ontology about the world.
- Electromagnetic dynamics can be reformulated using Wheeler-Feynman absorber theory which makes the same predictions without a mathematical field.
- Einstein's notion of spacetime in special relativity can be reformulated using Lorentz's theory which makes all the same predictions without the mathematics of relative space and time (by instead treating the one-way speed of light as relative).
- Quantum mechanics can be reformulated without having to invoke a wavefunction at all, and in fact this was the original formulation by Heisenberg called matrix mechanics.
Physicalists love to reify things in the mathematics, so they reify the field, the "fabric" of spacetime, and the wavefunction, as all real objects part of the ontology of the world. But, as mentioned in the list above, all of these theories can be mathematically reformulated in a way that is mathematically equivalent and makes all the same empirical predictions yet does not have these features, but different features.
Since they make the same predictions, the scientific method has no ability to distinguish between them, and so your ontology is solely contingent on historical coincidence. The reason you believe in fields as ontological entities, or ontologically relative spacetime, or the wavefunction as an ontological entity, is solely because that was the mathematics your society happened to be popularized first, but an alien species may popularize a different formulation first and thus have a very different notion of the ontology of the world.
The ontology then becomes arbitrary and ambiguous, seemingly derivative entirely of historical circumstances.
However, if we stick to materialism, this isn't a problem, because the mathematics is not treated as ontological to begin with but nomological. It doesn't matter if you can reformulate the mathematics without the mathematical construct of fields or relative space and time or the wavefunction, because these are just part of the nomology anyways to predict the motion of matter, and if the theory really is mathematically equivalent, you would predict the same dynamics from it, and so it would imply nothing different about the world.
I would argue that the majority of the confusion around the "weirdness" of quantum mechanics is derivative of physicalism, people's obsession with trying to reify things like the invisible wavefunction.
As Jacob Barandes has shown, the wavefunction can be shown to be mathematically equivalent to a description of a system that evolves according to stochastic dynamics where those stochastic dynamics are non-Markovian, i.e. the wavefunction can be understood to be part of the system's nomology, not its ontology, it captures something about how matter moves, its dynamics, but is not a physical object.
Indeed, the height of the metaphysical abyss of physicalism is the Many Worlds Interpretation, which not only reifies invisible entities like the wavefunction, but then turns around and denies the existence of matter. They thus deny what materialists associate with the ontology of the world while reifying the entire nomology into the ontology.
This leads you to a confusing situation where your beliefs about the ontology of the world consist of nothing with observable properties at all. It is the most incoherent philosophical view possible, yet is taken seriously by physicalists because physicalism has become so dominant with hardly anyone sufficiently criticizing it.
I am not the only one to have noticed this problem. Below, the physicist Carlo Rovelli also points out how the Many Worlds Interpretation bizarrely does not posit anything to exist in the world with observable properties:
The gigantic, universal ψ wave that contains all the possible worlds is like Hegel’s dark night in which all cows are black: it does not account, per se, for the phenomenological reality that we actually observe. In order to describe the phenomena that we observe, other mathematical elements are needed besides ψ: the individual variables, like X and P, that we use to describe the world. The Many Worlds interpretation does not explain them clearly.
It is not enough to know the ψ wave and Schrödinger’s equation in order to define and use quantum theory: we need to specify an algebra of observables, otherwise we cannot calculate anything and there is no relation with the phenomena of our experience. The role of this algebra of observables, which is extremely clear in other interpretations, is not at all clear in the Many Worlds interpretation.
— Carlo Rovelli, “Helgoland: Making Sense of the Quantum Revolution”
The philosopher Tim Maudlin also has a whole lecture on this problem:
If we stick with strict materialism, then the fact you can reformulate these theories in different ways is unimportant, at least as far as natural philosophy is concerned, and so much of the mystery and debate around these theories disappears.
This leaves me with an apparent crossroads. Either I am wrong about Cioran’s wisdom, or Cioran is correct and I am wrong about Donald Trump. Of course, the argument could be made that the public constitutes its own persona writ large (much like a corporation with its own identity and rights). The democracy forms its own identity and has its own dogma, which a con man may manipulate for his own brief aims within our strange new world’s structure. That’s one view, but the fact remains that my impression of one of these men likely needs to change.
(above) Juan de Torquemada of the Spanish Inquisition
(above) Gaius Caesar Augustus Germanicus a.k.a. Caligula
This does not necessarily imply the con man is empty; rather he may believe in himself with dogmatic ferocity. Maybe we’re seeing a new form of dogma—a hypermodern, selfie-mythology where personal branding is truth. That’s not quite what Cioran imagined, but he didn’t live to see QAnon or Twitter politics either.
