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A newly discovered problem with the Apache helicopter’s transmission is plaguing the Army’s fleet, just as funding woes have pushed the service to drastically cut flight hours and rapidly retire older variants of the combat helicopter, Defense One has learned. An Army investigation has indicated that “some AH-64E [improved drive system] main transmissions can experience an internal failure resulting in loss of accessory gearbox drive, which can result in loss of tail rotor thrust, electrical power, and hydraulics,” according to an April internal safety document reviewed by Defense One. “The root cause is still under investigation.” The safety document said “All AH-64E series aircraft” are affected, and instructed the service to “ground affected [improved drive system] main transmissions” until more guidance is provided. The service confirmed the investigation, but declined to say when the transmission problem was discovered and how many helicopters were affected. A spokesman for Boeing, the Apache’s manufacturer, declined to comment. “The Army has identified a potential transmission issue involving the AH-64E helicopter,” a service spokesperson said in an emailed statement. “We are actively collaborating with the manufacturer to conduct a comprehensive investigation to determine the root cause of the problem.”

The Apache transmission investigation comes as the Army leans heavily on the combat helicopter for the war in Iran, sends them to foreign militaries, transports celebrities and administration officials in them, and plans to upgrade them into high-tech drone hunters for future conflicts. At the same time, other internal documents reviewed by Defense One revealed that the service’s III Armored Corps is heavily reducing its flight hour program and is quickly divesting the older AH-64D model to overcome funding woes. The AH-64E has been involved in several incidents stateside and abroad in recent months. One Apache pilot said the combination of the helicopter’s transmission problems and the service’s push to reduce some flight hour programs is a brutal combination, particularly amid seemingly continuous maintenance woes. “It's a double-edged sword,” the Apache pilot said. “You're getting less money in these budgets, at the same time, you're having more maintenance problems, which cost more money, but the money's not there.”

There have been at least three Apache incidents within the last three months. In March, an AH-64E, the latest Apache variant, crashed during a training exercise at Fort Rucker, Alabama, leaving two crew members injured, several local media outlets reported. Last month, another Apache made an emergency landing in rural Alabama following an in-flight problem, one local TV station reported. That same month, another Apache crashed at Fort Hood in Texas during a maintenance flight, according to photos and information one pilot provided to Defense One. Last week, another Apache made a similar precautionary landing outside of Camp Humphreys in South Korea, Stars and Stripes reported. An Army spokesperson declined to confirm a timeline of recent Apache incidents and wouldn’t say whether they were tied to the transmission problems. “While we have gathered some preliminary findings, we are currently withholding these details to prevent any unnecessary speculation while the investigation is still in progress,” an Army spokesperson said in an email.

Less money, more problems

The ongoing investigation into the AH-64E’s transmission comes as the Army works through sudden funding challenges that have pushed some units to drastically reduce flying hours and divest the older helicopter variant, internal documents reviewed by Defense One show. Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., hinted at the issue during a Senate Armed Services hearing last week, and said the Homeland Security Department’s domestic missions have caused funding headaches for the Army. “The Army is facing a nearly two-billion-dollar readiness shortfall, largely because DHS has failed to reimburse the Army for border support missions,” Reed said in his opening statement.

holy shit they're literally grinding the US military down in fucking border control bullshit!? genuinely some of the stupidest motherfuckers to have ever ruled a country, jesus christ

“The committee will want to understand what that means in concrete terms. I have received concerning reports about the potential for cancelled training rotations, grounded flight hours, and reduced Guard and Reserve training resources.” One internal memo shows that’s the case for the aviation units of the Army’s III Armored Corps. The funding for the III Corps flying hour program was to be decreased by about $46 million, “effective immediately,” due to “operational requirements,” according to an April 26 internal memo reviewed by Defense One. To meet minimum aviation requirements, the III Corps commander transferred $26.6 million from the funds used for armor training to its aviation units, the memo said. The formation recognizes that the sudden shift in funds comes with risks, according to the memo. The III Armored Corps “accepts the secondary effects of degraded combined arms support for Division [Armored Brigade Combat Teams and Combat Training Center] rotations, and the long-term career stagnation for Warrant and Company Grade officers resulting from a constrained [flight hour program],” the memo said. “Rebuilding this combat proficiency is estimated to take 12+ months.” III Corps officials will "tightly manage” the flight hour program on a monthly basis, with plans to “restrict all non-essential flying” and to issue waivers for not hitting flight hour minimums, the memo said. Missions that are exempt from the flying-hour restrictions are the Southwest border mission, transportation for the 1st Infantry Division, cadet summer training, and flights tied to the modernization of the AH-64E and divestments of the older D models.

“The Army has issued guidance to subordinate commands – for the remainder of this Fiscal Year, make tough, sound resource decisions that optimize and prioritize resources toward their most critical requirements,” the service spokesperson said in an emailed statement. “Army commanders are taking all necessary measures to prioritize critical readiness and operational requirements, ensuring we operate responsibly within the funding levels currently in place. We continuously analyze and assess funding across the force to ensure the Army remains agile, prepared, and ready to defend the nation.” The Army’s III Corps will "divest all AH-64Ds to achieve cost saving" by June 15, the memo said. Officials must also “cancel all static displays and flyovers” for the rest of the fiscal year. The service was already retiring the older models as part of its Army Transformation Initiative and its pivot to the upgraded Apache models. The Apache pilot said the sudden push to reduce time in the cockpit and the persistent mechanical problems with the AH-64E could be a deadly combination. “Aircraft are going to break, that's kind of a given in this life, but it feels like a snowball effect,” the pilot said. “We have lower-hour cockpits and lower-hour piloting commands because they can't get the training they need, and then, in my own personal opinion, you see an uptick in incidents when you see a downtick in flight hours.”

Yesterday Rybar posted two updates on the west Zaporozhie and south Kharkov sectors of the front line. Coincidentally the day after I posted skeptically about those sectors myself and called them out for laundering Ukrainian propaganda, but I digress. And - predictably for mappers - they doubled down. In West Zaporozhie, Rybar marked up Stepnogorsk - a town with a number of comblock apartment buildings in its center and generally a solid defensive stronghold - as having been largely cleared by the AFU. Their evidence for this? The same Ukrainian propaganda video I posted two days ago - a heavily blurred mess showing a handful of AFU troops dismounting from two APCs in a low-rise suburb, which was accompanied by a text claim of having seized the town from the Russians. They're quite explicit in their post that this video alone was what led to them making this assessment. As I pointed out in my original post, it's likely this small group of Ukrainian infantry was killed by an airstrike shortly after dismounting - they certainly haven't been seen or heard from since after likely attacking during low-visibility conditions on or about May 4th. Alternatively they may have attacked during heavy cloud cover during the May 15-18 timeframe, which would make the video VERY recent - and its release a reckless breach of operational security regardless of the amount of blurring being done. In any event it shows nothing more than a squad attack well outside the town center of Stepnogorsk, conducted in low-visibility conditions that hinder drone operations. Significant portions could have easily been shot elsewhere and edited in. Rybar accepted the Ukrainian claims without question regardless, marked up their map, and posted some defeatist commentary to go with it. Earlier today, the Russian unit operating in the area publicly denied the claim and posted a video of them attacking a couple small handfuls of Ukrainian infantry with drones in a rural area and the outskirts of a settlement, and destroying a couple AFU trucks on country roads. Rybar does not seem to have consulted them on the matter. As of this writing, no Ukrainian flags have gone up in Stepnogorsk.

Now to Borovaya. Yesterday Rybar reverted their map (where they had previously marked up a very small Russian control zone in the eastern outskirts of the town based on geolocated video) and straight-face claimed that Russian troops had assaulted and actually taken the town in late April, but then had their supply lines cut off by the AFU (somehow) and been forced to retreat. The Russian General Staff then apparently decided to announce the town had been seized regardless, for some reason. Rybar entirely missed this action - which must have been a considerable battle and presumably worthy of commentary at the time it was going on - while it was allegedly happening. They only posted this very strange narrative after having consulted with parties unknown after the status of Borovaya became a topic of discussion, and they again ran with a Ukrainian framing that acknowledged an attack had taken place but minimized Russian gains in the area. The Russian unit responsible has doubled down on their claim that they control all of Borovaya, and the AFU has provided no evidence that they continue to hold the town despite this actually being something of a hot-button topic right now.

I remind the reader that the AFU is quick to exploit the Russians getting over their skis with control claims. A couple weeks ago the Russians claimed to have seized the border village of Miropolia in Sumy Oblast, and within hours the AFU had a video out showing a couple of rather forlorn-looking infantrymen in the center of town with a Ukrainian flag. Perhaps they were doomed holdouts, perhaps this was a last bit of propaganda before the Russians swept through (the AFU's done that before) - but the point is that the AFU put video evidence on the table and made propaganda hay immediately when they had a chance to peacock and make the Russians look like liars. In these two much larger towns, in far more important front sectors? Crickets. Which brings me back to my original point. In both of these cases Rybar's map updates and analysis trailed and in fact conformed to Ukrainian propaganda framing and entirely ignored what the actual units responsible for these sectors had to say for themselves. And in both of these cases the evidence at hand does not fit the narrative that's being put forward. All of this suggests rather strongly that Rybar lacked any inside information from the Russian military on the front situation and in fact relied entirely on Ukrainian propaganda and/or discussions with Ukrainian propagandists to seed their analysis. And even then they didn't apply a lot of critical thinking to what they were getting!

Simply put, the Russian Army seems to have really tightened down on OPSEC recently and the leak vectors out of the front line that many voenkors previously relied upon have dried up - this is likely why they're still crying about the Starlink cutoff, by the way. That's an obvious way for journalists to extract information out of the front line and it's likely that was their means of communicating with sources. This goes back to something I say frequently when the fog of war thickens, as it appears to be thickening in Ukraine. Practice informational hygiene. Consider not just the sources you're getting your information from but where they themselves sourced it, and form your own opinions accordingly. And be aware that source quality can and does vary over time and between geographical and subject matter areas.

Bolivia’s right-wing President Rodrigo Paz has said he will reorganise his cabinet as he faces calls to resign amid weeks of widespread protests. During a news conference on Wednesday, Paz said he would reshuffle his ministers in a bid to ease tensions with antigovernment protesters.

“We need to reorganise a cabinet that must be able to listen,” Paz told reporters. Since taking office in November, Paz and his government have faced backlash to economic restructuring measures, including controversial cuts to fuel subsidies. The country is in one of its worst economic crises in decades. Protesters have taken to the streets to express frustration with Paz’s free-market reforms. His inauguration ushered in a period of right-wing leadership after nearly two decades of governance by the Movement for Socialism (MAS). Thousands of farmers, labourers, miners and teachers have denounced Paz’s reforms. Riot police clashed with protesters again in the capital, La Paz, earlier this week.

While Paz acknowledged frustrations in his remarks on Wednesday, his government has depicted the protests as dangerous and anti-democratic.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Fernando Aramayo said earlier in the day that the mass protests and roadblocks were aimed at destabilising the country and “disrupting the democratic order”.

Former leftist President Evo Morales, who continues to exert influence over the country’s politics, has expressed support for the demonstrations.

The Paz government, meanwhile, has accused Morales of fomenting unrest. The former socialist president faces charges of statutoryremoved and has an arrest warrant out against him. His allies, however, say the charges are part of an effort to remove him from political life.

The administration of US President Donald Trump has expressed support for Paz, whose election is seen as part of a regional shift to the right.

“Let there be no mistake: the United States stands squarely in support of Bolivia’s legitimate constitutional government,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in a social media post on Wednesday. “We will not allow criminals and drug traffickers to overthrow democratically elected leaders in our hemisphere.”

Paz also slammed Colombian President Gustavo Petro, who has frequently feuded with right-wing governments in the region, for recent comments describing the protests as a “popular insurrection”.

The Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on Wednesday that it would ask the Colombian ambassador to leave the country, citing interference in domestic political affairs.

“If they expel the ambassador simply for proposing dialogue and mediation, it means we’re sliding towards extremism that could lead to a very difficult situation for the Bolivian people,” Petro said in an interview with the local radio station Caracol.

The JS Special Economic Zone, the first SEZ comprising 2 separate countries, is the ruling classes solution to resolve the economic malaise facing both nations. The matter is that Johor has lived in Singapore shadow for the past half century - a reversal of the historical developments in which the Johor sultanate was always one of the richest and most powerful states across the Malay Peninsula. This is why Johor was explicitly allowed in the constitution to keep it’s own separate army during the formation of the federation. Singapore’s further rise corrupted these dynamics and projected a strong gravitational effect in the economy of Johor.

But as the last 30 years proceeded, Singapore’s full development of the island and continuous ongoing land reclamation projects faced a material reality: land is scarce. The economy has run too large and has lead to a breaking down of the tripartite social contract of the state, business and workers, where increasing land rents although very beneficial to government coffers, has also lead to considerable asset appreciation of the country’s HDB flats, which simultaneously benefits Singapore’s 90% home-owning population while making it harder for the houseless youth to obtain. The country has also realised, as much as it can invest in food security, it simply does not have the water or land for vast industrial agriculture to feed it’s population. Integration ensures that vital supply chains of energy, food, water and land remains accessible for Singaporeans in a fracturing global environment.

For Johor, the SEZ is to attract capital investments to ultimately stem (or atleast ease) the flow of Johoreans from migrating to Singapore for work, whether permanently or the daily commutes through the causeway. The state’s close proximity to Singapore distorts cost of living and inflation pressures, leading to the state facing both the highest living and property costs in the country despite near-average wage levels. It is also to bolster the industrial clusters formed in the state in the past few decades by both scaling up through the aforementioned investments, but also through linking with Singapore’s vast network and corporate prestige.

The explosion of data centres, the building of the Pengerang fully integrated petrochemical complex, further investments in industrial agriculture, health and aerospace manufacturing, is the state’s plan to stop living in Singapore’s shadow by enabling (high-paying) jobs. Obviously the success of the initiative is one thing, and whether it can also provide high-paying jobs is another big one, but the institutional support and enthusiasm seen from both sides of the causeway reflects the political will from the ruling classes.

One thing is for sure, Singapore’s social stability hedges upon PAP fulfilling the social contract of providing social housing (that guarantees long-term wealth) for a youth that sees it desperately escaping from their grasp. Public support of the SEZ in Johor correspondingly is thus dependent on resolving longstanding issues of cost of living and jobs. Perhaps if Singapore and Malaysia is able to both simplify movement across the border while simultaneously managing migration and cost pressures, both countries come out better. That is the gamble both sides are playing.